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ABSTRACT
KANT’S THEORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
SEPTEMBER, 1991
KEVIN E. DODSON, B. A. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff
The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant’s theory of the social
contract, which is the central concept of his political philosophy, provides,
when suitably reconstructed, an adequate theoretical foundation for liberal
democracy. I take liberal democracy to consist of three components: first,
the rule of law; second, democratic self-rule (either representative, direct,
or some combination of the two); and third, the recognition and
institutional guarantee of the rights of individuals.
In the dissertation, I take as my starting point Kant’s conception of
autonomy. For Kant, the idea of the social contract explains how
individual moral agents can maintain their autonomy in the context of
community. The social contract resolves the conflict between moral
autonomy and political authority by defining a model of civil society in
which free, equal, and independent rational agents collectively legislate
the public laws that are to govern their external relations, which are
essentially property relations. Ideal civil society, then, is a condition of
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The past two decades have seen an upsurge of interest in Kant's
long-neglected political theory. While Kant's stature as a political theorist
does not yet rival that of Hobbes or Rousseau in the English-speaking
world, we are finally beginning to recognize his contributions to political
philosophy. For far too long, commentators slighted Kant's politics in
favor of his many other contributions to philosophy, and while this was
understandable, it nonetheless did a great injustice to Kant's rich and
sophisticated thinking on the moral foundations of politics. With the
publication of several studies of Kant's political theory over the last two
decades, this injustice has now been rectified.^ As yet, however, no
commentator on Kant's political theory has focused on the all-important
idea of the social contract and provided us with a comprehensive account
of Kant's thought about this notion. Given the centrality of the concept of
the social contract to Kant's theory (and those of Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau), this is somewhat surprising. A clear and comprehensive
account of Kant's thinking on this matter is essential to an understanding
of his politics, and this is what I propose to provide in my dissertation.
My initial interest in Kant's political philosophy grew out of my
desire to ground my pre-philosophical commitment to liberal democracy.
It is my conviction that utilitarianism is incapable of providing an
1_ Among the most notable of these are: William Galston, Kant and the Problem of History ,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); Patrick Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983); Susan Meld Shell, The Rights of Reason: A
Study of Kant's Philosophy and Politics, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980),
and
Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
1
adequate foundation for liberal democratic theory and that only social
contract theory is up to the task. Kant's theory provides the most cogent
and philosophically sophisticated version of classical social contract
theory.
I take liberal democracy to consist of three components: first, the
rule of law; second, democratic self-rule (either representative, direct, or
some combination of the two); and third, the recognition and institutional
guarantee of individual rights. Thus, any defense of liberal democracy
must provide some account and justification of the rule of law,
democracy, and human rights. Of these three notions, I take it that the
third is logically prior to the first and second. The task of law in a liberal
democracy is to define and protect the rights of individuals within civil
society. The most fundamental of these rights is the right to participate as
a free and equal citizen in the collective decisions of that society. Thus, the
concept of right is the basic concept of Kant's politics. Kant's political
theory, however, is rooted in his ethics, and thus the concept of right is in
turn grounded in the autonomy of the will, which Kant declares in the
Grundlegung to be "the supreme principle of morality." Now the three
components of liberal democracy appear to be incompatible in practice.
For example, a majority may democratically enact a law that violates the
rights of individuals within civil society. Kant's theory, however,
provides a satisfactory resolution of this problem.
According to Kant, an individual is autonomous when she obeys
no laws except those she has given to herself, that is, when she is self-
legislating. Obedience to external legislation is heteronomy. This poses a
rather tricky issue in the justification of civil society. A law is essentially a
command, and political authority is the right to issue those commands
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and enforce thenn through the use of force. When one enters into civil
society, one subjects oneself to some authority. But this submission to
authority would appear to place us in a condition of heteronomy and be in
conflict with our own autonomy. How can we reconcile the right to issue
commands with the right to obey only those commands we have given to
ourselves? The reconciliation of these two conflicting requirements is
central to my project. If Kant's attempted reconciliation of these two
conflicting demands fails, then he cannot justify the moral legitimacy of
the rule of law and civil society itself; authority must give way to
autonomy.
For a utilitarian, the conflict between autonomy and authority
never arises. The rule of law is justified by its consequences for the social
balance of pleasure over pain (or whatever other standard a particular
variant of utilitarianism may employ). The autonomy of the individual
need not be considered, except insofar as it has consequences for that social
balance.
Though utilitarian theories may be capable of grounding the rule of
law, they are incapable of providing an adequate foundation for
democratic self-rule and the rights of individuals. Because utilitarian
theories are teleological in nature, democratic self-rule and individual
rights can be justified only in instrumental terms. That is, the rights of
individuals and democratic self-rule are justified only if they promote the
end specified by utilitarian theory.
Let us consider the theory elaborated by John Stuart Mill in
Utilitarianism as an example.2 The fundamental problem with Mill's
2- John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1983).
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theory in this regard is shared by all utilitarian theories, despite their
variations. Therefore, a brief discussion of Mill will enable us to examine
this difficulty with sufficient clarity and generality.
In simplest terms. Mill maintains that one should act so as to
produce the greatest amount of happiness in society at large. The amount
of happiness is a function of the relative quantities of pleasure and pain,
so that the greatest happiness is the greatest balance of pleasure over pain
in the society ar large. (Mill does distinguish between higher and lower
pleasures, but it is not clear that this distinction is tenable. Even if it were,
it would make no difference for my argument.) Those actions that
produce this result are right and those that do not are wrong. By
subordinating the right to the good. Mill forces us to justify democracy and
human rights in purely instrumental terms and thus only contingently.
Whether a society should be democratic or individuals should have
rights can be decided only by determining whether such a societal
organization would generate a greater balance of pleasure over pain than
any possible alternative. This type of justification is wholly contingent
and dependent on matters of fact. It is quite possible, however unlikely,
that the most rigid totalitarian regime could produce a greater balance of
pleasure over pain than its democratic counterpart. In principle, then, one
could argue along utilitarian lines that such a system is morally preferable
to liberal democracy. This point can be generalized to include all forms of
political organization, liberal democracy being only one among many. The
determination of the specific form of political organization appropriate to
a society would depend upon cultural, historical, and other empirical
considerations. Such considerations are certainly legitimate in
determining the specific form that liberal democracy is to take and how
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one should proceed in establishing it, but they are not legitimate
considerations in determining whether there ought to be democracy and
human rights in the first place.
The aforementioned point is readily apparent in Chapter Three of
Utilitarianism, "The Ultimate Sanction." From the point of view of
utilitarian theory, there is no intrinsic moral difference between a law that
is self-imposed and one that is imposed by external force; it is irrelevant
whether the law is the edict of a philosopher-king or the result of
democratic deliberation. Further, the content of laws is to be determined
solely by the principle of utility, unchecked by any prior conception of
rights. In fact, as Mill points out in Chapter Five ("Utility and Justice"),
the particular rights we are to enjoy in a society are themselves
determined by appeal to the principle of utility. If social conditions
change, our rights are liable to change along with them.
As conceived by the natural rights tradition and its historical
offspring, individual rights are universal and inalienable. According to
the American Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man, and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, one possesses rights simply by virtue of being human. The
Preamble to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
for example, asserts that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." Further, Article 1
states that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights." Later articles then attempt to specify those particular rights that
we all possess. The same discourse found in the Universal Charter can be
found in other texts governing human rights law. In a sense, then, I am
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attempting to spell out what must be the philosophical foundations of this
view and its associated political documents. Clearly, utilitarianism can
not provide this foundation.
If we are to provide a foundation for the universal validity of
human rights and democratic self-rule, then, we must turn to Kantian
social contract theory. In my Dissertation, I demonstrate how Kant’s
theory of the social contract provides an adequate grounding for the
universality of democratic self-rule and human rights. The connecting
thread throughout the dissertation is the idea of a social contract. Simply
put, my thesis is that the idea of the social contract is the central concept of
Kant's political philosophy and that his theory of the social contract, when
suitably reconstructed, provides an adequate theoretical foundation for
liberal democracy.
In Chapter Two, I provide the historical background needed for my
discussion of Kant's theory of the social contract. I survey briefly the
relevant doctrines of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, constructing out of
these a connected and coherent development that culminates in Kant's
own theory. In the course of this discussion, I point out the internal
tensions in their respective theories as well as providing a Kantian
critique of each of them.
Chapter Three is devoted to a discussion of the conceptual status
that Kant attributes to the idea of a social contract. In order to achieve
theoretical clarity, we must understand the types of concepts we are using.
Hence, a clear account of the nature of this concept is absolutely essential
to any adequate social contract theory; we need to understand what type of
concept the concept of a social contract is. Unfortunately, Kant's
predecessors (in particular, Locke and Rousseau) do not adequately discuss
6
the conceptual status of the idea of a social contract, a failing of which Kant
is not guilty. Kant maintains that the concept of a social contract is an
idea, a concept of reason. This account allows us to resolve certain basic
misunderstanding and provides a much-needed self-understanding to
social contract theory.
In Chapter Four, I examine our obligation to enter into the social
contract. Kant asserts that the social contract is the only contract we are
obligated to enter into and I explain why he thinks we have such an
obligation. He bases this obligation on the need for property as a
precondition of any action whatsoever. I also demonstrate how Kant
reconciles the autonomy of the individual with authority of state, while at
the same time justifying the existence of civil society.
Chapter Five is concerned with the content of the social contract. 1
begin with a discussion of Kant's underlying moral theory and then
proceed to the derivation of the a priori principles of justice that provide
the content of the social contract and link this content to Kant's
conception of autonomy. Further, I argue that we ought to look beyond
the apparent formalism of Kant's theory by pointing to Kant's own
recognition of the limitations of formal a priori principles and the
necessity of supplementing such principles with an empirically-rooted
understanding of actual social conditions. In connection with this, I
discuss the implications of the Kantian social contract for political
economy and argue that Kant's concept of autonomy provides both a
powerful tool for the critique of liberal democratic capitalism and a means
of effecting a rapprochement between liberalism and socialism.
In Chapter Six, I examine Kant's republicanism. Kant asserts that a
republican constitution provides the only legitimate form of government
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and argues for this claim by applying the a priori principles of justice to the
structure of the state. I first expound Kant's conception of the nature of a
republican constitution and then discuss the argument he makes on its
behalf. Further, I criticize his rejection of democracy as incompatible with
a republican constitution and locate this rejection in Kant's conflation of
his own terminological distinction between the form of sovereignty and
the form of government. Finally, I discuss Kant's assertion that the spread
of republicanism increases the prospects for world peace.
In Chapter Seven, I discuss the relation between the ideal and actual
civil society and point to certain internal problems with Kant's theory.
Specifically, I am concerned with our obligations towards existing civil
societies and their laws. Kant, the great spokesperson of moral autonomy,
argues that we have an absolute duty to obey the laws of whatever state
exists. Given the nature of existing states, this duty would involve the
abdication of moral autonomy and place us in a condition of heteronomy.
I will critically examine Kant's rationale for his position and then provide
a more satisfactory, alternative Kantian account.
In the eighth and final chapter, I examine Kant's philosophy of
history as it relates to his political theory. Kant sees human history as
progressing towards the achievement of the true social contract. Thus, I
link Kant's political theory with his views on history, which provide the
capstone to his theory. In a sense, Kant's theory of history is an attempt to
resolve the third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason at the societal
level.
One final comment about my interpretive approach to Kant's
corpus is in order. In his politics, Kant is at best a paradoxical thinker, a
man who denied the right to revolution and yet supported both the
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American and French Revolutions. His views present a disturbing and at
times contradictory mix of the conservative authoritarianism of Hobbes,
the liberalism of Locke, and the radical democratic and emancipatory
politics of Rousseau. From Hobbes, he derives his opposition to
revolution and his commitment to existing civil societies; from Locke, he
derives his commitment to natural rights and his emphasis on property as
the basis of civil society; and he is indebted to Rousseau for his notion of
the general will. I intend to sort out all these conflicting lines of Kant's
thought and present a reconstruction of what I take to be Kant's strongest
position on the issues. My reconstruction will be at variance with Kant's
own statements at certain points, and these discrepancies will be duly
noted. Nonetheless I think my reconstruction does present a coherent,
defensible strand of Kant's thought.
In order to remain within the general framework of Kant's theory, I
will proceed with my reconstruction in the following manner. First, I will
present Kant's position on a particular subject, or at least what I take to be
the dominant view expressed in the text. I will then present a critique of
that position. I will finish by proposing and arguing for a revision of
Kant's position as a response to that critique. Both my critique and
proposed revision will be internally generated; that is to say, I will rely
primarily on the textual and theoretical materials that Kant himself
provides by paying careful attention to internal inconsistencies and lines
of thought that Kant suggested but failed adequately to pursue and
develop. Kant often stakes out bold positions only to step back and
weaken them in the next breath; my task is the elimination of these
regressions in order to display the essential core of Kant's thought. I have
been forced to play the archaeologist in this effort, excavating the textual
9
materials in order to expose in bold relief the doctrines embedded within.
In doing so, I have tried above all to remain faithful to Kant's spirit.
It may seem to some readers that I have granted myself excessive
license in reconstructing Kant’s political theory and that I should confine
myself to expounding what Kant actually thought and wrote. To this
objection, I have only one defense. Any interpretation of the work of a
great philosopher is inherently anachronistic in that it unavoidably
involves reading that philosopher in the light of one's present concerns.
In fact, past philosophers are alive and important to us today only to the
extent that their writings permit and even invite such a reading, for if they
do not address provocatively and incisively the same philosophical
problems that we ourselves are grappling with, then there is no sense in
applying ourselves as philosophers to the interpretation of their work.
Consequently, I can not rest content with a simple recounting of Kant's






The idea of a social contract has traditionally performed two
different functions, one historical and the other logical.^ Eirst, it has been
used to provide an historical account of the genesis of government, state,
and society in an agreement between individual persons or between some
previously constituted people and its sovereign. Second, it has been used
as a theoretical tool to explicate the nature and limits of political obligation
and authority. Though these two functions are distinct, they have not
always been clearly differentiated by contractarian theorists, but have often
been merged, producing a hybrid of political anthropology and political
philosophy. At times, a theorist will write as though the social contract
describes an actual event that both explains the origin of a government
and justifies some claim about the basis and extent of that government's
authority, while at other times he will appear to conceive of the social
contract as something else, though not always specifying clearly what that
something else is. One of the merits of Kant's theory of the social contract
is his provision of an explicit, well-developed account of the conceptual
status of the social contract based on a recognition of the aforementioned
distinction.
L For a useful survey of the contractarian tradition, see J. W. Gough, The Social Contract,
(London: Clarendon Press, 1957).
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I take it that there is an intrinsic value in understanding the nature
of the theoretical activity involved in any serious intellectual discipline.
The idea of the social contract is the central concept of any contractarian
theory, and we can never hope to attain clarity about this particular
theoretical approach without understanding the nature of that concept.
An account of the conceptual status of the contract, then, is simply an
essential component of theoretical self-consciousness, and the provision
of such an account is justified by nothing further than the need to
understand our own theorizing.
But an understanding of the nature of our conceptual apparatus is
more than just intrinsically valuable. In addition to providing some
account of the conceptual status of the social contract, a contract theorist
must provide some justification for our obligation to enter into the
contract, specify the content of the contract, and explain the relationship
between his theoretical contract and reality, in particular actually existing
civil societies. A theorist's response to our initial question in turn
determines the types of moves available to him in addressing these other
issues, as well as generating its own problems.
If the social contract is conceived as an actual event, then it faces
objections on the grounds of historical realism and transmissibility of
consent from one generation to the next. The plausibility of the theory
depends on whether such an event has ever or could ever take place, and
the theorist must be prepared to argue for this. Further, the theorist will
have to explain how the legitimacy of the contract entered into can be
preserved past the first generation. For this reason, Locke, who does
conceive of the social contract as an actual event that did or at least ought
to take place, is forced to explain away the lack of any records of such an
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event and to provide some mechanism by which later generations that
were not a party to the original contract may enter into it.
But if we construe the social contract in hypothetical or ideal terms,
we must provide some other account of how this construction is to be
related to actual civil society and our duties within it. Finally, a difference
in such an account may affect the content of the contract. For example,
there were attempts to translate contractarian theory into practice by
actually drawing up and agreeing to one (the Mayflower Compact is a
notable instance) or by interpreting historical documents in contractarian
terms, as in the Settlement of the English Revolution.^ Assuming the
problem of transmissibility can be solved, these documents do provide a
determinate historical content that forms the basis of a real tradition.
Hypothetical and ideal contracts lack such a content. Therefore, some
alternative means of injecting content into the contractual form must be
found by using reason— instrumental reason in the case of the
hypothetical contract and substantive reason in the case of the ideal.
These points will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Before we embark on an exposition of Kant's theory of the social
contract, it will be useful to provide a brief account of the theories of his
most important predecessors. For purposes of brevity and clarity of
presentation, I will confine my remarks to the theories of Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Kant wrote against the
background of these thinkers, responding both to their insights and to
their failures; by understanding this background we can arrive at a deeper
appreciation of Kant's achievement. I intend to construct an account that
2- See Gough, The Social Contract .
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displays these theories as a development culminating in Kant’s own
theory of the social contract, and to a considerable extent, my
interpretation of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau will be governed by this
end. My account will serve to introduce certain issues and themes that are
central to the contractarian tradition in general and Kant in particular.
While I will be concerned with such specific issues as the conceptual
status of the social contract and the relation of property to civil society, the
larger, encompassing issue of the nature and limits of reason itself will
never be far from the surface, for no commentary on any aspect of Kant's
critical philosophy can ignore this question and still hope to do justice to
his thought. The controlling theme of this discussion will be the nature of
autonomy and the progressive development of this concept from Hobbes
to Rousseau. Autonomy is the central concept of Kant’s moral theory and
unites two different conceptions of freedom. Positive freedom is practical
reason itself, the capacity of reason alone to determine action, whereas
negative freedom is an agent’s independence from determination by
natural causation. Reason can be legislative only if one’s actions are in
some significant way independent of the natural course of cause and effect,
whereas human action can be independent of natural causation only if
reason is capable of legislating action. All events occur in accordance with
law; human actions, if they are to have some moral content, must be
determined in accordance with laws promulgated by reason and not laws
of natural causation.
From Kant’s point of view, the failure of his predecessors derived
largely from their failure to undertake a critique of reason itself. As a
result, they are unable to prove that reason can be anything more than, in
Hume’s words, a "slave of the passions." Reason must examine itself in
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order to determine the sources and limits of its own powers; "to criticism
everything must submit," and politics and law are no exceptions to this
demand.3 Only by means of such a critique can reason adequately ground
its own activities and achieve the necessary theoretical self-consciousness.
Kant's critique of reason, in both its theoretical and practical aspects,
enabled him to avoid some of the problems that plagued his predecessors
and clarify certain key issues.
B. Hobbes; Mechanism versus Reason
Hobbes opens his theoretical discussion in Leviathan with an
"examination of the Thoughts of man." According to him, all our
thoughts can ultimately be traced back to sense impressions, which are in
turn produced by objects. The qualities of the objects that cause our sense
impressions are "but so many several motions of the matter, by which it
presseth upon our sense organs diversly.'"^ This pressure produces a
motion in our sense organs that is then transmitted to our brains, "for
motion, produceth nothing but motion. "5 For the same reason, the
thoughts to which our sense impressions give rise are also nothing but
matter in motion. Matter in motion is the ontological basis of the
Hobbesian system, and to it all phenomena are reducible.
Our thoughts, of course, are not isolated atoms but are always a part
of a "trayne," in which each thought is connected with those that precede
and succeed it. Since each thought is just the motion of matter in the
3- Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 9.
4- Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (London: Penguin,1985), p. 86.
3- Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 86.
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brain, the connection between thoughts in this series is determined in
accordance with the causal laws governing the motions of matter. Thus,
each thought is caused by that which precedes it and in turn causes that
which succeeds it.
But there is another sense in which we can talk about the
connection of one thought to another, that is, logical connection. Here we
are concerned with reasoning, the drawing of conclusions from premises
in accordance with rules of inference. The necessity of connection here is
not causal but logical. One judgment entails another; it does not produce
or cause it. To this picture, we can of course add inductive and
probabilistic reasoning.
There is a practical correlate of our theoretical reasoning. Practical
reasoning is guided by the adoption of some end, which is a consequence
of our desires and aversions. Our desires and aversions reglate our
thought processes by directing us to "the Thought of some means we have
seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of
that, the thought of means to that means; and so on continually, till we
come to some beginning within our own power. "6
In Chapter Three, Hobbes distinguishes between two sorts of mental
discourse. The first type of discourse "is Unguided, without Designe, and
inconstant," whereas the second is "regulated by some desire, and
designe. In the latter, there is some "Passionate Thought, to govern and
direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or
other passion."8 This is Hobbes' conception of practical reason, but it is
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 95-6.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 95.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 95.
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difficult to see how Hobbes can fit this conception into his ontological
scheme. For Hobbes, practical reasoning is teleological in nature. If we
take Hobbes' mechanistic materialism seriously, however, teleological
reasoning is impossible. Our thinking is governed by causal laws in which
each thought is an event that is determined by those thoughts that precede
it and not some end at which our thinking aims.
Herein lies the basic problem for Hobbes: How do we reconcile
these two views of human thought? In the first, thinking is merely the
diverse motions of matter in the brain and is accordingly governed by laws
of natural causation. Each judgment is caused by the preceding one. But
the latter view is essentially different, for here we are concerned with
reason. Rational thought is governed not by causal laws but by rules of
inference; a judgment is not caused by preceding judgments, but is
inferred from them. While we do not always think or act rationally, we
must be at least capable of rationality if we are to acquire knowledge or to
act purposefully. We attempt to establish knowledge-claims by putting
forth arguments in which a conclusion is justified by reasons, either in the
form of the premises of a syllogism or in the form of empirical evidence.
This capability is the essential prerequisite of any scientific theorizing or
purposive action.
The main tension in Hobbes' thought, then, lies in the conflict
between mechanism and reason, and this gives rise to an ambiguity
regarding the guiding aim of his political theory. Hobbes is clearly
concerned with the nature of political authority, but it is not clear whether
his aim is simply to explain such authority or, in addition, to justify it.
That is, is Hobbes engaged in descriptive political science or normative
moral philosophy? If the former is the case, then we can construe Hobbes
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as attempting to describe the process by which political authority originates
and is sustained, while if the latter is the case, then Hobbes must be read as
arguing that we ought to enter into civil society and accept the obligations
such entrance involves. Hobbes is rather ambiguous on this point, and
there is certainly a textual basis for either reading. For example, in his
Introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes state that his aim is "To describe the
Nature of this Artificial! man (the sovereign)," though this description
involves an account of his "Rights and Just Power."9 Thus, we seem to
have both projects joined together in one, an attempt at describing
political authority that unavoidably involves normative concepts.
If we take seriously Hobbes' attempt to explain all phenomena in
terms of matter in motion, then we must adopt a positivist approach to
Hobbes and interpret him as providing a scientific account of de facto
authority. Hobbes was deeply influenced by the mechanistic natural
science of his time and attempted to construct a science of politics along
similar lines. The starting point of Hobbes' scientific model of politics is
matter governed by mechanistic laws of motion. On this basis, Hobbes
proceeds to construct an account of individual persons and their behavior
and then of the joining of these persons together in a commonwealth. By
construing the theory in this way, we are able to preserve the unity of
Hobbes' thought, but we do so at the price of depriving it of its normative
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 82.
For an example of this interpretive approach, see Andrezj Rap-ezynski, Nature and
Politics. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
IL For an interpretation of that questions the importance of mechanistic natural science for
Hobbes, see Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984). Strauss argues that Hobbes arrived at his moral and
political theory prior to and independently of his acquaintance with modern science. The
mechanistic foundation of his theory was a later addition that was grafted on to a pre-
existing theory.
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force. Ostensibly normative terms (such as 'right,' 'good,' etc.) are
ultimately defined in purely mechanical terms, thus draining it of the
prescriptive content the theory appears to have.
Hobbes' mechanistic materialism is simply incompatible with an
account of human action in terms of even prudential rationality.
Prudential norms are norms and, as such, presuppose an ability to
perform an action simply because one ought to perform it and not because
one is causally determined to perform it. Hobbes is guilty here of
confusing motives with causes, for as Bishop Bramhall points out in
Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, "motives determine not naturally, but
morally."^ 2 appropriate contrast here is not between prudence and
morality, but between reason and mechanism, prudence and morality
being different forms of rationality. This point is captured best by Kant's
distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. In Kantian
terms, prudential norms are hypothetical imperatives; they inform us of
the best means of attaining a given end and are the product of reason in its
instrumental capacity. Moral imperatives, however, are categorical,
commanding actions independently of ends derived from one's desires
and aversions, and are issued by a reason capable of self-legislation. Since
both are the products of reason and in that sense rational, what is at stake
here is a difference in the assessment of the powers of reason.
One might try to interpret prudential norms in terms of the
mechanistic laws governing human behavior, but such an interpretation
is dubious in the light of Hobbes' own theory ( as it imputes to humans a
12- Thomas Hobbes, The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, The English
Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. V, 1841, p. 279.
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level of automatic self-interested behavior in the state of nature, an
imputation that Hobbes rejects ) and renders such norms superfluous.
The real explanation of any action would involve an appeal to the
preceding motions of the basic components of matter, and once such an
explanation were supplied, no appeal to motives or reasons would be
necessary. Deliberation and reasons would be purely epiphenomenal and
irrelevant.
Hobbes himself indicates that his theory is not just descriptive, but
has some prescriptive force as well. At the end of the second part of
Leviathan ( Of Commonwealth ), Hobbes expresses his hope that "this
writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider
it himselfe, ....; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the
Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility
of Practice. Clearly, Hobbes conceives of his theory as more than just a
description of political society, but also as having some value for the
conduct of practical human affairs.
For the purposes of my presentation, I will interpret Hobbes' theory
as essentially prescriptive. I do this for reasons both internal and external
to Hobbes' theory. I do not see how the positivist reading of Hobbes can
account for the extensive use of prudential and purposive language (with
respect to human ends). So, for example, though an act of the will is the
As Bishop Bramhall argues, "if T. H.'s opinion were true that the will were naturally
determined by the physical and special influence of extrinsical causes, not only motives but
reason itself and deliberation were vain." (Hobbes, The Questions Concerning Liberty,
Necessity, and Chance, p. 279.) This is of course a controversial point that has been widely
debated in contemporary analytic philosophy. Since I am concerned here solely with
motivating Kant's position, I will not discuss these debates, but will content myself with
merely noting their existence and persistence.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 409.
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last appetite or aversion before acting, when deliberating about whether or
not we should perform a specific action, "the Appetites and Aversions are
raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequells of the
action whereoff we Deliberate."^ 5 Thus, our volitions, which are merely
appetites or aversions (i.e. motions in the brain), are governed by our
beliefs about the consequences of acting or not acting and the how these
consequences relate to our ends. Further, as we shall see, Hobbes
construes the "lawes of nature" as prudential norms and argues that one
ought to enter into civil society on purely prudential grounds.
Nor am I convinced that Hobbes' own attempted reduction of
mental activity to matter in motion is successful. Mental states are
essentially intensional, that is, they refer to something beyond themselves.
But matter in motion lacks such a character, for the states and processes of
matter just are and lack any referential component. Even an ingenious
interpretation such as Rapaczynski's at some point must appeal to mental
states for which no adequate reduction can be given.^6
Finally, Kant's theory of the social contract is prescriptive, and Kant
interpreted Hobbes as providing the same. For the purpose of providing
an exposition that highlights certain important issues, it behooves me to
follow Kant's lead.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 129.
Rapaczynski argues that, for Hobbes, political authority and obligation are rooted in a
type of self-fulfilling prophecy. Individuals mistakenly come to believe that they lack
sufficient power to resist a specific individual or set of individuals, but when enough
individuals acquire this belief, it in fact becomes the case that no individual is capable of
successful resistance. The source of this mistake can be traced to religious belief. I do not
see, however, how an adequate materialist reduction can be given of these mistaken beliefs,
nor, for that matter, of religious belief.
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Let us turn now to specifics of Hobbes' political analysis. Hobbes
transforms the unlimited rights of individuals into the unlimited right of
the sovereign, thus basing the most illiberal of conclusions on what would
appear to be impeccably liberal foundations. This places Hobbes in a rather
ambiguous position relative to the liberal tradition.
In the pre-political state, Hobbes tells us, organized society is
impossible as humanity is nothing but a collection of thoroughly
atomistic, self-governing individuals, each possessing the same right of
nature. Hobbes characterizes this right of nature as "the Liberty each man
hath to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his
own nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing
anything, which in his own Judgement and Reason, hee shall conceive to
be the aptest means thereunto."^ ^ While in this condition, no individual
has any obligations to any other individual. On the contrary, any
obligation on the part of one individual to another would constitute a
restriction of the liberty of that individual and thus would be incompatible
with the right of nature.
While all individuals possess absolute liberty to act as they see fit,
the "condition of meer nature" (Hobbes' expression for the state of nature)
is far from satisfactory. Each person seeks after the means of satisfying his
desires, but is opposed in this by other persons. In fact, power ( i.e. the
"present means to obtain some future apparent good") is defined in terms
of this opposition: "Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of
Body, or Mind."^^ This situation is aggravated by the natural equality
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 189.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 150.
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among individuals. Individuals are naturally equal in that any individual
is capable of killing any other individual, either alone or in league with
others. Consequently, every person is threatened by every other person.
In order to defend oneself against the threat posed by everyone else, one is
entitled to use whatever means one thinks necessary. Now since there is
nothing whatsoever that might not prove useful in the struggle for self-
preservation, each individual has by nature the right to everything. Thus,
there can be no such thing as property in a state of nature: "There be no
Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be
every mans that he can get; and for so long as he can keep it."^^ Since
everyone is equally entitled to everything, no individual alone can claim a
right to the exclusive use of any particular object. This produces an
inevitable clash of rights and wills as each individual attempts both to
appropriate for himself the means to defend his person and to preempt
any threats from other individuals. Consequently, the state of nature is in
effect a war of all against all; for even when there is no actual fighting,
there is the disposition to fight and no assurance to the contrary. Under
such circumstances, "the life of man" is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish,
and short."^0
Fortunately, human rationality is capable of conceiving a way of
quitting this mean condition. Reason is able to discern general rules or
"lawes of Nature," the most fundamental of which commands one to
defend oneself by all means possible, but also to seek peace, peace being the
best means of preserving one's life. From this, Hobbes derives the critical
^9- Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 188.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 186.
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second law of nature: "That a man be willing, when others are so too, as
farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary
to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty
against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.'’^!
Strictly speaking, these "lawes of nature" are prudential maxims of self-
preservation: "These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of
lawes; but improperly: for they are but Conclusions or Theoremes
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of
themselves;. "22
Thus, Reason dictates that, in order to preserve themselves and
attain a more contented life, individuals remove themselves from the
state of nature by creating a "visible power to keep them in awe," thereby
forcing them to keep their agreements and observe the laws of nature.
This power is created when individuals in a state of nature :
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon
one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by
plurality of voices, unto one; which is as much to say, to
appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person,
shall act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne
the Common Peace; and therein to submit their Wills, every
one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgement.
This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of
them all, in one and the same person, made by Covenant of
every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man
should say to every man, 1 Authorise and give up my Right
of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of
men, on this condition, that thou give up the right to him,
and Authorise all his actions in like manner.23
And thus a commonwealth is born.
21- Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 190.
22- Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 216-7.
23- Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 227.
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The sovereign established by this covenant is an "artificial person"
who represents the individuals within the commonwealth and acts by
their authority. Though the sovereign is the actor, the actual authors of
his actions are those he represents, and it is only by the authority they
have vested in him by virtue of choosing him as the sovereign that he has
the right of acting on their behalf. The sovereign is charged with
maintaining order and possesses absolute, unlimited authority to do
whatever in his judgment is necessary to secure the public peace, with all
citizens placing their powers at the disposal of the sovereign so that he
may effectively carry out this task. No subject has the right to resist the
decisions of the sovereign, for all subjects have transferred their respective
rights of judging and acting for themselves to the sovereign. If one were
to reserve the right of resistance to oneself, one would in effect continue to
exist in a state of nature. The sovereign arbitrarily determines the
distribution of property within the commonwealth, and no citizen of the
commonwealth can complain of being treated unjustly by the sovereign.
Since one is the author of all the acts performed by the sovereign and no
one can do an injustice to oneself, no one can suffer an injustice at the
hands of the sovereign. Because the commonwealth was instituted to
preserve the lives of those within it and it would be irrational for them to
give up the right of self defense , the only right that one retains in a
commonwealth is the right to defend one's life.
What are we to make of this account? Is Hobbes describing an
historical process that culminates in an actual event of covenanting or is
his account a purely hypothetical construction necessary for an
understanding of the nature of political authority and obligation? While
the latter view is certainly now the dominant one, the former
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interpretation does have some considerable history behind it and still
finds adherents today.24 Hobbes is ambiguous on this point, and both
interpretations have some textual basis. Therefore, I will present both
sides of this interpretive question and then state my own view on the
matter.
In some texts, Hobbes himself explicitly adopts the view that his
account of the genesis of the commonwealth is a hypothetical
construction. In response to the possible criticism that a state of nature has
never existed, Hobbes states that his account is not meant to be taken
literally as a description of a historical period or process, but is a
hypothetical construction of "what manner of life there would be, where
there no common power to feare."25 (Prior to this statement, however, he
does claim that the people in America can be appropriately characterized
as living in a state on nature.) Hobbes bases this construction on an
analysis of human nature. It is an "Inference from the Passions"26 and, as
such, is subject to empirical verification or falsification.27 The model,
then, describes what rationally self-interested individuals of a specific
nature would do if they found themselves in a state of nature with other
rationally self-interested individuals of a similar nature, a condition in
which there exists no political authority. The specific nature of these
individuals depends upon the constitution of their faculty of desire and
2^- See C. B. Maepherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1964) and Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975 ) for interpretations that treat Hobbes' social
contract as a hypothetical construction. For an interpretation of the Hobbesian covenant as
an actual event, see Michael Lessnoff, Social Contract, (London, 1986).
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 186.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 187.
27- Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 83, 186-7.
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aversion. This is a critical point, because the conditions that prevail in a
state of nature depend upon the types of individuals that compose it, that
is, the specific nature of their desires and aversions and the behavior to
which those give rise. One major criticism of the use of the concept of a
social contract focuses on the vacuity and flexibility that results from this
dependence. The conclusions one draws from the model depend upon
the manner in which one construes human nature; hence, one can draw
whatever conclusions one wants simply by depicting human nature in an
appropriate manner. This explains how Hobbes and Locke were able to
draw radically different conclusions by employing a contractarian model,
which would appear then to be useless because it is empty. I will discuss
this further later, so let us now return to the issue at hand.
On the other hand, Hobbes’ theory of political obligation does
appear to require that the members of a commonwealth enter into some
actual covenant, for he claims that there is "no obligation on any man
which ariseth not from some act of his own. "29. Political authority
involves the right to promulgate laws that are binding on the citizens
within the commonwealth. Laws are essentially commands issued by the
legitimate sovereign to his subjects: "And first it is manifest, that law in
general, is not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any
man, but only of him, whose command is addressed to one formerly
obliged to obey him."30 But one is "formerly obliged" to obey the
28- As one commentator puts it, "Barely stated, it is a mere formula which can be filled
with any content from absolutism to pure republicanism." G. D. H. Cole, "Introduction", in
Jean Jacgues Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, (London, 1973), p. xviii. See also
Gough, The Social Contract .
29- Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 268.
80- Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 312.
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sovereign only if one has covenanted to do so. This act of covenanting
occurs upon one's entrance into the commonwealth, wherein one
commits oneself to obeying all the laws enacted by the sovereign
authority: "But every subject in a Common-wealth, hath covenanted to
obey the Civill Law, (either one with another, as when the assemble to
make a common Representative, or with the Representative it selfe one by
one, when subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may
receive life;) And therefore Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the
Law of Nature."31 A violation of the law is a violation of one's covenant
and, hence, an act of injustice; in fact, for Hobbes, "violation of a
covenant" is the definition of injustice.32 Similarly, as one would expect,
the attribution of authority to the sovereign also appears to depend on the
existence of some actual covenant. Without an actual event in which the
sovereign is chosen by the parties to a covenant ( by majority vote at the
institution of the commonwealth, for example ), the sovereign appears to
have no basis on which to claim authority as the representative of those
parties, whose authorization his actions require. There appears,then, to be
substantial basis for interpreting Hobbes' social contract as an actual event.
Nonetheless, I think that such an interpretation is incorrect.
Hobbes describes two ways in which sovereign power can be acquired: by
institution ( or voluntary agreement); and by acquisition (or force). The
establishment of sovereign power by institution involves a covenant by
the members of the commonwealth, whereas the establishment of
sovereign power by acquisition is the normal course in human history
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 314.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 202.
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and is what Hobbes refers to when talks about citizens covenanting with
the sovereign "one by one." Hobbes employs the model of sovereignty by
institution as his paradigm in his analysis of political authority and
obligation, but maintains that the mode by which sovereign power is
established is irrelevant to the rights of the sovereign and the duties of his
subjects. A sovereign by acquisition possesses the same rights as a
sovereign by institution. With this assertion, Hobbes vitiates the need for
any actual event in which a multitude covenant together and legitimate
the de facto political authority of any realm. Such of course was Hobbes'
aim; the absolute need to prevent the overwhelming disaster of civil war
makes it imperative that individuals submit unconditionally to whatever
political authority exists. The historical origins of the de facto sovereign,
then, are irrelevant when considering his just powers. But even if
sovereignty has been acquired by force, there still appears to be some need
for an actual act of submission on the part of each member of the
commonwealth to serve as the ground political obligation.
But Hobbes' conception of the will is simply too weak to support a
moral theory in which consent generates moral obligations and
legitimates political authority.33 According to Hobbes, an act of the will is
merely the last appetite prior to an action, the appetite that is the cause of
that action. If our obligation to obey the law is derived from an actual
volition, from willing such an obligation, then, Hobbes is committed to
the claim that appetites are capable of creating obligations. Now it is
33- See Patrick Riley's discussion of Hobbes' political theory in his Will and Political
Obligation. (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1982). Riley argues that Hobbes'
concpetion of the will as appetite is an insufficient basis for his politics, but that Hobbes
makes his system work because "he does not use the concept of will as his definition
requires."
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difficult to see how a mere appetite can give rise to an obligation, but that
is what must be the case if we are to interpret Hobbes as asserting that the
authority of the sovereign requires for its legitimacy an actual act of
submission on the part of each member of the Commonwealth. However,
we face no such difficulty fitting appetites into an account of prudential
rationality, as long as they are divorced from the mechanistic
underpinnings that Hobbes provides them. Thus, just as we may interpret
the establishment of a commonwealth by institution as a hypothetical
construction, we may interpret the act of submission in a similar fashion.
Prior to any act of submission, an individual is in a state of nature vis a vis
the commonwealth and, thus, is subject to the depredations inherent in
that condition, as well as possessing an interest in exiting it. The act of
submission merely describes what a prudentially rational agent would do
in such a situation, especially when confronted with the overwhelming
power of the sovereign.
The account of consent that Hobbes supplies in Chapter V of De
Cive further supports this interpretation. According to Hobbes, even bees
and ants are capable of consent, which consists only in "ensuing or
eschewing the same things."34 Consent, then, is nothing more than the
desire for some object. But bees and ants are not capable of forming a
Commonwealth "because their government is only a consent, or many
wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civil government)
one will."35 The will of the sovereign is this "one will." But the consent
3^- Thomas Hobbes, Philosphical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, The
English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Vol. II, ed. by William Molesworth, p. 66.
35- Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, p. 66. Emphasis
is mine.
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of such creatures is "natural," for their "natural appetite is
conformable; and they desire the common good, which among them
differs not from their private."36 gut the consent of humans is not
natural but "by compact only, that is to say, artificial."37 Because their
wills are not automatically in conformity with each other but often in
conflict, human beings require that one will be imposed upon them by
some "common power" if they are to live in peace with each other. The
possession of the appropriate desire or appetite, the desire for peace, and
not any actual act of submission is all that is needed for consent to this
imposition.
From a Kantian perspective, Hobbes' hypothetical social contract
has significant shortcomings as a justification of the existence of civil
society and a model for its proper organization. These problems derive
from the nature of its construction, specifically the impurity of reason that
lies at its root. Hobbes operates with a purely instrumental conception of
reason, which, according to Kant, illegitimately construes reason as
subordinate to inclination. As a consequence, Hobbes can not attain the
universality he desires for his claims and reduces moral agents to a
condition of what Kant calls heteronomy, supplying them with only
hypothetical imperatives. Hobbes himself thought he could do no more
than that, but that is because he failed to apprehend the true nature of
reason.
There is a fundamental conflict at the heart of Hobbes' moral
theory. Hobbes enunciates two distinct conceptions of moral philosophy:
36- Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, pp. 66-7.
37- Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, p. 67.
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moral philosophy as the science of the laws of nature; and moral
philosophy as the science of good and evil 38 Yet there is considerable
tension between these two conceptions. On the one hand, Hobbes
declares that "The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternal."39 Thus,
moral philosophy as the science of the laws of nature would seem to
provide us with universal laws of action. Yet when we view moral
philosophy as the science of good and evil, a very different picture
emerges, for Hobbes' conceptions of good and evil are thoroughly
relativistic: "For these words of Good, Evil, and Contemptible, are ever
used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing
simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of Good and Evil, to be
taken from the nature of the objects themselves;"'^^ vVhat is good and
evil is a function of one's faculty of desire and hence will differ from
person to person and for the same person at different times.'^^ The object
of appetite is good, whole the object of aversion is evil. Further, appetite
and aversion are reduced to motions in the human mechanism; appetite
is the first beginning of motion toward an object, whereas aversion is the
same except away from the object. The direction of these motions will
depend on the particular constitution of a mechanism, which will differ
from mechanism to mechanism. Construed as the science of good and
evil, moral philosophy seems incapable of generating any universally-
valid laws. Thus, there is an incompatibility between the claim to
universality for the laws of nature and the basis on which these laws rest.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 215.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 215.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 120.
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 216.
32
Now one might argue that the law of good and evil is (like the law
of gravitational attraction) universal, even though its application varies
with the circumstances to which it applies. As far as the form of law is
concerned, this point is perfectly correct, but there is still a gap here
because the laws of nature are actually only maxims of prudence and thus
involve the positing of a specific end. The content of the laws of nature,
then, requires that there be some end that is universally recognized as
good, for otherwise these laws would not be "immutable and eternal."
Hobbes locates this end in the universal desire for peace based on an
overriding fear of violent death. If we carry out Hobbes' reduction to
matter in motion, we find that Hobbes postulates a drive to continued
motion on the part of human mechanisms. Pleasure and pain serve as
signifiers as to what furthers and hinders that motion. Thus, we desire
those objects that further the continued motion of the mechanism and are
averse to objects that hinder that motion. A science of good and evil
would serve to specify those objects that contribute to our continued
motion and those objects that threaten it. Certainly, peace is a condition
that contributes to the continued motion of all human mechanisms, and
therefore we can consider peace to be a universal object of desire and thus
universally good. Since all men agree that peace and the means of
achieving peace are good, the science of good and evil consists of laws that
are universally valid. Since these laws serve to specify the conditions
under which peace is to attained and subsequently maintained, they just
are the aforementioned laws of nature.
But there are problems with the reduction that enables Hobbes to
effect the reconciliation between his two conceptions of moral philosophy,
for it is simply not true that pleasure and pain are the accurate signifiers
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that Hobbes claims they are. Further, it is difficult to see how this
reduction can handle a conflict between immediate or short-term pain (or
pleasure) and deferred or long-term pleasure ( or pain ) without
introducing an account of prudential rationality that is inconsistent with
a materialist basis. But in keeping with my interpretive strategy here, we
can easily jettison this reduction and still retain the claim that the desire
for peace is universal, which alone is sufficient to make the reconciliation
work. Given the glorification of militarism and warfare throughout
human history, however, this is a very dubious assertion on Hobbes’ part.
Hobbes himself recognizes a strong desire for "glory" and "vaine-glory" on
the part of human beings, a desire that has traditionally been satisfied by
success in battle. Both glory and vaine-glory are based on assessment of
one's power, one's own in the former case and that of others in the latter.
Now physical strength and intelligence, in the form of tactical cunning
and strategic vision, are forms of power the successful exercise of which
will contribute to one's glory and vain-glory. Hence there would appear to
be no unambiguous desire for peace, but also a desire for war. The
empirical evidence certainly favors such a conclusion. If Hobbes is to
ground his claim that we ought to enter into civil society on our desires
and aversions, then any ambivalence or ambiguity in this area seriously
weakens his argument. But even if we grant that the desire for peace is
universal, the correct formulation of these laws depends upon human
nature, and thus we must make the further assumption that human
nature is universal and not subject to change over time.
Again, for Kant,the root of Hobbes' problem lies in his
subordination of reason to inclination. Hobbes conceives of reason as
purely passive; it is a slave of the passions, from which it takes direction.
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The precepts of Hobbes’ moral philosophy are prudential maxims derived
from a model of human interaction under hypothetical conditions. It is in
our self-interest to join civil society, as life outside it is "solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short." Thus, we are well-advised to submit to the
absolute authority of the sovereign that the commonwealth requires.
Hobbes, then, has provided us with what Kant calls a hypothetical
imperative, specifically a counsel of prudence. Counsels of prudence state
general rules for the achievement of happiness and are hypothetical in
form. Hobbes' argument for the existence of civil society amounts to the
claim that, given the type of creatures we are, if we want to achieve
happiness, we ought to covenant together and form a commonwealth.
The force of Hobbes' argument depends upon our acceptance of the end he
posits (though it is certainly hard to argue with solitary, poor, nasty
brutish, and short ) and on the truth of his depiction of human beings.
By pointing this out, I have certainly not refuted Hobbes. Hobbes
himself did not think he could accomplish any more than this, but this is
because he did not appreciate the active and spontaneous powers of
reason. Hobbes succumbed to:
the confusions of philosophers concerning the supreme
principle of morals. For they sought an object of the will in
order to make it into the material and foundation of a law; ...
instead they should have looked for a law which directly
determined the will a priori and only then sought an object
suitable to it."^^
As active and spontaneous, reason can provide such laws in the form of
categorical imperatives, imperatives whose binding force does not depend
'^2-lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1978 ), p. 66 .
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on one's inclinations or interests. Only categorical imperatives are moral
imperatives, according to Kant. Hobbes, then, is unable to provide a moral
justification for entrance into civil society; rather, he consigns agents to a
condition of heteronomy with respect to their desires and aversions. It is
with Locke that we begin to move beyond an account of reason as purely
passive and instrumental and begin to see reason as active with respect to
desires and inclination.
C. Locke: The Failure of Empiricism
In both the Essay Concerning Humane Understanding and the Two
Treatises of Government. John Locke makes a considerable advance from
the position of Hobbes to that of Kant, thereby marking an intermediate
point between the two. As a result of occupying this intermediate
position, there is considerable tension in Locke's thought, a tension which
he recognized but could never resolve. Locke is committed both to some
form of mechanism, though not the materialistic variety of Hobbes, and
also to a conception of persons as free agents. Locke recognizes that free
agency is required for moral responsibility. He is faced with the difficult
task, then, of combining mechanism with free agency, which "are not
very easy to be reconciled or made consistent."'^^ xhe conflict between his
empiricism and the need for some a priori foundations for morality is
closely connected to this issue. In the Second Treatise, Locke deploys a
notion of natural law that requires an a priori epistemic basis, yet the
epistemological postion he develops in the Essay, particularly his denial of
innate practical ideas, is incompatible with there being any such basis. It is
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (New York: Dover) p. 80.
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to Locke's credit that he acknowledged the existence of these tensions, and
though he failed to overcome them, his attempt to do so is illuminating.
In spite of certain similarities, Locke's account of the state of nature
differs considerably from that of Hobbes. According to both Locke and
Hobbes, a basic natural equality prevails in the state of nature; all power
and jurisdiction is reciprocal; there is neither subordination nor
subjection; and all persons have roughly similar abilities. The state of
Nature is a "state of perfect freedom" in which persons may "order their
Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit,
within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other Man."^4 But whereas for Hobbes
one is unconstrained in a state of nature except insofar as one is checked by
the physical force of another, there being no pre-political obligations
between persons, Locke holds that people in a state of nature are bound by
the laws of nature, which establish pre-political obligations. As we have
seen, Hobbes also employs the notion of laws of nature, but conceives of
them in purely prudential terms and grounds them in the self-interest of
rational agents. In the Hobbesian state of nature, every other person is a
potential enemy; hence one is not bound to respect their person or their
possessions. According to Locke, however, the laws of nature bind one to
a respect for other persons in a state of nature and thus place a check on
one's self-interest: "The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it,
which obliges every one; And reason, which is that Law, teaches all
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988), p. 269.
37
Mankind, who will but consult it, that being equal and independent, no
one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions."45
Every individual has the right to enforce the law of nature and
consequently rightfully possesses a power or jurisdiction over every other
individual. The right to enforce the law of nature involves the right to
punish violations of it ( which is possessed by everyone ) and the right to
recover damages stemming from such violations ( which belongs only to
the aggrieved victim of a transgression ); however this power is not
arbitrary, but is regulated by the law of nature. The severity of
punishment is determined by what is necessary to induce repentance on
the part of the transgressor and deter others from similar actions. This
situation is problemmatic, however. In interpreting the law, each
individual is influenced by his or her own self-interest; thus when
judging in one's own case, one will tend to favor oneself, one's friends,
and one's family to the disadvantage of others. Civil society is established
to remedy this shortcoming by creating a publicly known law
administered by impartial judges.
The law of nature serves as the basis for property rights for Locke.
Locke maintains that the world was originally given by God to humanity
in common for its livelihood and support, but in order to use some part of
the common for its intended purpose, one must inevitably exclude others
from the same use of that resource. Therefore, if there is to be any rightful
use of the common, and God certainly intended that there be such a use,
there must be some method by which an individual can rightfully remove
resources from the common and appropriate them for himself. Locke
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 270.
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locates this method in application of labor to the common. Each
individual has a property in his own person and hence in his own labor as
an extension of his person. One may remove an object from the common
by an application of one's labor to it, i.e. by mixing one's person with it,
thereby annexing it to oneself and making it one's private property. The
private appropriation of the common, then, does not require for its
legitimacy the consent of all other agents, but is justified by natural law.
Natural law places only two restrictions on the extent of private
appropriation of the common: first, one may appropriate only so much as
one may use without any spoilage; second, there must be "enough, and as
good left in common for others."46 Unlike Hobbes, then, Locke maintains
that property, not just possession, exists prior to civil society. Locke
recognizes the centrality of property for the establishment of civil society,
and in this he agrees with Kant. But where Locke argues that civil society
is necessary to guarantee the security of pre-existing property, at his
deepest Kant recognizes that the social contract is necessary for the
establishment of property in the first place.
The introduction of money prior to the establishment of civil
society, by means of consent on the part of all individuals with tacit
agreement as to its value, radically alters the previously existing system of
property rights. As a permanent store of value and medium of exchange,
money invalidates the two restrictions on the private appropriation of the
common, paving the way for unlimited private accumulation and
inequality. Since money does not spoil, one is no longer constrained by
the spoliage limitation and may hoard up as much as one desires, and
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 288.
39
since money serves as a medium of exchange, individuals who formerly
had to earn their living by working the land may now survive by selling
their labor to others who no longer must leave "enough and as good."47
The original equality of individuals in a state of nature, then, is
considerably modified by the introduction of money: "This partage of
things, in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable
out of the bounds of Societie, and without compact, only by putting a
value on gold and silver and tacitly agreeing in the use of Money."48 in
addition to generating economic inequality, the introduction of money
gives rise to conflicts among individuals. Prior to the introduction of
money, one's title to a piece of property was established solely by the labor
one bestowed upon it, hence there was "no room for Controversie about
the Title, nor for Incroachment on the Right of others; what Portion a
Man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless as well as
dishonest to carve himself, or take more than he needed. jj-
then that Locke believed that the invention of money provided the
impetus for the creation of civil or political society.
Still, according to Locke, a state of nature is not necessarily a state of
war, as it is for Hobbes. A state of nature is distinguished by the lack of
some political authority; it is a state in which individuals live "together
For two excellent discussions of Locke's theory of property and the importance of money
in that theory from opposing points of view, see Macpherson and Rapaczynski. Macpherson
argues that Locke uses the introduction of money to suspend the limitations on property
embodied in natural law, thereby legitimating capitalist accumulation and wage
dependency. Rapaczynski, however, arues that property is the means by which humans
transform their dependence on nature and express their autonomy. The sufficiency
limitation is operative only in backward societies and in more developed societies is
superseded by a sufficiency principle that dictates that no one be left without the means to
each autonomy. Rapaczynski's interpretation turns Locke into something of a Kantian.
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 302.
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according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with
Authority to judge between them."50 a state of war exists where person(s)
employ force or have designs against others: "Want of a common Judge
with Authority puts all Men in a State of Nature: Force without Right,
upon a Man’s Person, makes a State of War, both where there is, and is
not, a common Judge. Nonetheless, the desire to avoid a state of war is
one of the reasons why persons enter into civil society.52
Though not a state of war, the conditions prevailing in a state of
nature are far from ideal. In the absence of a publicly established and
known law and impartial judges to administer it, the law of nature is
distorted by self-interested individuals acting as judges in their own cases.
Further, without the protection offered by the state, individuals are subject
to aggression on the part of others and are insecure in their person and
possessions. Consequently, though one possesses freedom and property in
the state of nature, "the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly
exposed to the Invasion of others. "'53 Civil society is instituted to remedy
this condition, as it provides a means of securing the lives, liberty, and
estates of those who enter into it.
Locke is clearly vacillating here. This stems from Locke's desire to
justify the establishment of civil society, while at the same time avoiding
Hobbes' conclusion that absolute power must be placed in the hands of a
self-perpetuating sovereign. The former goal requires that he construct a
plausible rationale for entrance into civil society by individuals, whereas
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 280.
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 281.
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 282.
53- Locke, Two Treatises, p. 350.
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the latter requires that the state of nature and the individuals who
compose it not be so atomized and recalcitrant that the only solution is the
imposition of absolutist government. These dual objectives give rise to
oscillation or shift in Locke's depiction of the state of nature. In order to
contrast his views with those of Hobbes, Locke begins by declaring that
"the State of Nature, and the State of War, which however some Men
have confounded, are as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual
Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and
Mutual Destruction are from another. But if the state of nature were so
idyllic, there would be no reason for anyone to exit it, and thus Locke is
forced to acknowledge certain "inconveniences" in the state of nature. For
Hobbes, entrance into civil society is a matter of vital interest, a question of
survival; hence the Hobbesian conception and justification of political
authority is extremely compelling. Inconvenience, however, is not a
particularly compelling argument for relinquishing one’s natural
freedom, so Locke gravitates towards the Hobbesian position and asserts
that we must quit the state of nature in order to avoid the danger that it
will degenerate into a state of war. But as Hobbes points out, a state of war
is not characterized by constant violence but by the ever-present potential
or disposition for violence, with the consequence that Locke's state of
nature drifts perilously close to being a state of war. Locke, then, has
considerable difficulty reaching an intermediate position between the two
views of the state of nature, one as a golden age and the other as a state of
war of each against all.
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 280.
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Locke does have other means at his disposal to break his slide into
the Hobbesian defence of absolutism. First, he argues quite plausibly that
absolutism is incompatible with civil society, for an absolute sovereign,
since he acts as judge in his own cases, remains in a state of nature vis a
vis all other members of civil society. The citizens of the Commonwealth
could not possibly agree to such a situation, as it would be even worse
than the state of nature, with the absolute power of the sovereign added to
the original defects of the state of nature. Further, natural law, which
defines the rights and legitimate powers of all agents, serves as a moral
restraint on political authority. Given his empiricism and corresponding
denial of innate practical ideas, however, Locke cannot provide an
adequate epistemic basis for his conception of natural law. Finally, Locke
believes that individuals are capable of a greater degree of social cohesion
than Hobbes thought possible and simply do not need the iron hand of an
absolutist sovereign to make civil society a reality.
As stated before, the creation of political power is needed to remedy
the defects of the state of nature. Locke defines political power as the
"Right of making laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less
Penalties, for the regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing
the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and in the
defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for
the Publick Good."^^ This power is created with the establishment of civil
or political society and is legitimate only when it is based on the consent
on those who are subject to it. In order to establish civil society, all
persons must relinquish their natural freedom and power by placing it in
Locke, Two Treatiscs.p. 268.
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the hands of the community, which then "comes to be Umpire by settled
standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties."56 These actions
must be voluntary, for one can only lose one's natural freedom and be
bound to civil authority by an act of one's own will;
Man being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and
independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and
subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own
Consent. The only way whereby any one devests himself of
his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is
by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a
Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living
one amongst another, in secure Enjoyment of their
Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of
it.57
This general agreement of individuals is the social contract or "original
Compact" by means of which civil society is constituted.
Upon entrance into civil society, individuals relinquish the right to
do whatever they think necessary to ensure their own survival and the
right to punish violations of the law of nature and transfer these rights
and their natural force to the community. But the legislative power of the
community is not unlimited and arbitrary. Since individuals can not
transfer a power greater than that which they possess in the state of nature,
a power limited by the law of nature, that same law of nature
circumscribes the power and authority of the community. The purpose of
political power, then, is to secure the property rights of the members of the
community and to pursue the common good.
In effect, political power is not vested in the community as a whole
but in the majority of the community. Since collective decisions must be
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 324.
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made even though unanimity is impossible, Locke argues that the
majority must have the right to decide. Locke employs an analogy with
physics to establish this claim: the body politic must move one way or
another; the direction of movement is to be determined by the greater
force; the majority possesses the greater force; therefore, the majority
should determine the direction of movement. This is somewhat similar
to Hobbes in that every one binds himself to the decision of the majority
in the act of covenanting. With Hobbes, however, the majority makes
only one decision; it chooses the sovereign and then transfers decision-
making power to him. For Locke, on the other hand, the majority retains
some right to make collective decisions to the extent that it may determine
whether the government has abused its trust. The original unanimity of
the social contract is further mediated by the creation of representative
institutions- a majority of the representatives chosen by the majority of
the people choose for all the people.
The establishment of civil society, however, is not equivalent to the
establishment of government. Sovereignty resides ultimately in the
hands of the community, or at least the majority of the community, which
erects a government to carry out its will. Locke characterizes the relation
between the community and the government as a trust, with the
community as both trustor and beneficiary and the government as
trustee. A trust is a one-sided relationship in which the trustee has no
rights, only duties, and the trustor is under no obligation to the trustee.^S
There is, then, no reciprocal obligation between the community and the
For a discussion of the concept of a trust as it relates to Locke, see Ernest Barker,
"Introduction," The Social Contract. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. xxii-xxiv.
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govenment; the government has only duties, while the community has
rights. The government is entrusted with political power so that it may
protect property and advance the common good, where failure to do so is
grounds for dismissal. But the dissolution of the government does not
constitute the dissolution of political society. If the community
determines that the government has abused its power and failed to live up
to its trust, it may dismiss the government without dissolving itself in the
process and then create a new government to replace it. Political society
persists throughout this change of governments. The sharp distinction
between civil society and government allows Locke to avoid Hobbes'
conclusions that the sovereign must be self-perpetuating and that there
can be no right of resistance to that sovereign. Even if the government
fails, political society continues to exist, and resistance to the government
is not equivalent to resistance to civil society. One may resist government
without leaving civil society and returning to a state of nature.
Locke never presents an account of the conceptual status of the
social contract, but appears to be possessed of a greater historical naivete
than Hobbes and to conceive of it in historical terms. In section 100 of
Chapter VII of the Second Treatise, Locke raises two possible objections to
his theory: first, that there are no historical instances of a social contract;
second, that all persons, being born under governments, have no liberty to
begin a new one and must simply submit themselves to one that already
exists. His responses indicate that he conceives of the social contract as a
historical event and of the consent needed to legitimate a government as
actual. This conclusion is further buttressed by the lack of any alternative
account.
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Locke devotes sections 101 to 112 of Chapter VII to his response to
the first objection, the details of which need not concern us much here.
Basically, Locke asserts that political society originated with some compact,
but emerged at a time when historical records were not kept, such records
being a product of political society. He then explains the nature of those
first governments and the process by which they degenerated. Clearly
then, Locke appears to conceive of the social contract as some sort of
historical event, a conclusion which is buttressed by the lack of any
alternative account. But Locke does recognize the limitations of such a
conception. Though at one time governments were founded on a
contract, this is no longer the case, and the consent involved in the
original agreement is no longer operative for consent cannot be passed
from generation to generation. Further, appealing to the is/ought
distinction, he holds that "at best an Argument from what has been, to
what should of right be, has no great force. This point is important in
considering criticisms by those such as David Hume who assert that
governments have nowhere been founded on consent ( except, as Hume
concedes, in their earliest stages) but on force. Despite its historical
pretensions, Locke's point should not be construed descriptively ( as
Hume does ) but prescriptively: government should be based on consent
and not force, regardless of whether it is so based now. The moral
legitimacy of political power depends on the consent of those over whom
it is exercised.
This creates a problem for Locke. Even if a commonwealth is
founded on an actual contract that specifies the terms of civil association,
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 336.
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it is not binding past the first generation, with whose passing the moral
legitimacy of the established political authority ends. How then may
political society maintain its legitimacy throughout time? This can be
accomplished only if some method can be found by which succeeding
generations may become parties to the contract. Locke employs the notion
of tacit consent as the means of solving this problem.
Now one may enter into civil society by express consent, but also by
tacit consent. Though the consent of the parents is not visited upon their
children, parents can annex conditions to the inheritance of their property:
for children to come into possession of their parents' property, they must
consent to the prevailing political authorities and become members of the
political society where that property is located. When one takes possession
of one's parents' property, one has tacitly agreed to the social contract and
consented to the authority founded on that contract. Locke's comments
indicate that he is thinking of land here, but he also recognizes that not
everyone within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth is a landowner.
This limited conception of tacit consent, then, would exclude the majority
of inhabitants of a territory, and thus he develops a more inclusive notion
of tacit consent that includes not only land ownership but also "Lodging
only for a Week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the Highway;
and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the
Territories of that Government,"60 a conception is so broad as to permit
one to tacitly consent to any tyranny. It is only the narrow conception of
tacit consent, however, for which any explicit motivation is provided,
though clearly the concept of property applies to far more than just
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 348.
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ownership of land. Locke argues that government is established to secure
and regulate property by means of settled laws, and hence anyone who
owns property and benefits from this function of government is subject to
these laws. It is axiomatic that whoever wills an end wills the necessary
means to that end; therefore, it is simply contradictory for one to enter
into civil society for the purpose of securing one's life and property and at
the same time to claim exemption from the laws established for the
attainment of those ends. Anyone who assumes ownership of some
property within the domain of a Commonwealth has by that fact become a
member of that same Commonwealth. A similar argument can be made
for any individual who even enters the territory of a Commonwealth.
This position, however, has several problems. First, as Hume
pointed out, it is wholly unrealistic, for given the situation of most
persons, we can not reasonably describe this "tacit consent" as freely given.
Due to economic circumstances and legal restrictions, people are simply
not mobile enough to describe their remaining in one jurisdiction as
freely-given tacit consent to the authority of the governors. As Hume so
eloquently states it.
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free
choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign
language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small
wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man,
by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of
the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and
must leap into the ocean and perish, the moment he leaves
her.61
6L David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in Barker, Social Contract, p. 156.
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Now the situation may not be so grim as Hume depicts it; historically,
large numbers of people of limited means have migrated from their
native lands to new territories. Nonetheless, Hume’s criticism does have
the ring of truth. Given the severe constraints on such movements, it is
difficult to see how the failure to emigrate can be reasonably construed as a
form of tacit consent.
Second, Locke has construed tacit consent in such a way that one's
intentions do not matter.62 One may tacitly consent to existing political
arrangements without even being aware that one is doing so. All that is
necessary for tacit consent is the purchase of property, and the purchase of
property does not necessarily involve the consciousness of having
consented to some political arrangement. It seems quite odd to describe
one's consent as freely given when one is not even aware that one has so
consented, let alone intended to give it.
Third, the appeal to consent seems to be unnecessary here. Locke
holds that we consent to a government because it preserves our property
and in general secures the blessings of civilization and that we are
obligated to obey the government because we have so consented. But why
do we need this extra step? We can derive an obligation to obey the
government directly from its role in protecting our person and property
without appealing to any notion of consent. This is just a variation of the
argument Hume makes in "Of the Original Contract." According to
Hume, contractarian theorists argue that we are obligated to obey the law
because we have promised to do so, this promise being expressed by our
For a discussion of this point, see A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Politica l
Obligations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
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freely-given consent. But why, Hume asks, are we obligated to fulfill our
promises? Because, Hume answers, if people did not live up to their
promises, the bonds that hold society together would break down and
civilized life would be impossible. But the same holds true of political
authority and the law, for if there were no law or any common power to
enforce it, civilization could not endure. Political authority and obligation
can be justified in utilitarian terms, and there is no need for any notions of
consent or contract to do this job. Thus, the idea of a social contract is
superfluous with respect to the grounding of our actual obligations to any
existing government. Whether we accept this claim about the basis of
political obligation and authority depends on whether we subscribe to
utilitarian moral theory. But even if we accept Hume's criticism, the
contractarian model is not without some value, for it still provides us
with some guidance in the construction of political institutions and the
assignment of legal rights. This can be seen most clearly with Hobbes, who
accepted the ground of obligation later advanced by Hume but used a
contractarian model to determine the extent of this obligation and the
proper organization of civil society.
Finally, Locke's doctrine of consent, both tacit and express, is
difficult to reconcile with the assertion of a right to dismiss the
government, by force if necessary, and his characterization of the relation
between the government and the people as a trust. If this relation truly is
a trust, then the people as trustors and beneficiaries have only rights and
no obligations toward the government. Locke also holds that one's tacit
consent lasts only so long as one owns property and terminates with the
termination of possession, whereas express consent binds one
permanently. But if one is obligated by any form of consent, how can one
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rightfully resist that government to which one is bound? Someone who
has given express consent seems unable to resist rightfully under any
circumstances. On the other hand, someone who has given only tacit
consent may withdraw that consent by relinquishing his properties and
free himself of any obligation, but in doing so would deprive himself of
the only means by which he might effectively resist the government.
I think the problem here arises from Locke's failure to observe his
own distinction between civil or political society and government. One's
primary obligation is to the commonwealth and not to the govenment,
the obligation to which is derived from one's obligation to the
commonwealth. One's obligation to the commonwealth may actually
require that one actively resist the government that has violated its trust.
One may withdraw one's consent from the government without
withdrawing from civil society, as one's express or tacit consent ties one to
civil society, not to the government.
We have seen then that, though it is problematic, Locke's
deployment of consent is essential to his political theory. But if consent is
to be meaningful, it must be freely given and proceed from the will of the
agent. We need to step back now from Locke's political theory and
examine its metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings in order to
determine whether or not Locke's account of practical reason and the will
can adequately ground his use of consent. This discussion will of necessity
involve us in an examination of the troubled relationship between
Locke's appeal to natural law and his empiricism.
As pointed out earlier, Locke recognizes free agency as a necessary
condition of morality. Locke equates self-determination with free agency,
positing the former as the telos of our being, and in doing so takes a
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considerable step towards the Kantian conception of autonomy. An agent
is free only if his actions are the products of his own judgment:
were we determined by anything but the last result of our
own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we
were not free; the very end of our freedom being that we
may attain the good we choose. And therefore, every man is
put under a necessity, by his constitution as an intelligent
being to be determined in willing by his own thought and
judgmentwhat is best for him to do: else he would be under
the determination of some other than himself, which is want
of liberty.63
In Locke's contrast between determination of the will by one's own
judgment and determination by something other than one's self, we see
the outlines of the Kantian opposition between autonomy and
heteronomy. Since one is free only when one acts in accordance with
one's own judgment, freedom "is grounded on his having Reason, which
is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by."64 Locke's
empiricism, however, prevents him from locating this Law, the source of
our judgments of good and evil in reason itself. Instead, the law is
imposed on us from without, thus relegating us to a condition of
heteronomy, in which desire and not reason governs our actions.
According to Locke, the will is a power, an ability to produce change;
specifically, it is the power to command an action or its forbearance, where
a volition is the exercise of that power: "Volition, it is plain, is an act of
the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over
any part of the man, by employing in, or witholding it from, any particular
action. "65 Freedom is the capacity to act in accordance with one's
Locke, Essay, p. 346.
Locke, Two Treatises, p. 308.
Locke, Essay, p. 370.
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volitions, the commands issued by one's will. A free agent, then, is able to
act according to dictates of his will, whereas a necessary agent lacks both
thought and volition. Since both freedom and the will are powers or
attributes and powers can be attributed only to substances and not other
powers, any talk of a "free will" is incoherent according to Locke, as we
would be referring to the power of a power.
But volitions are not uncaused and we may inquire as to what it is
that determines the will, an issue Locke discusses in sections 29 to 31 of the
first book of the Essay . His initial answer looks very much like an appeal
to transeunt causation: the mind or the agent himself determines the
will. In the succeeding discussion, however, he reverts to a version of
immanent causation, where the immediate cause of a volition is a desire
or present uneasiness over some absent good.66 Locke's distinction
between desire and will enables him to use desire to mediate between
understanding and will, thus substituting a mechanism of the mental for
Hobbes' materialism.
Judgments of good and evil, then, do not directly determine the
will, but reguire some connection with desire to be efficacious. Thus, the
greatest perceived good will not necessarily determine the will, for a
pressing immediate uneasiness may override it and incline us to act
contrary to our long-term interest. Only if desire is raised to a
proportionate level can we be sure that we will act according to our
perceptions of our greatest good. Now if Locke were to hold that our
desires are fixed, he would be unable to account for even prudential
For a discussion of the distinction between transeunt and immanent causation, see
Roderick Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in Freedom and Determinism, ed. Keith Lehrer
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976 ).
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rationality within this framework, but in fact he accepts that our desires
are malleable and subject to our own control on the basis of rational
examination. According to Locke, we possess a power of suspending the
determination of the will so that we may engage in a rational critique of
our desires: "For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident in
experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its
desires; so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of
them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others." This
ability opens up the possibility of prudentially rational action. We can
compare our immediate desires with our understanding of our long-term
well-being in order to determine their place, or lack of such, in our overall
life plan, and on the basis of this evaluation, we can alter our the nature of
our desires so as to reflect our long-term interest. Locke writes: "And thus
by due consideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power
to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby
in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will, and be
pursued. "67 in this way, understanding determines the will, though
mediately.
All persons naturally pursue their own happiness, which Locke
defines as "the utmost pleasure we are capable of," and avoid misery, the
"utmost misery."68 The goodness of an object of desire depends on the
amount of pleasure or pain it produces: objects that produce pleasure are
good; objects that produce pain are bad. Since pleasure and pain depend
on a person's constitution, which varies from person to person, good and
Locke, Essay, p. 344.
Locke, Essay, p. 340.
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evil appear to be person-relative, just as with Hobbes. For this reason,
there can be no summum bonum.69 Locke's typically liberal commitment
to a toleration of different conceptions of the good life, however, conflicts
with his conception of natural law, as we shall see.
If Locke were to stop here, he would have made a small advance
over Hobbes. Locke would have produced a theory of practical reason in
which reason is purely instrumental in the prudential pursuit of self-
interest, while avoiding the pitfalls of Hobbes' pure materialistic
mechanism. Moral agents would still be left in a condition of
heteronomy, though an intelligent one, and reason would be incapable of
generating universally-valid categorical imperatives. But at points Locke's
comments suggest that he is operating with a concption of the good that is
not relativistic but absolute and objective, and as such can serve as a
standard of judgment for our actual desires and a guide to the formation
of new ones. For example, in connection with his discussion of our power
to modify our desires, he writes: "In this we should take pains to suit the
relish of our minds to the intrinsic good or ill that is in things; and not
permit an allowed or supposed possible great and weighty good to ship out
of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any desire of itself there, till
by a due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our
minds suitable to it, and make ourselves uneasy in the want of it, or in the
fear of losing it."^0 vVe seem to have, then, some standard of intrinsic
goodness to which we ought to make our desires conform. Locke's
problem is to find some epistemic basis for this standard.
Locke, Essay, p. 351.
Locke, Essay, p. 350.
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What then is the source of our judgments as to the intrinsic
goodness of an object? It certainly can not be experience; experience can
only tell us what actually pleases us, not what ought to please us. What
we need is a standard to which we can appeal when judging our actual
desires, thereby enabling us to bring them into accord with the demands of
our true happiness. Experience can only teach us how to coordinate our
desires to achieve the greatest amount of pleasure throughout our life
given our present constitution, whereas we need to know how to reform
that constitution. There is simply no empirical basis for judging the
intrinsic worth of an object except for the actual pleasure we derive from
it.71
Now an obvious move here would be to appeal to some innate
standard of the good, a moral standard known a priori, but Locke's
empiricism prevents him from making just such an appeal. In Chapter
Two of Book I of the Essay, he takes considerable pains to refute the claim
that there are any innate practical ideas by arguing that there are no
plausible criteria for their identification. Locke considers two possible
criteria, self-evidence and universal acceptance, and rejects them both.
Locke argues that any innate moral principle would have to be self-
evident. But since we may legitimately ask with regard to any moral
principle for the reasons that would justify it, "the truth of all these moral
rules plainly depends on some other antecedent to them, and from which
they must be deduced."72 Moral principles, then, are not self-evident, and
This is a problem with Rapaczynski's interpretation of Locke. Rapaczynski ably
reconstructs Locke's claim that we can choose our pleasures, but offers no rational grounds on
which we may make that choice. Without such grounds, we can not construe Locke as a
theorist of true autonomy.
72- Locke, Essay, p.
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therefore, they are not innate. Further, Locke points out that any principle
can be justified by an appeal to self-evidence: "if it be the privilege of
innate principles to be received upon their own authority, without
examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's
principles can be questioned."73
Finally, as part of our original cognitive make-up, any innate
principle would have to universal. But Locke points out that there are no
such principles that are universally held, as beliefs and practices vary from
person to person and culture to culture. The study of human history
reveals that "there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule
of virtue to be thought, .... , which is not, somewhere or other slighted and
condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, ..."74
Let us first consider Locke's claim that the need to rationally justify
a moral principle indicates that it is not innate or known a priori. Now
there is an ambiguity here with regard to the type of reason that Locke
would accept as justifying a moral principle. First, if one asks for a reason
to act according to a specific rule of conduct, one might be asking for a
specifiaction of the end or goal for the attainment of which it is conducive.
For example, if I ask why I ought to tell the truth, you might reply that, by
telling the truth, I will acquire a good reputation, which would be useful
in my business dealings. It may be that Locke thinks that this is the only
type of reason we can give when asked to justify a rule. If Locke were
right, then all moral imperatives would be hypothetical in nature,
applicable only if we accept the specified end. But this is unacceptable. It
Locke, Essay, p. 90.
Locke, Essay, p. 74.
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always makes sense to ask why we ought to adopt the end specified in the
antecedent of a hypothetical imperative, and the answer to this question is
not trivial. The same can not be said, however, of moral imperatives.
Moral imperatives are commands; they tell me what I ought to do, i.e.
what is my duty. It makes no sense to ask with regard to a duty why I
ought to perform it, for that would be to ask why I ought to do what I
ought to do. The statement 'I ought to do what I ought to do' is
tautological. Thus, the only possible answer to such a question is trivial;
'I ought to do what I ought to do, because I ought to do it.’
There is still a non-trivial sense, however, in which I can ask for the
reason why I ought to act according to a specific rule. If someone asserts
that a rule is in fact a moral imperative, I can always ask for the epistemic
justification of this claim. Now when Locke asserts that an a priori moral
principle must be self-evident, he clearly goes too far. A principle may be
susceptible of a demonstration and yet still be known a priori as long as it
is deduced from other a priori prinicples. Nonetheless, Locke does have a
point. The process of justification must eventually end, and we must
arrive at principles for which no further demonstration is possible.
When that point is reached, we seem to be left with no justification for
those fundamental principles but the appeal to their self-evident character,
an appeal that can be used to justify any principle. Further, if a principle is
truly self-evident, then it ought to be apparent to everyone. The great
variety of mores and cultural practices throughout human history,
however, suggests that no moral principle possesses the required
universality of acceptance.
When Locke demands the "marks" or "character" by which we can
identify innate or a priori moral principles, he fails to consider the
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criterion of universalizability. For Kant, the lack of universality of assent
to or action in accordance with a rule is irrelevant in determining whether
it specifies a duty. If it is our duty always to keep our promises, it remains
our duty regardless of whether anyone actually does always keep his
promises. Even if there were never an instance of someone who always
kept his promises, it would still be our duty to do so. What matters is the
universalizability of the rule, not the universality of assent or conformity
to it.75 It \)Q that Locke failed to recognize this standard because he
believed that the good or object of the moral law was logically prior to the
right or the law itself. Only rules are universalizable, and in fact, this
criterion is derived from the very nature of a law.
In order to ascertain whether a rule or maxim is morally acceptable,
one must determine whether it is universalizable. The principle of
universalizability, then, is not the first premise of a syllogism (as suggested
by Lockean demand for a demonstration), but a test or canon that one
applies to the maxims one has formulated for oneself. But if as the
highest or fundamental principle, it is itself not susceptible to proof by
demonstrative reasoning, then what justifies our acceptance of it? What
we need, and what Kant attempts to provide, is a deduction in which this
principle is derived from the nature of practical reason itself. But as a
result of his empiricism and his corresponding acceptance of the priority
of the good, Locke lacks the conceptual resources necessary to carry out
such a deduction.
Kant of course believed that this principle was imbedded in the everyday common
understanding of morality, but that this understanding was confused and distorted by the
influence of sensuous inclinations. The first part of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals is an analytic attempt to clear away these confusions and distortions and bring this
understanding to proper clarity and self-understanding.
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In the end, Locke is left with only the appeal to God as the source of
our judgments of intrinsic goodness, and even this claim is rendered
problematic by his epistemology. Locke holds that God has promulgated a
law of nature that directs human beings to the pursuit of their true
happiness and goes so far as to identify this law with reason itself.^^ He
further asserts that, though there may be some variation in right and
wrong, virtue and vice, from culture to culture "as to the main, they for
the most part kept the same everywhere," an assertion that contradicts his
earlier denial of the existence of universally-accepted practical precepts.
Now this appeal to a law of nature in the form of reason granted by God
might make sense if Locke were a Cartesian and committed to a light of
nature bestowed upon us by our creator, but he is not. Locke's empiricism
with its denial of synthetic judgments known a priori is incompatible with
his identification of reason as the law of nature and his appeal to it as the
source of our moral judgments. Locke is left with his final fallback
position- revelation.
Locke's appeal to God still leaves moral agents in a condition of
heteronomy, pursuing only their own self-interest. The law that we ought
to be obey is not the product of the self-legislative activity of reason, not
even reason as a gift of God, but is imposed upon reason from without. In
order to insure our compliance, this law is backed up by the threat of
punishment and the promise of reward. Morality, then, consists in the
mere conformity of action to the law, the motive for which is supplied by
our expectation of punishment or reward. Morality is reduced to
prudential self-interest with an eye to eternity:
7^- Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 271, 272.
61
morality, established upon its true foundations, can not but
determine the choice in any one that will but consider: and
he that will not be so far a rational creature as to reflect
seriously upon infinite happiness, and misery, must needs
condemn himself as not making that use of his
understanding he should. The rewards and punishments of
another life, which the Almighty has established, as the
enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine
the choice, against whatever pleasure or pain this life can
show when the eternal state is considered but in its bare
possibility, which nobody can make doubt of.^7
This is in sharp contrast to Kant's position, which grants primacy to
practical reason rather than theoretical reason. For Kant, our belief in the
existence of God is derived from our knowledge of our own moral
responsibility; a theoretical proof of the existence is dangerous simply
because it would preempt that knowledge and induce agents to obey the
moral law out of fear and desire and not because it is the law, thus
depriving their actions of all moral worth. Locke leaves us as creatures of
passion, activated by fear and desire, governed by a law imposed from
without.
We have seen then that Locke in many ways aniticipates and is
struggling toward an understanding of autonomy, but is unable to
complete the process. His inability to break with mechanism prevents
him from constructing an adequate account of free agency governed by
reason, while his commitment to empiricism prevents him from
formulating an adequate account of practical reason. Locke is unable to
resolve the tensions within his own thought and the conflicting demands
made upon it.
Locke, Essay, p. 364.
62
D. Rousseau: The General Will
Of our three chosen predecessors, Rousseau’s moral and political
theory is closest to Kant's. A brilliant stylist and intuitive thinker, though
lacking in rigor and methodological sophistication, Rousseau proved to
be a seminal influence on Kant's philosophical development.78 Kant
himself credited Rousseau with teaching him to respect human nature in
the person of the common people and placed Rousseau's contribution to
moral philosophy on the same level with that of Newton's to the natural
sciences. Rousseau places the concept of autonomy at the center of his
politics and states in very clear terms the fundamental problem this
concept poses for political philosophy, though as we shall see he was
unable to solve it.
In his first discourse. The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences.
Rousseau challenges the basic assumptions of the Enlightenment.^^
Writing in response to the Academy of Dijon's prize essay question, "Has
the restoration of the sciences and the arts helped to purify morals?",
Rousseau argues that the advance of the arts and sciences does not
generate an improvement in the morals of the species, but on the contrary
contributes to the decline of virtue, with the refinements of intellectual
For an account of this influence, see Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau. Kant and Goethe: Two
Essays. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 1-60. For a neo-Kantian
interpretation of Rousseau, see also his The Question of Tean-Tacques Rousseau.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967). Cassirer argues that Kant, almost alone
among 18th century thinkers, understood Rousseau's real position and significance, but
unfortunately he interprets Rousseau's writings so much in the light of Kantian theory that
one begins to wonder what the real differences between the two are and whether Kant
made any significant contribution to ethical theory other than systematizing and
elaborating Rousseau's insights.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, "The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," The Social Contract and
Discourses, trans. and ed. G. D. H. Cole, (London, 1973).
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and aesthetic culture walking hand in hand with the degeneration of
moral character. When faced with a choice, Rousseau opts for virtue over
knowledge and cultivation, thereby elevating the practical over the
theoretical. Though polemical and rhetorical in character, the first
Discourse marks the beginning of Rousseau’s assault on the naive
optimism of his time and its faith in the power of reason to emancipate
and benefit humanity. Rousseau pursues this line of thought in The
Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men, his
second Discourse . In the second Discourse. Rousseau questions the value
of reason itself and asserts that the improvement of human reason has
paralleled the decline of the species, portraying reason as a corrosive force
that weakens our natural sentiment of pity. The development of reason
and of artificial human passions and needs are intertwined in an historical
development in which each determines the other and humans are
reduced from a condition of independence from each other to one of
mutual dependence. Rousseau forces us to question whether reason is in
fact good and demands that reason justify itself in the court of virtue.^^
Rousseau’s methodological observations regarding the theoretical
activity in the second Discourse are confusing at best. The outlook of the
work appears to be historical and to describe the actual social contract, but
Rousseau’s own comments raise major difficulties for any such
For a provacative interpretation of Rousseau's influence on Kant along these lines, see
Richard Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989). Velkley argues that Enlightenment thinkers attempted to emancipate human
thought from the fetters of tradition and the supernatural and to use reason as a means of
satisfying human desires. Yet reason itself could not justify this emancipatory project nor
could it justify its own principles on either teleological or methodological grounds.
Rousseau questioned the goodness of reason and raised this teleological problem for it.
Kant’s solution to this problem, his provision of a telos for reason, is the guiding and
unifying theme of the critical philosophy.
64
intGrpretation, for hG claims that factual accuracy is irrelevant in
determining the truth value of his claims;
Let us begin by setting aside all the facts, because they do not
affect the question. One must not take the kind of research
which we enter into as the pursuit of truths of history, but
solely as hypothetical and conditional reasonings, better fitted
to clarify the nature of things than to expose their actual
origins; reasonings similar to those used everyday by our
physicists to explain the formation of the earth.81
The work, then, purports to present a scientific model that explains the
genesis of property, inequality, civil society, and the degraded condition of
humanity. Yet Rousseau presents this account as a history of the species
and affirms the historical validity of his claims: "here is your history as I
believe I have read it, not in the books of your fellow men who are liars
but in nature which never lies."^^
Rousseau seeks to uncover the nature or natural condition of
humanity by stripping away "all the supernatural gifts he may have
received, and all of the artificial faculties that he can have acquired only
through a long process of time," the modifications and accretions
generated by society. Rousseau claims that no previous philosopher has
succeeded in reconstructing humanity's natural condition, though many
have tried, because all have imported into their depiction of the state of
nature characteristics that are attributable to our later social existence and
thus have confused "savage man with the man before our eyes."
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among
Men, trans. Maurice Cranston, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984 ), p. 78.
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 79.
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 81.
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Though a critic of Hobbes’ modelling of the state of nature,
Rousseau's understanding of natural phenomena was quite similar to that
of Hobbes, for both were deeply influenced by mechanistic natural science.
Natural beings are merely machines for Rousseau, so that a description of
the natural condition of human beings is merely a model of the
functioning af a specific type of machine. In this respect, humans are no
different from animals:
I see in all animals only an ingenious machine to which
nature has given senses in order to keep itself in motion and
protect itself, up to a certain point, against everything that is
likely to destroy or disturb it. I see exactly the same things in
the human machine, with this difference: that while nature
alone activates everything in the operations of a beast, man
participates in his own actions in his capacity as a free
agent.84
Rousseau's task in describing humans qua natural beings is to isolate these
mechanical operations and display the manner in which they function.
But, unlike Hobbes, Rousseau holds that the resultant model is incapable
of capturing and explaining all human activity, for as a free agent, "we see
a spiritual activity, of which the laws of mechanics can explain
nothing.
According to Rousseau, human beings in their natural condition
are motivated by an instinctive drive for self-preservation moderated by a
sentiment of pity activated by the sight or sound of others of their kind in
pain. Hobbes' voracious egoists forever seeking to dominate their fellows
disappear in Rousseau's state of nature. Far from being the vicious
creature described by Hobbes, humans in their natural condition are
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 87.
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 88.
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neither virtuous nor vicious for they know nothing of right and wrong,
good and evil. There is no society to speak of; contacts between humans
are few and fleeting and are regulated by natural pity and physical desire.
Human needs are few, modest, and unlikely to generate any conflict, for
even if one is injured by another, one feels no enduring insult worthy of
vengeance, but reacts reflexively "like a dog that bites a stone thrown at
him. Humans in their natural condition lack self-awareness, possessing
no sense of themselves as distinct from others and no conception of their
own existence in time: "His soul, which nothing disturbs, dwells only in
the sensation of its present existence, without any idea of the future,
however close that might be, and his projects, as limited as his horizons,
hardly extend to the end of the day."86
Unfortunately, humans were not destined to remain forever in the
state of nature. Human beings possess what Rousseau ironically calls the
faculty of self-improvement- perfectibilite - which enables the individual
and the species to develop all its other faculties. Human beings, then, are
malleable, capable of assuming a variety of forms. The operation of the
faculty of self-improvement, set in motion by external forces, drives
humanity out of the state of nature and places it on the long road to
civilization without any hope of return to its original innocence. But this
faculty is more curse than blessing: "It would be sad for us to be forced to
admit that this distinguishing and almost unlimited faculty of man is the
source of all his misfortunes; that it is this faculty which, by the action of
time, drags man out of the original condition in which he would pass
peaceful and innocent days; that it is this faculty, which bringing to
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 90.
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fruition over the centuries his insights and his errors, his vices and his
virtues, makes men in the end a tyrant over himself and over nature."87
Rousseau conjectures that the original stimulus that activated this faculty
was the increase in population, as a result of health and fertility of our
natural condition, beyond the capacity of the environment to support it.
Thus humanity exits the state of nature and enters nascent society, the
next stage of its development.
While Rousseau speaks in terms of stages of develoment, he
recognizes that these stages can not be divided into discrete periods, but
required long periods of germination and slow, gradual transformation for
their emergence. Language, thought, and society all slowly develop
together until eventually humans enter into nascent society. According to
Rousseau, nascent society is "the golden mean between the indolence of
the primitive state and the petulant activity of our own pride" and "must
have been the happiest epoch and the most lasting."88 Nascent society
was characterized by the settled life of families in small communities nited
by "custom and character- not by rules and laws." The gathering of
individuals into families and communities gave rise to notions of merit,
value, and consideration on the part of humanity and to which everyone
claimed a right. Thus, the passions of pride, jealousy, and revenge are
formed, and along with these passions, new needs begin to develop which
later serve to enslave humanity. Morality is introduced to regulate social
intercourse as the force of natural pity diminishes, with revenge serving
to punish transgressions and sufficing in the place of law.
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 88.
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 115.
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Full-fledged civil society emerges with the development of
agriculture and metallurgy and the consequent division of labor these
developments generated. Cultivation of the land necessitated its division,
and this, in combination with the division of labor, resulted in the
transformation of natural inequality into inequality of rank.
Independence was replaced by relations of mutual dependence, for where
formerly one could survive without the aid of others, now one reguired
their assistance. This situation was exacerbated by the development of
new desires and needs that could be satisfied only with the efforts of
others, thus forcing each person to persuade others that it is in their
interest to provide that help. Finally, ambition and greed developed as
individuals strove to surpass others. Under such circumstances, life and
property became increasingly insecure with nascent society giving way to a
Hobbesian state of war of all against all. Yet, at the same time, we find "all
our faculties developed, memory and imagination brought into play, pride
stimulated, reason made active and the mind almost at the point of
perfection of which it is capable.
This situation was most disadvantageous for the rich, who had the
most to lose and whose claims to wealth and property were based on force
rather than right. In order gain security in the enjoyment of his life and
possessions, the rich man concocted "the most cunning project that ever
entered the human mind: to employ in his favor the very forces of those
who attacked him, to make his adversaries his defenders, to inspire them
with new maxims and give them new institutions as advantageous to
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 118.
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him as natural right was disadvantageous.’’90 Thus, the social contract
was born. All persons were persuaded to unite their forces so as to protect
the lives and property of the members of the community and to
promulgate settled laws to govern their mutual relations. Of course, this
arrangement favored the rich, who had the property that was to be
protected and could manipulate the laws to suit their own interests.
Rousseau, then, exposes actual civil society as a sham perpetrated by the
rich upon the poor "which put new fetters on the weak and gave new
powers to the rich, which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty,
established for all time the law of property and inequality, transformed
adroit usurpation into irrevocable right, and for the benefit of a few
ambitious men subjected the human race thenceforth to labor, servitude
and misery."9^
Though reason and the faculty of self-improvement have proven to
be curses in the past, they also provide the means by which we can
extricate ourselves from our present predicament. As pointed out above,
humanity is malleable and capable of receiving a variety of forms,
including modes of social existence devised by human reason. Reason is
capable of formulating ideals that extend beyond present reality, and in
The Social Contract Rousseau presents just such an ideal construction.
Where the second Discourse explains how we arrived at where we are.
The Social Contract tells us where we ought to go from here, and we are
capable of making this proposed journey because we are malleable and not
condemned to remain in our present condition in perpetuity. In the
Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 121.
91- Ibid., p. 122.
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second Discourse
, we see the process by which all humans are induced to
run towards their chains;" in The Social Contract, we begin with
humanity "everywhere in chains" and seek to determine whether "there
can be any legitimate and sure principle of government, taking men as are
and laws as they might be" and thus transform our condition from
bondage to freedom.92
The state of nature presented in The Social Contract is considerably
different from that of the second Discourse, so much so that one wonders
whether he is using the expression with the same meaning. According to
Rousseau in the former text, life in the state of nature becomes untenable
at some point and some drastic change in humanity's mode of existence is
neccessary for the species to survive. The demands of self-preservation
require that we find some mechanism by which individuals can continue
to maintain their existence. Since we are incapable of creating new powers
but can only combine previously existing ones, individuals can create this
mechanism only by uniting together in civil society and employing the
power of all to defend the life and property of each. This union, however,
generates what Rousseau considers to be the "fundamental problem" of
political philosophy: "How to find a form of association which will
defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of
all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the
others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before."93 The
social contract is supposed to provide the solution to this problem.
^2- It ought to be pointed out that, contrary to my interpretation, in the The Social Contract,
Rousseau holds that he does not know how we arrived at our present state.
93- Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston, (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1968 ).
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Now taken literally, this problem simply can not be solved.94 if
everyone is to govern himself and possess the same freedom as in the
state of nature, then the transition from the state of nature to civil society
is meaningless as it is no transition at all. These conditions can be met
only in the state of nature. But I think Rousseau should not be taken
literally here, and though the problem is a difficult one, he points the way
to the solution that Kant carries out. The key point here is the expression
"as free as before." When one enters the state of nature, one can not
remain "as free as before" because the freedom that one enjoys in civil
society is different in kind from that which prevails in the state of nature.
Entrance into civil society generates a qualitative change in the moral
status of individuals: "The passing from the state of nature to the civil
society produces a remarkable change in man; it puts justice as a rule of
conduct in the place of instinct, and gives his actions the moral quality
they previously lacked."95 By entering into civil society, individuals
exchange the lawless freedom of the state of nature for the autonomy of
reason, that is, they acquire the capacity to govern their actions by reason
rather than passion: "man acquires with civil society, moral freedom,
which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by
appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself
is freedom."96 The moral freedom Rousseau describes can only be
achieved in true community with others of the species, for it is only in
such a context that we acquire a general will. Real autonomy, then, is
For discussions of this problem, see Gough, The Social Contract, p. 168-9, and Robert Paul
Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 64.
Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 65.
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collective in nature. The human beings we are left with at the conclusion
of the second Discourse possess no general will, for suspended midway
between nature and true community, they are governed by appetite and
passion and possess only a private will, the result of the gross imperfection
of actual civil society.97
The terms of the social contract are "precisely determined by the
nature of the act:" one alienates one's person, possessions, and rights to
the whole community, an alienation that is unconditional and absolute.
The mutual dependence between persons is replaced by the dependence of
each upon all, and thus upon no one in particular. Our persons and
possessions are placed under the control of the general will, which in turn
directs the legislative activity of the community towards the common
good, the purpose for which civil society was instituted. In our present
condition, private interests are in conflict with each other, thus
necessitating the establishment of civil society, but there is also a harmony
of interests which makes civil society possible and is expressed by the
general will. Rousseau states clearly that the general will is not a mere
aggregation of all the diverse private interests, but is not clear as to what it
is:
There is often a great difference between the will of all (what
all individuals want) and the general will; the general will
studies studies only the common interest while the will of all
studies private interest, and is indeed no more than the sum
Rapaczynski argues that Rousseau attempts to overcome the atomizing effects of liberal
theory, while at the same time accepting its individualistic basis. Alienated from nature,
human beings in modem society are also alienated from each other and entirely alone in the
world. Rousseau attempts to overcome this condition by bringing individuals together in
tightly integrated community that will replace nature as man's home; thus Rousseau's
theory expresses a yearning that can not be met within the confines of traditional
liberalism.
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of individual desires. But if we take away from these same
wills, the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out,
the sum of the differences is the general will.98
When deliberating on legislation as a member of civil society, one must
consider only the common good, for qua citizen one possesses only a
general will. All law is a declaration of the general will (as determined by
the majority), and the essence of human freedom lies in this legislative
activity, since freedom just is "obedience to a law one prescribes to
oneself." Thus, an individual may be compelled to obey the law, "which
means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free."99
But individuals in modern society do not possess a general will yet,
and Rousseau needs to find some means by which such a will may be
brought into being. If a people is to be free, then social institutions must
be the product of its free consent, for only that people posssesses legislative
right. This creates a serious problem for Rousseau. The general will is a
product of correct social institutions, but correct social institutions
presuppose the existence of a general will; therefore, individuals "would
have to have already become before the advent of the law that which they
become as a result of law."^00 Rousseau resolves this problem by
resorting to the deus ex machina of revolutionary politics, the enlightened
lawgiver. If one aims at the sudden transformation of existing society root
and branch by conscious human agency, then one must find some person,
or group of persons, who have risen above the corruption and degradation
engendered by existing social conditions and can lead the rest of humanity
to its emancipation. Rousseau finds this in the person of the lawgiver.
Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 72-3.
Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 64.
^0^- Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 87.
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The lawgiver crafts the appropriate social institutions for a people and
then, lacking the moral authority to promulgate laws on his own, submits
his program to the people for their approval. The lawgiver elicits their
consent by deceiving his charges with appeals to supernatural authority
and divine sanction. Unlike Kant, then, Rousseau does not conceive of
the social contract as the projected end-point of an infinite historical
process. Rather, a people must receive the foundational laws of its civil
society all at once, generally in its infancy.^ 0^ In contrast to this, Kant's
reliance on historical process vitiates any need for a lawgiver or
revolutionary vanguard. The ideal that Rousseau lays out is meant to
guide the lawgiver in the construction of civil society, but the lawgiver
requires the actual consent of the people when translating this ideal into
practice, otherwise the resultant civil society lacks moral legitimacy. It
appears, then, that in some sense the social contract can be an actual event
or is at least a metaphor for an actual event.
As we have seen, Rousseau makes a considerable advance over
Locke in the development of the notion of autonomy by asserting that
freedom consists in being governed by "a law one prescribes to oneself," by
reason rather than appetite, and unfolding the political implications of
this freedom. Nonetheless, Rousseau is unable to formulate clearly this
concept, a problem that can be discerned clearly in Rousseau's account of
the general will. The notion of general will is extremely paradoxical , for
the will is essentially particular as opposed to general, an individual
faculty not a collective one, and one is tempted to make sense of it by
positing some collective mind or ego. But we need not do this, since the
Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. 88-9, 95.
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general will can be defined in terms of its object or end, the common good.
In the concept of a general will, Rousseau attempts to combine a morality
of the common good with one of individual consent.^ 02 j^e source of
Rousseau s difficulties I shall argue lie in his granting priority to the good
over the right, from his attempt to base the law on a conception of the
good rather than base his conception of the good on the law.
Despite Rousseau's attempts to distinguish sharply between reason
and desire, identifying freedom with the former and slavery with the
latter, this distinction is untenable within the confines of his moral
theory; it is merely apparent and not real. As we have seen, Rousseau is
forced to appeal to the desires and interests of individuals when
attempting to explain his conception of the general will. For a Kantian,
this comes as no surprise, because, as Kant points out, one can only be
related to the good through the faculty of desire. Now this relation must
be either necessary or contingent. If our relation to some good is
necessary, then we lack the freedom that is the precondition of moral
agency and responsibility. Any law formulated on the basis of that good is
nothing but a description of human behavior in terms of causal
connection; it links a stimulus (the object of an action) with a response
(the end of that action). On the other hand, if our relationship to some
good is contingent, then we are incapable of formulating a categorical
imperative with regard to that good. Whether or not an object is good will
See Patrick Riley's discussion of Rousseau in Will and Political Obligation . Riley
argues that Rousseau attempts to combine two traditions of political thought, the ancient
tradition of community and social cohesion with the modem tradition of individuality and
consent, and that this attempted synthesis is what makes Rousseau's thinking so
paradoxical. For a history of the development of the idea of the general will, see Patrick
Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
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depend on whether or not we desire it, and this will vary from agent to
agent, being determinied by the specific constitution of a person’s faculty
of desire. Under these circumstances, reason can provide us only with
hypothetical imperatives and not categorical ones. By granting primacy to
the law rather than its object (the common good), Kant enables us to
overcome Rousseau's confusion on this point and to formulate clear
concepts of autonomy and the general will. Kant identifies the general
will with pure practical reason; the generality of this will is derived from
the universal validity of its principles.
Kant's shift of priority from the good to the right also allows us to
soften what is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Rousseau’s political
theory- its totalitarian implications. Despite Rousseau's protestations to
the contrary, it is difficult to see how individuality can be preserved in
Rousseau's tightly and thoroughly integrated community. The individual
seems bound to be swallowed up in the collective. Each person receives
"his life and being" from the collective and, unable to do anything
without "the help of others," becomes completely dependent on the
whole. The power of the community over its members is total and
"absolute;" its authority "penetrates into a man's inmost being, and
concerns itself no less with his will than with his actions."^ jhe public
sphere expands to the point where the sphere of private life disappears,
and each person's "particular will is in all things conformable to the
general will."^^'^ Rousseau's conception of the common good is so strong
and all-inclusive that there appears to be no room left for any conception
103.jean Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on Political Economy," in Cole, The Social Contract
and Discourses, p. 127.
Rousseau, "A Discourse on Political Economy," p. 130.
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of an individual good distinct from that of the collective. Rousseau's
concern for community and his opposition to the atomizing and
dehumanizing effects of liberal individualism, though noble, in the end
forges shackles as strong and as confining as any of those clamped on us by
Hobbes.
Kant's political theory walks this fine line between the rights of the
individual and the claims of the community. In the Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals. Kant combines the legislative activity of the
collective with the pursuit of private ends in his vision of a realm of ends:
By 'realm' I understand the systematic union of different
rational beings through common laws. Because laws
determine ends with regard to their universal validity, if we
abstract from the personal difference of rational beings and
thus from all content of their private ends, we can think of a
whole of all ends in systematic connection, a whole of
rational beings as ends in themselves as well as of the
particular ends which which each may set for himselfA^^
For Kant, the "common objective laws" that form the bonds of this
"systematic union of rational beings" and govern our mutual relations is
the concern of the social contract, not the particular ends of inidividuals.
The concept of autonomy lies at the center of the social contract as the laws
of civil society are the product of a collective self-legislation in which each
member "gives universal laws in it while also subject to these Laws" and
is thus "subject to the will of no other."^06 individuals are left to pursue
their own private ends within the framework of these common laws.
This reflects the division of his Metaphysics of Morals into two parts, the
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 51. Emphasis is mine.
Kant, Foundations, p. 52.
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theory of justice (the Rechtslehre) and the theory of virtue (the
Tugendlehre) . The former discusses the external relations between agents,
which are subject to collective self-legislation as determined by the social
contract, while the latter concerns itself with the ends adopted by
individual agents, which because internal can not be subject to the
legislative edicts of civil society.
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CHAPTER III
THE IDEA OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
A. Introduction
As we saw in the previous chapter, there are essentially three
different accounts of the conceptual status of the social contract: the actual;
the hypothetical; and the ideal. Of these three different accounts, Locke's
theory is an instance of the first, Hobbes’ of the second, and Rousseau's
and Kant's of the third. In each case, of course, the social contract is meant
to guide practice, though the basis of this guidance varies from theory to
theory. Locke seeks the renewal of the original contract that bound
humans together into civil society; we are to establish that contract anew
by harkening back to the basic principles of that contract, which have
become distorted over time. Hobbes, on the other hand, argues that we
need to govern ourselves in accordance with the principles of prudential
rationality. The social contract is merely a model that enables us to discern
the operation of prudence with respect to political affairs and not any sort
of actual event, which either has or at least ought to take place. Kant
rejects both of these conceptions of the social contract, instead opting for
an account of the contract along idealistic lines.
The Kantian critique of the social contract as a hypothetical
construction was laid out in the last chapter. A hypothetical construction
can yield only hypothetical imperatives, more specifically, counsels of
prudence, which inform us as to how we are best to promote our own
happiness. Because these imperatives depend on the presence of sensuous
inclinations and on the specific contingent make-up of the agents who are
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the parties to the contract, they are not universally valid for rational
beings. Incapable of generating any properly moral, i.e. categorical,
imperatives, such an interpretation of the social contract represents an
illegitimate attempt on the part of empirical practical reason to overreach
its appropriate limits.
If, on the other hand, we construe the social contract as an actual
historical event, then some proof of its occurrence would be required for it
to be binding: "Such an assumption would mean that we would first have
to prove from history that some nation, whose rights and obligations have
been passed down to us, did in fact perform such an act, and handed down
some authentic record or legal instrument, orally or in writing, before we
could regard ourselves as bound by a pre-existing civil constitution."^
Given the lack of records at the time of the founding of civil society, this
would require an impossible feat of historical archaeology, "for savages do
not draw up documents when they submit themselves to the law, and,
indeed, from the very nature of uncivilized men it can be inferred this
was achieved through the use of violence. In the absence of any
historical documents, the theorist is left with only practical reason to fill in
the details of the contract, and this is exactly what Locke is forced to do
when he engages in speculation about the original contract. Further, as we
L Immanuel Kant, "On The Common Saying: 'This May Be True In Theory, But It Does Not
Apply In Practice'," in Kant's Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss, trans. by H.B. Nisbet, (
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970 ), p. 79. Hereafter cited as 'Theory and
Practice."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, ed. and trans. John Ladd,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 111. In addition to the impossibility of excavating
the original contract, Kant maintains that any examination of the historical origins of the
state is potentially dangerous, for it may bo used to weaken its legitimacy in the eyes of the
people.
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saw in our discussion of Locke, the claim that such an event imposes an
obligation on succeeding generations is extremely dubious.
This brings us to the key point here. Any attempt to found political
obligation and the prescription for the proper arrangement of political
society is an attempt to derive an ought from an is; it is an attempt to base
an account of how civil society ought to be constituted on a claim about
how it was constituted. Such an effort by its very nature precludes any
moral critique of the original contract, for that contract itself is put forth as
the standard by which to judge existing political arrangements. This
reverses the proper relationship between theory and practice. Instead of
theory guiding practice, practice guides theory.
But perhaps we have placed an excessive emphasis on the apparent
historicity of Locke’s presentation. While some contractarian theorists of
his time did conceive of the social contact as an historical event,^ and
there is some textual basis for interpreting Locke’s theory in a similar
fashion, Locke also recognizes that the historical reality of the original
contract is not essential to his theory, as was pointed out in the last
chapter. Instead, Locke can be interpreted as arguing that civil society
ought to be founded on a contract, even though it may not have been in
the past. Even so, this does little to salvage Locke’s theory in this respect,
for he is still committed to conceiving of the contract as an actual event.
In addition to the problem of transmissibility, the actuality of the social
contract is theoretically superfluous. Since we must rely on practical
reason to guide us in the drafting of the contract, otherwise we can not
remove the is/ought problem, the act of covenanting adds nothing to
For a discussion of Locke's predecessors and contemporaries, see Gough, The Social
Contract.
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either our understanding of the content of the contract or the obligations
that derive from it. These can be deduced directly from morality itself.
Kant maintains that the social contract "is in fact merely an idea of
reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality."^ it serves as a
standard by which to judge existing constitutions with an eye to their
improvement and as a guide to the legislator in the framing of laws,
thereby establishing the proper relationship between theory and practice.
Without this idea, we lack any standard by which to evaluate the moral
imperfections of existing civil societies, "for it is only by means of this idea
that any judgement as to moral worth or its opposite is possible; and it
therefore serves as an indispensable foundation for every approach to
moral perfection. Whether existing constitutions and laws actually
conform to the idea of the social contract is irrelevant with respect to its
truth and value, as "the canon of reason is related to practice in such a way
that the value of practice depends entirely upon its appropriateness to the
theory it is based on. "6 In constructing this idea, then, we are forced to
abstract from all the empirical and contingent conditions of human society
and to rely solely on pure practical reason itself, for "all is lost if the
empirical conditions governing the execution of the laws are made into
conditions of the law itself, so that a practice calculated to produce a result
which previous experience makes possible is given the right to dominate a
theory which is in fact self-sufficient."^ By abstracting from empirical
conditions, we obtain universal validity for the theory.
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 79.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 311
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 63.
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 63.
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Unfortunately, Kant's contribution in this regard has been given
short shrift by some commentators on the contractarian tradition.
J. W
Gough, for instance, argues that the social contract has only "pragmatic
reality" for Kant, obliging both rulers and ruled to act "'as if it were real."
Further, he dismisses it as purely superfluous since one's political
obligations can founded directly on the moral law.8 But the social contract
simply is the moral law as applied to politics and, as such, is an integral
part of the Kantian system of morality. This sort of interpretation fails to
grasp the role of ideas in the critical philosophy. For Kant, 'idea' is a
technical term, the specific meaning of which can be understood only in
the context of the critical philosophy.
In the next section, I will examine Kant's theory of ideas in general.
In doing so, I will situate that theory in the context of Kant's critical
philosophy and present the rationale Kant adduces for his account of
ideas. In section C, I will turn from the general to the particular by
considering Kant's treatment of the idea of freedom, of which his theory
of the social contract is one aspect. Section D will be devoted to a
discussion of the defects with Kant's account of freedom. Finally, I will
conclude in section E with some remarks on the fundamental importance
of freedom for both theoretical and practical reason.
B. The Theory Of Ideas
Kant occupies the position of a transitional thinker within the
history of western philosophy. He is deeply attached to the tradition of
rationalist metaphysics, but the epistemological doctrine he propounds in
Gough, The Social Contract, p. 183. See also Lessnofs discussion of Kant.
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Q’itique of Pure Reason is one of the most trenchant critiques of that
very same tradition. Torn between the limits imposed upon reason and
knowledge by his own epistemology and his unwillingness to relinquish
fully rationalist metaphysics, Kant searches for some way of reconciling
these conflicting demands. The theory of ideas is the means by which
Kant attempts to effect this reconciliation.
Norman Kemp Smith points out that Kant actually works with two
distinct, though not necessarily incompatible, conceptions of ideas- a
skeptical one and an idealist one.9 Though Kemp Smith does not argue
for this, these two conceptions correspond roughly to the distinction
between theoretical and practical reason. I will use this as the organizing
principle of my discussion and begin by examining what I take to be the
skeptical conception.
According to the skeptical conception of ideas, reason is just
understanding in its self-regulating capacity. Ideas, or concepts of reason,
are merely the categories extended beyond the realm of possible experience
and applied to things-in-themselves. This extension is the result of the
natural tendency of reason to seek the unconditioned and must be
defended against by exposing the "natural and inevitable" illusions to
which this tendency gives rise, a task Kant undertakes in the
Transcendental Dialectic. Ideas, however, do have a legitimate cognitive
function. Properly understood, they are regulative principles that govern
the subjective conditions of thought and not objects themselves. The
explanation of these remarks requires a brief excursion into the
Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique .
Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (New Jersey:
Humanities Press, 1984), p. 425-31.
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The central question that Kant seeks to answer in the first Critique
is: How can synthetic judgments concerning the independently real be
known a priori?^0 it is obvious how analytic judgments can be known a
priori, for in such judgments we are merely explicating the content of our
concepts, and for this we need only the definitions of the appropriate
terms and the rules of formal logic.^^ But synthetic judgments are
ampliative. What they assert cannot be justified simply by appealing to
the meanings of their component terms, for they provide us with
substantive information that can not be gleaned from mere conceptual
analysis. Since we are concerned with judgments known a priori, any
appeal to experience is strictly forbidden here. Kant, however, does not
stop here. As a result of his encounter with David Hume's skeptical attack
on the traditional conception of causation as necessary connection, Kant
recognized that the synthetic a priori also lies at the root of our empirical
knowledge. The empirical knowledge provided by science consists of laws
of necessary connection, but, as Hume points out, sense experience alone
presents no such connection. Through the senses, we can discover only
Kant first posed this question in a letter written to his friend Marcus Herz after the
Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, in which he had espoused the view that such knowledge
was possible. "In my dissertation, I was content to explain the nature of intellectual
representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not
modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However, I silently passed over the
further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way
affected by it can be possible. I had said: The sensuous representations present things as
they appear, the intellectual present them as they are. But by what means are these
things given to us, if not by the way in which they affect us? And if such intellectual
representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are
supposed to have with objects- objects that arc nevertheless not possibly produced thereby?
And the axioms of pure reason concerning these objects, since the agreement has not been
reached with the aid of experience?" Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence 1759-
99, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 72.
Kant defines the analytic/synthetic distinction in terms of judgments that involve only
subjects and predicates. My description of the distinction is more expansive than this and
includes judgments that are not in strict subject/predicate form.
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the constant conjunction of two different types of events, which produces
a habit of association on the part of the mind. Even our empirical
knowledge, then, contains elements that can not be derived from
experienced but must be given a priori. But on what basis can we establish
reason's claim to provide such a priori knowledge?
Kant's answer is both elegant and simple. We cannot have a priori
knowledge of the independently real, but we can have such knowledge of
that which is dependent on our own mental activity. We can know a
priori what our mental activity contributes to the objects of experience.
Thus, synthetic judgments known a priori do not apply to things as they
are in themselves, independent of our own mental activity, but to things
as they appear to us, for the mind is active with respect to appearances.
We construct experience with the aid of concepts provided by our own
understanding. Human knowledge, then, has two distinct sources:
understanding and sensibility. Understanding provides the form of
thought, while sensibility provides the matter of thought.^ 2 are
absolutely necessary, if we are to have knowledge, for "without sensibility
no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be
thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without
concepts are blind."^3 Rationalism focuses on the former to the exclusion
of the latter, whereas the opposite is the case with empiricism. Both
rationalism and empiricism fail as accounts of human knowledge because
they do not take adequate account of the two sources of knowledge,
understanding and sensibility, and the corresponding duality of our
The picture is a bit more complicated than this. The mind also provides the form of
sensibility, space and time or the pure forms of intuition, which is the source of
mathematics.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 93.
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mental activity, that it is both active and passive, combining spontaneity
and receptivity.
The form of our experience of the world is provided by the
understanding through its own pure concepts, the categories. In order to
establish this claim, Kant employs a particularly powerful argumentative
strategy. Kant starts with the fact of self-consciousness or intelligible
thought and then deduces its necessary conditions. Since all potential
critics must accept the starting point of self-consciousness to even enter
into debate, Kant has constructed an argument for which, if it is successful,
there can be no reply. In brief, Kant points out that 'I think' must be
capable of accompanying all of our diverse representations
('representation* is Kant's generic term for any mental event). For this to
be possible, unity must be introduced into the manifold of our
representations by means of synthesis. The categories are the rules by
which the manifold of representation is synthesized so as to produce the
necessary unity, and thus without the categories, no intelligible thought
would be possible. But the categories require some material on which to
operate, for otherwise they are mere empty forms of thought. The matter
of experience is provided by sensibility in the form of intuition. The
faculty of sensibility is the receptive capacity of the mind, and the resulting
representations are intuitions. The categories, then, synthesize a manifold
of intuition into a connected, coherent experience.
By arguing in this fashion, Kant provides a powerful justification
for the existence of synthetic judgments known a priori, but he does so at
the cost of restricting those judgments to appearances only. The categories
require material in the form of intuition for their operation; in the
absence of intuition, the categories are incapable of determining an object.
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The categories, then, and the principles based on them apply only to
phenomena, or appearances, and not to noumena, things-in-themselves,
that is, their application is restricted to the domain of possible experience.
Reason, however, naturally seeks to transcend this limitation of its
powers and in doing so generates dialectical illusions. Because it seeks
what Kant terms the unconditioned" for any conditioned events or
judgment, reason is impelled by its own nature to transcend the bounds of
experience, where only the conditioned can be found. This process is best
illustrated by the logical employment of reason:
reason, in its logical employment, seeks to discover the
universal condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and the
syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment made by means of
the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (the
major premiss). Now since this rule is itself subject to the
same requirement of reason, the condition of the condition
must therefore be sought (by means of a prosyllogism)
whenever practicable, obviously the principle peculiar to
reason in general, in its logical employment, is: to find for
the conditioned knowledge obtained through the
understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is
brought to completion.
Kant construes every judgment about the world as the conclusion of a
syllogism. The major premise of this syllogism is itself a judgment that is
in turn the conclusion of another syllogism , the major premise of which
is justified as the conclusion of a still further syllogism. Thus, we are
caught in an regress that can only brought to an end by finding some
judgment that is not the conclusion of a syllogism, that is, some condition
that is itself unconditioned.
The same holds true of the real employment of reason, its
application to events in the world. For every event, we seek to determine
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 306.
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its cause or condition, as we know that every event has a cause, i.e. is
connected with another in accordance with a rule. A complete
explanation of any event would involve a statement of all the conditions
leading up to its occurrence, namely it would provide the totality of
conditions for the specific conditioned in question. Experience, however,
presents only the infinite regress of one event serving as the condition of
another succeeding event, and thus, the series of conditions can never be
brought to completion by any possible experience. In order to end its
restless quest for the unconditioned, reason must transcend the range of
possible experience and its infinite series of conditions for any
conditioned. Reason does this by illegitimately applying the categories,
which serve only to determine possible experience, to things in
themselves, depriving them of an object and thus all content. This move
is certainly understandable, for the categories find ample instantiation in
experience, but in the process reason succumbs to transcendental illusion.
The purpose of the Transcendental Dialectic is, in part, to expose and
explain these "natural and inevitable" illusions by locating them in reason
itself.
Ideas do, however, find a legitimate, even necessary theoretical
employment in the regulation of the understanding. Where
understanding operates on intuition by means of the categories, reason
operates on the understanding by means of ideas. The concepts of reason,
then, are related only mediately to the objects of experience. Ideas are
heuristic principles that guide the operations of the understanding
towards systematic unity in its investigation of nature. This systematic
unity involves the subsumption of the greatest variety of rules under one
principle:
90
multiplicity of rules and unity of principles is a demand of
reason, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into
thoroughgoing accordance with itself, just as the
understanding brings the manifold of intuition under
concepts and thereby connects the manifold. But such a
principle does not prescribe any law for objects, and does not
contain any general ground of the possibility of knowing or
of determining objects as such; it is merely a subjective law or
the orderly management of the possessions of our
understanding, that by the comparison of its concepts it may
reduce them to the smallest possible number,.. .15
An example of an idea is the scientific principle of simplicity of theory.
This principle is neither true nor false, but merely regulative of our
theoretical activity by specifying a desideratum for theory construction and
acceptance. The systematic unity posited by the idea "is only a projected
unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only."16 The
unconditioned can never be an object of experience, and experience is
never fully adequate to the idea of the unconditioned. Nonetheless, ideas
are used to guide us in extending and systematizing empirical knowledge;
"If the concepts of reason contain the unconditioned, they are concerned
with something to which all experience is subordinate, but which is never
itself an object of experience."!^
As pointed out earlier, however, Kant often works with an idealist
conception of ideas, as opposed to the skeptical conception. Conceived of
idealistically, reason is a faculty, independent of and in fact superior to
understanding, with concepts and interests all its own. Here, Kant takes
his cue from Plato:
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.305.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 535.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 308-9.
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Plato made use of the expression 'idea' in such a way as quite
evidently to have meant by it something which not only can
never be borrowed from the senses but far surpasses even the
concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied
himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met
with that is coincident with it. For Plato ideas are archetypes
of the things themselves, and not, in the manner of the
categories, merely keys to possible experiences. In his view
they have issued from highest reason,. .^8
In the idealistic conception of reason and its ideas, the whole precedes its
parts, and the unconditioned is prior to the conditioned. Ideas are
indispensable to the conditioning of experience, revealing its phenomenal
character.
Kant borrows a great deal from Plato's account of ideas, adapting it
to meet the requirements of the critical philosophy. According to Kant,
Plato possessed an intimation, however obscure, of the true nature of
reason, for he "realized that our faculty of knowledge feels a much higher
need than merely to spell out appearances according to a synthetic unity,
in order to read them as experience," and "that our reason naturally exalts
itself to modes of knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of
experience that no give empirical object can ever coincide with them, but
which must none the less be recognized as having their own reality, and
which are by no means mere fictions of the brain."^^ Kant, however, only
approves of Plato's use of ideas as regards morality and rejects Plato's
attempt to extend their use to mathematics and to employ ideas to acquire
speculative knowledge of the nature of things-in-themselves. While
recognizing the legitimate regulative employment of ideas by theoretical
reason, Kant asserts that it is "in regard to the principle of morality.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 310.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 310-11.
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legislation, and religion, where the experience, in this case of the good, is
itself made possible only by the ideas- incomplete as their empirical
expression must always remain- that Plato's teaching exhibits its peculiar
merits."20 Kant argues that the substantive practical employment of ideas
IS absolutely necessary, for we need some standard by which to judge
virtue and vice, right and wrong. Experience can not provide such a
standard but only examples of it, for we need this standard in order to
evaluate our experiences in the first place. We can recognize an instance
of personal virtue only by comparing individuals to the idea of virtue.
Any attempt to derive the idea of virtue from examples of virtuous
conduct is doomed to failure, for it must presuppose the idea of virtue in
order to determine instances of it.
The substantive employment of ideas is made possible by the nature
of practical reason itself. Where the aim of theoretical reason is
knowledge of the phenomenal world, the end of practical reason is action.
Practical reason "deals with the grounds determining the will, which is a
faculty either of bringing forth objects corresponding to conceptions or of
determining itself, i.e. its causality to effect such object."21 Theoretical
reason, as a cognitive faculty seeking knowledge of objects of experience,
can employ ideas only as regulative principles, because ideas, being
without any intuition on which to operate, do "not contain any ground of
the possibility of knowing or of determining objects as such." But practical
reason is unconcerned with knowledge of appearances, except insofar as
such knowledge is necessary for the attainment of its ends, rather it is
concerned with the determination of the will, for which it needs ideas.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 313.
2^- Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p.l6.
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The objective reality of ideas is derived from the capacity of the will to be a
cause of objects. Thus, "we give objective reality" to an idea, "at least in a
practical context, because we regard it as the object of our will as pure
rational beings. ^2 xhis is possible because of our freedom as rational
agents. Practical reason, then, enables us to arrive at the unconditioned in
the form of freedom; in fact, Kant defines 'the practical' as "everything
that is possible through freedom."23
The idea of freedom, then, is the fundamental concept of practical
reason, and we need to explore the nature of this idea in order to place the
social contract in its appropriate theoretical context. The social contract
covers one aspect of the idea of freedom; it regulates external relations
among rational agents by defining the conditions of maximum equal
freedom for those agents. As such, it partially defines Kant's conception of
a community of rational agents as expressed by his notion of the realm of
ends.
C. Freedom
Freedom, the spontaneous causality of an agent by means of which
a series of conditions is initiated, is the most important form of the
unconditioned in the critical philosophy. Because 'ought' always implies
'can', freedom is the sine qua non of moral responsibility. If it is the case
that we ought to act in a certain fashion, then it must be the case that we
can act in that manner. Strict determinism threatens that freedom, and
hence morality, because if all actions are events that are causally
necessitated by preceding conditions, then there is no sense in which we
^2- Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 45.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 632.
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can meaningfully assert that we could have acted differently than we in
fact did. Freedom, then, is the ratio essendi of the moral law, and the
moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. We are subject to the
moral law because we are free, and we know we are free because we are
subject to the moral law.
The necessity of making some place for freedom governs the
structure of the critical philosophy and motivates the distinction between
phenomena and noumena. If theoretical reason could provide knowledge
of things as they are in themselves, then freedom would be impossible, for
each action would then be the effect of an infinite series of causal
conditions over which the agent had no control. In order to make room
for freedom, and hence morality, Kant restricts the applicability of the
categories and theoretical reason to possible experience, finding "it
necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."24
The possibility of freedom and its reconciliation with the strict
determinism found in nature is established by Kant's resolution of the
third antinomy in the Transcendental Dialectic. An antinomy consists of
two contradictory propositions, a thesis and an antithesis, each of which is
established by a rational argument that decisively refutes the other. The
antinomies threaten the integrity of reason, for in them reason is brought
into conflict with itself, and thus reason must find some way of resolving
them if it is to preserve its legitimacy. In the case of the third antinomy,
the thesis states that there exists an unconditioned causality of freedom,
whereas the antithesis states that there is no such freedom, rather every
event occurs in accordance with natural necessity, i.e. laws of nature.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 29.
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Kant resolves the conflict between the thesis and the antithesis by
appealing to the distinction between noumena and phenomena. As
demonstrated in the Transcendental Analytic, the relation of cause and
effect is constitutive of all possible experience; hence the antithesis is true
of phenomena or appearances. But the phenomenal world, the world of
appearances, is not exhaustive of all being. There also exists a world of
noumena, a world of things as they are in themselves and not as they
appear to us in accordance with conditions of our consciousness, where it
is at least logically possible that there is a spontaneous causality of
freedom. The understanding is a distinct faculty from sensibility. The
categories, as pure concepts of this faculty, are concepts of objects in general
and thus have wider application than to just intuition, albeit a
problematic one. Without intuition, the categories lack the material
necessary for the determination of an object and thus remain empty forms
of thought. Nonetheless, we can at least think without contradiction of
these categories as being applied to noumena and giving rise to a notion of
transcendental freedom, though they do not thereby determine an object
of possible experience. The critique of theoretical reason, then, establishes
the possibility of the freedom necessary for morality, though not its
actuality, which is established by the moral law. Since the noumenal
world contains the ground of the phenomenal world and as noumena we
possess the freedom that would enable us to act differently than we in fact
do act, we can be held responsible for actions, despite the fact that as
phenomena we are subject to the strictest determinism. By restricting the
claims of theoretical reason to the realm of possible experience, Kant
creates a vacuum, which can then be filled by practical reason.
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The skeptical conception of ideas, then, establishes the possibility of
a spontaneous causality on the part of noumenal agents by checking the
attempt of the understanding to provide us with knowledge of things as
they are m themselves by means of an application of the categories beyond
the realm of possible experience. The space created thereby can then be
filled by the idealist conception of ideas, which allows us to conceive of the
laws governing the operation of this spontaneous causality or freedom.
By its very nature, causality must always be exercised according to
laws, for causality just is the connection of events in accordance with a
rule. The application of the category of cause to noumena, then, entails
the governance of noumena by laws. Therefore, qua free agents, we are
still subject to laws, though of a different type than laws of natural
necessity:
Since the concept of a causality entails that of laws according
to which something, i.e. the effect, must be established
through something else which we call cause, it follows that
freedom is by no means lawless even though it is not a
property of the will according to laws of nature. Rather it, it
must be a causality according to immutable laws, but of a
peculiar kind.25
The laws that govern our activity as free agents are laws of freedom, as
opposed to the laws of nature that govern our behavior as phenomena.
Laws of freedom prescribe how things ought to be, as opposed to describing
how they actually are, and in doing so, govern the exercise of our freedom.
Just as the laws of nature are constitutive of nature, the laws of freedom
are constitutive of freedom.
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. by Lewis
White Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 65, [446]. Hereafter cited as
Foundations.
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Since the categories provide the form of all possible experience, they
are constitutive of the empirical world. Their objective reality is derived
from the fact that they [the concepts of the understanding] constitute the
intellectual form of all experience."26 On the other hand, the concepts of
reason or ideas merely serve in their theoretical capacity to regulate the
manner in which we think about that world so that it accords with the
demands of reason and, consequently, they possess only subjective reality.
As concepts of practical reason, however, the ideas possess objective
reality, for they guide or regulate our action by providing us with an object
of the will in the form of a model. Herein then lies the crucial difference
between ideas in their theoretical and in their practical employment; in
the former, ideas are purely regulative, whereas in the latter they are also
constitutive.27 in fact, ideas of practical reason can only regulate our
activity because they are also constitutive of an object that serves as the
end of rational action.
Like the categories, the ideas derive from the legislative capacity of
the mind. Theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason, then, for it
26- Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 308. Kant does formulate this distinction in a different
manner in the Transcendental Analytic. There Kant claims that not all of the categories
are constitutive of possible experience. The axioms of intuition and the anticipations of
perception are constitutive, because they are essentially quantitative or rules of
mathematical synthesis that "enable us to determine appearance as magnitude," i.e., they
are constitutive of objects of possible experience. As essentially qualitative, however, the
analogies of experience and postulates of empirical thought do not allow this since they
require material provided by sense. Consequently, the analogies of experience and the
postulates of empirical thought are purely regulative. (Ibid., A178-80=B221-23; Smith, pp.
210-11) I think we see here a shift in the meaning of this distinction between the
Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. In the former, Kant is concerned
with objects in the world, whereas in the latter his concern is with the world of objects, i.e.
the whole as opposed to its parts. The usage of the Dialectic is carried over into the
Critique of Judgment . (See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar,
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), pp. 3-5. Note that Kant states that reason "does not contain
any constitutive a priori principles except for the power of desire." Emphasis is mine.)
22- See Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 48-9.
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is the in practical, the self-legislation of rational agents, that reason finds
Its telos: "it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature in her wise
provision for us has indeed, in the constitution of our reason, been
directed to moral interests alone."28 Practical reason, through its
legislative capacity, posits the end of all our activity, for the attainment of
which theoretical reason is employed. .
In the Canon of Pure Reason of the first Critique. Kant describes a
free will as an arbitrium liberum; it is a will that is independent of
sensuous impulses and is instead capable of being motivated by reason.
This is contrasted with an arbitrium brutum, a will that is determined
pathologically according to laws of nature.29 Kant deepens this account
considerably in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals by
providing an account of the law that governs such a will and the
corresponding motive that determines it. A free will can be determined by
the pure form of legislation, universality or the fitness of a maxim to
serve as a universal law for all rational agents. A free will, then, is
identical with a will that is subject to moral law. The strict proof of this
claim is found in the Critique of Practical Reason.30 Here Kant
demonstrates that we are free if and only if we are subject to moral law.
We prove the first half of the biconditional by assuming that we are
subject to moral law, i.e. that the legislative form of a maxim is sufficient
to determine the will and then derive the character of a will that can be so
determined. Now the form of a law can only be thought by reason and
thus is not an object of experience, or appearance; these can provide only
28- Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 632-3.
29- Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 633.
80- Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 28-9.
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the material or object of a law. Hence, the conception of the form of law as
the determining ground of the will is distinct from determination by
natural causes, the determining grounds of events in nature, for these are
appearances. If the sole determining ground of a will were universal
legislative form, this will would have to be independent of the natural
causal order, which just is transcendental freedom. Such a will, then,
would have to be a free will. In order to prove the other half of the
biconditional, Kant assumes that the will is free, i.e. independent of the
natural causal order, which is freedom in the negative sense, and then
determines what type of law would be competent to determine such a will.
Now empirical conditions are part of the world of sense and, as such, are
governed by a thoroughgoing determinism. Thus, a free will must be
determined independently of empirical conditions. Therefore, a free will
must find its determining ground in the law but not in the material of the
law, which is empirical. Since outside the material of the law there is only
its legislative form, the legislative form of a maxim must be the
determining ground of a free will, that is, the moral law is the
determining ground of a free will. The positive and negative conceptions
of freedom, then, are reciprocal concepts that "can not be used to explain
each other." Kant fuses these two conceptions together in the concept of
autonomy, "for they can, however, be used for the logical purpose of
bringing apparently different conceptions of the same object under a single
concept," that being the concept of autonomy.^^
Now as we have seen, the laws of freedom apply not to phenomena
but to noumena and are constitutive of an intelligible world, which is
Kant, Foundations, p. 69.
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independent of the empirical world and is presented as possible through
our will. The totality of these laws of freedom is not just a aggregate, but
constitutes a system, for which "a special kind of systematic unity,
namely the moral, must likewise be possible. Kant's claim that reason
demands multiplicity of rules and unity of principles" is the clue to
understanding the place of the social contract in this system. The highest
principle of the system of morality is the categorical imperative. This
system is then sub-divided into two parts, the theory of justice and the
theory of virtue, with the idea of the social contract serving as the highest
principle within the theory of justice. The idea of the social contract is
the application of the categorical imperative to one dimension of human
existence, the domain of external relations among a manifold of moral
agents, and is used as a canon for the rules that govern these relations. As
a canon of practical reason, the social contract determines the moral
permissibility or impermissibility of laws, just as the law of non-
contradiction, a canon of theoretical reason, determines the logical
possiblity or impossibility of judgments. The social contract requires
unanimous agreement among all rational agents with respect to all laws
governing their external relations. According to the idea of the social
contract, a law is permissible if and only if it is possible that it could
command the unanimous agreement of purely rational agents.
Now there is an ideal that corresponds to every idea. The idea
provides the rule for the construction of the ideal, which is the idea "not
merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is, as an individual thing,
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 639, 637.
33- The distinction between the theory of justice and the theory of virtue is discussed in
detail in Chapter Four.
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determinable or determined by the idea alone" and serving as an end or
object of the will 34 Thus, from the idea of the social contract, we can
construct the ideal civil constitution, which is "a constitution allowing the
greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the
freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others."35 The
ideal serves as the model or archetype that we gradually seek to
approximate in reality.36 in any historical period, civil society is
inadequate when judged by the standard of the ideal, and we are obligated
to improve upon this state of affairs: "This perfect state may never,
indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect the rightfulness
of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organization of mankind
ever nearer to the possible perfection, advances this maximum as an
archetype."37 Though we may never be able to instantiate perfectly the
ideal, we can gradually approach the ideal through our collective efforts
over the course of history. In this sense, an ideal is analogous to a limit in
calculus; we approach the ideal asymptotically, so that at the limit we have
attained it.
An ideal, and the idea determining it, possesses reality even if no
instance of it can be found actually existing within the world. Ideas and
ideals possess objective reality, albeit only practical reality, as grounds
determining the will: "to this nature we give objective reality, at least in a
practical context, because we regard it as the object of our will as pure
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 485.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 312. Later in this passage, Kant does call this civil
constitution as a "necessary idea," but I think he is misusing his own terminology here,
which is not uncommon for Kant. See footnote 37 for an explanation of this.
36- Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 486.
37- Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 312. Here again Kant calls the perfect civil state an
idea. But he also explicitly describes the perfect civil constitution as an archetype, and
archetypes just are ideals.
102
rational beings."38 The reality of the ideas stem from the will as a cause of
objects. Reason, then, possesses a causality that takes ideas, which are
purely transcendent for theoretical reason, and endows them with an
immanent use as grounds determining the will: "Thus reason, which
with its ideas always became transcendent when proceeding in a
speculative manner, can be given for the first time an objective, although
still only practical reality; its transcendent use is changed into an
immanent use, whereby reason becomes, in the field of experience, an
efficient cause through ideas."39
D. Problems with Kant's Theory
Kants account of ideas and their role within the critical philosophy
is far from satisfactory. Despite his heroic efforts, the resources provided
by Kant's epistemology simply cannot meet the demands of his ethical
theory. Ultimately, Kant's resolution of the third antinomy fails to
provide the necessary epistemological and ontological basis of his ethics, as
the bifurcation of being into noumenal and phenomenal worlds leads to a
divorce between agency and action and prevents Kant from constructing
the shared, intersubjective world that is necessary for morality in general
and the social contract in particular.
At the root of Kant's ethics lies the conflict between reason and
inclination. The distinction between autonomy and heteronomy itself
expresses this conflict by locating two essentially different grounds of the
determination of the will, one in reason and the other in sensuous desire.
Further, the very idea of an imperative is defined in terms of this conflict.
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 45.
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 49.
103
Laws of freedom are expressed as imperatives for us because our
adherence to them is not necessary, as it would be for a holy will. Practical
laws merely describe how a perfctly rational agent would act. But human
beings are not perfectly rational; rather, they are influenced by desires and
impulses that often lead them to act contrary to the dictates of reason. For
this reason, laws of freedom are imperatives or commands and not
descriptive statements. Within the confines of Kant’s ontology, however,
there is simply no way to make sense of this conflict. Sense and the
resulting inclinations are attributes of phenomena and not noumena.
Reason, however, is a property of us as noumenal agents. Since
inclination and reason operate within two different worlds, there exists no
common arena in which they may come into conflict with each other,
each being restricted to its own distinct sphere of activity.^O
Now Kant does point out that, while noumena and phenomena are
different they are not wholly separate and cut off from each other. Rather,
the noumenal or intelligible world serves as the ground of the
phenomenal, phenomena being the product of the synthesizing activity of
noumenal agents: "But since the intelligible world contains the ground of
the world of sense and hence of its laws, the intelligible world is (and must
be conceived of) as directly legislative for my will, which belongs wholly to
the intelligible world. As I am a noumenal agent and member of the
intelligible world, "all my actions would completely accord with the
principle of the autonomy of the pure will."'^^ Now it is difficult even to
make sense of these claims, for it is incomprehensible how a noumenal
For a detailed discussion of this point, see Robert Paul Wolff, The Autonomy of
Reason,(New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
Kant, Foundations, p. 72.
Kant, Foundations, p. 72.
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agent, who is timeless, can engage in action, which is always temporal, or
how a timeless intelligible world can be legislative for a temporal
phenomenal world. The difference in kind seems to be so great as to
render these claims unintelligible.
Now one might maintain, as Karl Jaspers does in his study of Kant,
that the reflexive nature of Kant's project, thinking about thought,
necessarily breeds contradictions, tautologies, vicious circles, and (I would
add) category mistakes.43 So let us accept all of this at face value for the
sake of argument. From the two aforementioned claims, it follows that
there should be no moral imperfections in the phenomenal world. If as a
noumenal agent my will is legislative for phenomena and that will is
purely rational, i.e. always acts according to the moral law, the moral law
should always be perfectly instantiated in the phenomenal world.
Whence, then, arise the moral flaws and imperfections of the
phenomenal order, which it is our duty to remove under the guidance of
the ideas? Why does not the phenomenal world accord completely with
the moral law? Perhaps noumenal agents find themselves in a situation
similar to that of Plato’s Demiurge in the Timaeus. confronted with a
material of synthesis that is flawed and not wholly susceptible to their
power. But if this is the case, then responsibility for immorality can not be
placed on any agent.
Ultimately, the strict identity between freedom and rational agency
that Kant argues for in the second Critique is too restrictive and prevents
us from making sense of morally blameworthy actions. If a moral will is
Karl Jaspers, Kant, (New York; Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1962), pp. 34-43.
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identical with a free will, then it follows that by definition an immoral
will is not free.
Kant deepens this account in both Relieion within the Limits of
Reason Alone and Ihe Metaphysics of Morals by distinguishing between
two different faculties involved with action, Wille and Willkur. Wille
just is practical reason itself, whereas Willkur is our capacity to choose
and, as such, is the locus of the traditional conception of free will.44 As a
property of noumenal agents, however, we can have no substantive
knowledge about the nature of Willkur, but can only define it negatively
as our independence from determination by sensuous impulses. The
faculty of Willkur is capable of incorporating incentives derived from
sensuous inclinations into its maxims and thus has the capacity to adopt
and act on maxims contrary to the dictates of practical reason or wille.45
But this distinction is of little avail here. Given the sharp separation
between the noumenal and the phenomenal, one can not make sense of a
noumenal agent acting according to maxims that are derived from her
phenomenal inclinations and desires.
The second major problem here is the lack of intersubjectivity in
the critical philosophy. The epistemology of the first Critique does not
permit the construction of a common, shared world of experience, in the
absence of which there can be no concept of the social sufficient to make
sense of a social contract and external relations among moral agents. This
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Iiisticc, pp. 12-3. 'Wille' is often translated as
legislative will, while 'willkur' is translated as elective will or choice. This seems to
capture the distinction that Kant intended to bring out with these two different terms.
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by Theodore M.
Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 19. Hereafter cited as
Religion .
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can be best illustrated by examining the interaction between individual
action and human history.
I assume at the outset of this discussion that there is a one to one
correspondence between noumenal and phenomenal selves. Now if an
agent is to be held responsible for an action, it must be possible for that
agent to have acted differently. But given the strict determinism that
governs the world of appearances, any action performed by a phenomenal
agent is the product of an infinite series of conditions that stretch back
long before even the birth of that agent. Thus, for any agent to act
differently than he in fact does act, the whole history leading up to that act
would have to be different; a change in even one action presupposes some
change in the whole of history, however insignificant. Now Kant opens
up the possibility of alternative courses of action by appealing to the
synthesizing activity of the transcendental ego or noumenal self as the
ground of the phenomenal world. Presumably, the series of conditions for
a conditioned action could have been different because it could have been
constructed differently by the transcendental ego responsible for its
synthesis, and consequently the resulting action would also have been
different. Thus, in order for there to be different courses of action
available, the moral agent must be capable of changing the whole of
history, including that which occurred before his birth. In itself, this is
pretty tough to swallow, but there is more.
Given the interdependence between human beings, any difference
in the series of conditions would almost certainly affect other phenomenal
selves in some manner, an effect that would have to be reflected in the
synthesizing activity of the corresponding noumenal self. A change in
any one phenomenal world necessitates a similar change in every
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phenomenal world and this raises the question as to how there can be
such a harmony among phenomenal worlds. While different
phenomenal selves can encounter each other in the same phenomenal
world, there is no way that different noumenal selves can do so, for only
one one transcendental ego can occupy the position of author of or law-
giver to any phenomenal world. If we are to preserve a multiplicity of
noumenal agents, then it seems that we are left with only an inexplicable
pre-established harmony of synthesis among noumenal agents, with each
phenomenal world being monadic in character.46
But none of this will do if we are to make sense of Kant's ethics and
politics. We have duties towards other individuals and those individuals
have rights, only because they are rational agents. We are obligated to
treat other rational agents as ends and not solely as means simply because
they are rational, but individuals are rational only insofar as they are
noumena. As an appearance, a phenomenal self is no different from any
other natural entity, such as a tree, and is likewise subject to the laws of
nature. Now I have no obligations towards a tree as such. Though I may
have certain duties regarding my use of a tree stemming from my
obligations to other rational agents, unless that tree can be shown to
possess rationality, it has no claim to be treated as an end-in-itself and can
be used as a mere means to an end. Phenomenal selves occupy the same
position vis-a-vis myself as a tree does; they only acquire the moral status
of a person if they are rational agents. But they are only rational agents, if
there is a noumenal self to which they correspond and this is impossible.
One could, of course, retain Kant's epistemological framework and still establish a
single phenomenal world by arguing that there is only one mind that effects the required
synthesis, but this would eliminate the possibility of social interaction or external
relations among agents, which is a requirement of the social contract.
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There can only be one noumenal self that corresponds to any phenomenal
self in my experience, and that is my own noumenal self, for only I can act
as the lawgiver to my own experience. Thus, I have no moral obligations
to any phenomenal being I encounter in experience. This clearly will not
do as an ontological basis of morality. Morality requires that rational
agents share some common world of experience. Without this shared
world, there can be no concept of the social and hence no social contract.
The collective legislative activity of a multiplicity of agents implied by the
social contract is simply impossible within the Kantian epistemological
and ontological framework.
E. Conclusion
What then are to make of all this? We are faced with a clear choice
between Kant's epistemology and his ethics, and something must give.
Kant himself claimed that were an irreconcilable conflict between freedom
and determinism arise, we would be forced to abandon freedom in favor
of natural necessity.
As some commentators on Kant’s ethics have pointed out, we can
view human action from two distinct perspectives, that of an observer and
that of a participant.47 From the standpoint of an observer, human action
is merely another type of event within the natural order and occurs in
accordance with same laws of natural necessity that govern all natural
processes. Given sufficient knowledge of those laws and existing
conditions, an observer could predict with exactitude the behavior of any
For discussions of this point, sec H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 235-36, 266-68 and Beck, A
Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 29-32.
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human being. From this standpoint, human freedom is only an illusion,
a pathological feeling misleading us as to our real situation. But from the
perspective of the individual engaged in action, the situation is radically
different. As agents, we must deliberate on different courses of action and
decide on the basis of the reasons we proposes to ourselves. This process
presupposes the existence of freedom on our part, for we must make
choices concerning available courses of action. But this is a purely
subjective condition of thought and action, which from the standpoint of
the scientific observer has no basis in objective reality.
One is tempted to argue that the best we can do is to claim that as
agents we must act as if we were free, though in fact we are not. This
move is not wholly unfaithful to Kant. Kant himself maintains that "the
laws which would obligate a being who was really free would hold for a
being who can not act except under the idea of his own freedom."48
Certainly, human beings fall into this latter category. The moral law
merely states how an individual who was truly free ought to act, and since
we must act as if we were free, it applies to us as well. This clearly will not
do, however. Such a move might be sufficient to sustain a conception of
prudential rationality, but if an individual is not truly free, there is no
good reason for that individual to follow the dictates of morality contrary
to those of prudence. If we are not truly free, then we are not bound by
any moral obligations and should discard even the pretence of morality as
an illusion, conducting our affairs in accordance with prudential
rationality, though this too be an illusion. Since we can not escape from
Kant, Foundations, p. 66.
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the subjective fantasy of rational deliberation, let us look after ourselves as
best we can.
If we are to preserve morality, then despite Kant's protestations to
the contrary, we must relinquish Kant's epistemology as unworkable and
opt for freedom in order to preserve his ethical and political theory. At
the level of the architectonic, Kant insists on the necessity of determinism
for theoretical reason, but at a deeper level, Kant recognizes not only that
freedom is necessary for moral obligation, but that it is an essential
precondition of theoretical reason as well. If we are to consider our
judgments as grounded in reasons, we must consider those judgments to
be free of determination by natural causes, for "we can not conceive of a
reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside with
respect to its judgments, for then the subject would attribute the
determination of its power of judgment not to reason but to an
impulse. "49 in the absence of freedom, judgments are determined
causally by impulses and not rationally by evidence and logical
demonstration. The concept of justification would then have to be
discarded and with it any claim to knowledge. We simply can not retain
the claims to knowledge made by theoretical reason without accepting the
logically prior claim that we possess transcendental freedom, and for this
reason, if there is a conflict between freedom and natural necessity,
freedom must win out.
One can only admire Kant's uncompromising commitment to
retaining both freedom and determinism and his tenacity in attempting to
reconcile them without glossing over the moral implications of the latter.
Kant, Foundations, pp. 66-7. Kant's point here is similar to the one made by Bishop
Bramhall against Hobbes- there is an essential difference between reasons and causes.
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But despite his best efforts, transcendental idealism proves to be an
inadequate vehicle for establishing the claims of theoretical reason while
preserving those of practical reason. For the remainder of my discussion,





In this chapter, I will examine Kant's justification of the moral
necessity of civil society. In order for this justification to be both cogent
and compatible with the rest of his moral theory, Kant must successfully
complete two tasks. First, he must reconcile the sovereign authority of the
civil state with the moral autonomy of the individual and thereby
establish the possibility of an obligation to enter into civil society. If Kant
cannot effect this reconciliation, then membership in civil society cannot
be a morally legitimate condition. But Kant cannot rest content with the
bare possibility of such an obligation. Thus, as his second task, he must
establish the actuality of our obligation to enter into civil society, that is to
say, he must demonstrate that the establishment of civil society is not only
permissible but also necessary.
In the short essay on theory and practice, Kant declares that the
social contract differs from all other types of contracts in that agreement to
it is obligatory and may be exacted through the use of force. In all
contracts, we find a union of different individuals, but only in the social
contract do we find "a union as an end in itself which they all ought to
share and which is thus an absolute and primary duty in all external
relationships whatsoever among human beings (who cannot avoid
influencing one another)," and this union "is only found in a society in so
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far as it constitutes a civil state, i.e. a commonwealth.'’^ One has a duty to
enter into civil society, and should one refuse, one may be forced to do so.
Unlike Hobbes or a utilitarian theorist, Kant can not appeal here to
the happiness that civil society makes possible or to some other end that
can only be attained through it. Such an appeal would generate only a
hypothetical imperative, not a categorical imperative, and transform the
social contract into a purely hypothetical construction, not an idea of
practical reason. Instead, Kant must find some way of grounding a
categorical imperative commanding entrance into civil society as a duty.
Kant locates this ground in the necessity of property for action and civil
society as the necessary condition of the institution of property.
But before he can establish that we actually have a duty to enter into
civil society, Kant must first establish the possibility of such an obligation.
The civil union envisioned in the social contract involves the subjection
of all members of the commonwealth to "coercive public laws by which
each can be given what is due to him and secured against attack from any
others. "2 This subjection of persons to law generates what Kant calls "the
general problem of civil union": how "to combine freedom with a
compulsion that is yet consistent with universal freedom and its
preservation. "3 Kant comes face to face here with Rousseau's
"fundamental problem" of political philosophy: "How to find an
association which will defend the person and goods of each member with
the collective force of all, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no
1- Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 73. Kant uses the term 'social contract' in this passage to
apply to all contracts, but I of course will use it such a manner as to preserve its traditional
meaning in political theory.
2- Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 73.
Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence. 1759-99. ed. and trans. Amulf Zweig,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 132.
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one but himself, and remains as free as before."^ In short, Kant must
reconcile the moral autonomy of the individual with the political
authority of the state. In the absence of any reconciliation, there can be no
morally legitimate civil society and no obligation to enter into it.
The problem is as follows. Political authority is the right to
promulgate laws and enforce those laws through a publicly-recognized
monopoly on the use of coercion. Laws are in essence binding commands
issued by the sovereign, who exercises political authority, to the subjects of
the state, who for their part are obligated to obey. But the fundamental
attribute of moral agency is autonomy, i.e. self-legislation or the capacity of
a will to give laws to itself. The moral agent, then, is bound only by those
laws that he or she has legislated for him- or herself. Subjection to the
dictates of some source other than one's own reason, for example the will
of another, is heteronomy, the contrary of autonomy. The existence of
political authority places one in a condition of heteronomy vis a vis
whoever exercises political authority, because it subjects one to the
commands of that person and not one's own reason. Hence, political
authority, and with it civil society, is always morally illegitimate.^
4- Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 60.
For a provocative discussion of this problem, see Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism .
Professor Wolff argues that the problem is insoluble and that the only condition in which
persons can retain their autonomy is anarchy. Professor Wolff draws this conclusion because
he fails to appreciate the collective dimension of Kant's conception of autonomy and thus
his construal of the notion of autonomy is excessively individualistic; to put this point into
Kant's terms, he conceives of autonomy "distributively" rather than "collectively." Kant
is deeply concerned in his political theory with avoiding the pitfalls of a one-sided
emphasis on either the individual or the collective. This concern is manifest in his
conception of a community of rational agents (the realm of ends) as a totality, a s)mthesis of
the concepts of unity and plurality. I will discuss this point in greater detail in the next
chapter. For an important interpretation of Kant that emphasizes the central role the
concept of totality plays throughout both the pre-critical and critical corpus, see Lucien
Goldmann, Kant, trans. Robert Black, (London; New Left Books, 1971).
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Let us now formulate this problem in the terms of contractarian
discourse. In a state of nature, there exists no public authority with the
power to issue and enforce laws binding upon all citizens. Consequently,
individuals are left to their own devices and are free to fend for
themselves in whatever way they see fit, this freedom being bounded only
by the superior physical force of other individuals. Upon entering into
civil society, each individual relinquishes this anarchic freedom and
subjects him- or herself to a public authority that is authorized to legislate
and enforce laws on behalf of all citizens within civil society. Now such a
transition from a state of nature to civil society may be desirable on purely
prudential grounds, as Hobbes argues, but from Kant's perspective it is
highly problematic. In abandoning the state of nature, each person seems
also to be abandoning his or her moral autonomy and placing him- or
herself in a condition of heteronomy. Kant, then, faces the difficult task of
legitimating this transition and the resulting civil society by
demonstrating the compatibility of political authority with moral
autonomy.
In order to solve this problem, Kant begins with the basic insight
derived from Rousseau that civil society produces a moral transformation
in the nature of individuals. The person as a moral agent is qualitatively
different in civil society than in a state of nature. In civil society, one can
be just or unjust, whereas such notions simply do not apply in a state of
nature: "Certainly, a state of nature need not be a condition of injustice...;
it is, however, still a state of society in which justice is absent."^
C Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, p. 76.
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By entering into civil society, the individual "has completely
abandoned his wild lawless freedom in order to find his whole freedom
again undiminished in a lawful dependency, that is, in a juridical state of
society. 7 in the state of nature, one is free because one is capable of self-
legislation (that is, one has the capacity for autonomy), but this freedom is
lawless for as yet the capacity for self-legislation has not been fully
actualized. The self-legislation of moral agents, in so far as we are
concerned with their external relations with each other, is a collective
enterprise that can only be carried out through the civil union established
by the social contract. As regards external relations among moral agents,
Kant espouses a contract theory of morality, in which the specific duties
one moral agent has towards another are determined and systematized
through the idea of the social contract.
I shall develop my argument in this chapter in the following
manner. In the section that follows, I shall examine Kant’s discussion of
the nature of juridical legislation and its attendant duties of justice. This
will lead into a discussion in section C of Kant's conceptual unification of
freedom and coercion in the notions of justice and rights. Section D will
be devoted to an exposition of Kant’s deduction of the most important
type of right- the right of property. In section E, I shall complete my
exposition of Kant’s argument by displaying the essential connection
between the establishment of civil society and the institution of property.
I shall conclude this chapter with some remarks on both the conditional
character of our obligation to enter into civil society and the collective
dimension of moral autonomy.
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, pp. 80-1.
117
B. Juridical Legislation and Duties of Justice
Legislation is always composed of two parts: the prescription of an
action and an incentive to the performance of that action.8 Kant employs
this latter component as the basis for a distinction between two types of
legislation- juridical and ethical. Both ethical and juridical legislation
prescribe actions as duties, but whereas ethical legislation makes the idea
of duty the incentive for performance of its prescribed actions, juridical
legislation looks elsewhere for its incentives. Juridical legislation plays on
each person's natural desire for happiness by employing pathological
incentives derived from human inclinations and disinclinations,
specifically the latter as a form of coercion. Thus, while both ethical and
juridical legislation may prescribe the same action, they differ with respect
to the incentives for the performance of that action.
Now the actions prescribed by juridical legislation are duties and, as
such, ought to be performed simply for duty’s sake. Even if the incentive
of external coercion is lacking, one is still obligated to obey the
prescriptions of juridical legislation, for "ethics teaches only that, if the
incentive that juridical legislation combines with duty, namely external
coercion, were absent, the Idea of duty alone would still be sufficient as an
incentive."^ Consequently, every duty prescribed by juridical legislation is
also prescribed by ethical legislation, though the reverse is not true.
"Hence, though there are many directly ethical duties, internal legislation
makes all the rest indirectly ethical. "^0
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 18.
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 20.
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 21
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Kant calls those actions prescribed by juridical legislation "duties of
justice and those specific to ethical legislation "duties of virtue." Since
the incentive provided by juridical legislation is external compulsion and
not the idea of duty itself, only an external action can be a duty of justice.
One can always be compelled to perform any external action, however
internal actions are not susceptible to coercion. Consequently, the
adoption of an end, which is an internal act, can only be a duty of virtue.
One may be forced to perform an action that contributes to the realization
of a certain end, but one can never be compelled to adopt that end as one’s
own. This distinction between duties of justice and duties of virtue gives
rise to the division of the Metaphysics of Morals into two parts, the theory
of justice and the theory of virtue. The former, the first part of the
Metaphysics of Morals, is devoted to duties of justice, whereas duties of
virtue are the subject of the latter, the second part of the Metaphysics of
Morals . Because it deals with external relations among moral agents,
juridical legislation must be a social, collective enterprise, and the first
action it prescribes is entrance into civil society. On the other hand, ethical
legislation is primarily concerned with the internal adoption of ends by
individual moral agents and thus is individualistic in orientation.
There are two types of juridical legislation: natural law and positive
law. Natural law is rooted in reason, and the duties of justice prescribed by
it are recognizable a priori. Further, natural law provides the principles
that ought to guide positive law. Positive law, however, requires actual
external legislation in order to be binding and depends on the authority of
the legislator. The authority of the legislator consists of "his authorization
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to obligate others through his mere wiil" and is ground in natural law."
But how can such authority be possible?.
As pointed out in the introduction, autonomy is the condition of
being bound only by those laws that one has legislated for oneself, that is,
of being self-legislating. The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy, the
condition of being bound by laws that have been legislated by another.
The authority of the legislator consists of his ability or right to obligate
others through his will, i.e. to issue morally binding commands in the
form of laws. But in the exercise of this authority, the legislator reduces
those who are subject to his commands to a condition of heteronomy
Thus, political authority seems to be incompatible with the autonomy of
moral agents.
Now Kant's conception of political authority might at first glance
seem unnecessarily strong. Political authority need not be the right to
obligate others through the issuance of binding commands; rather,
political authority might be conceived merely as consisting of the
monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion. Such a conception of
authority is suggested by Kant's own conception of juridical legislation as
being external in nature and as involving external incentives that consist
primarily of the use of force.
This approach does not provide a satisfactory solution to the
problem, however, for we still require some explanation of why this use of
force is legitimate. One may use force to insure performance of a duty of
justice simply because the performance of such an action is a duty. Thus,
if one is permitted to use coercion to insure compliance with positive law.
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 26.
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then it can only be because positive law consists of duties of justice, duties
that are imposed by the will of the legislator. Locke's solution is to claim
that the authority of the legislator to impose obligations on his subjects
derives from the consent of those same subjects to that authority. But this
solution is unacceptable, for it implies that one can abdicate one's
autonomy by transferring legislative authority over one's own will to
another. This is exactly what happens when we abandon reason and
subject ourselves to our sensuous inclinations, and the result is the same-
heteronomy.
The conflict between autonomy and authority strikes at the very
heart of Kant's political theory, for it threatens the integrity of the idea of a
social contract. In terms of logical priority, the most fundamental claim of
Kant's politics is that we have an obligation to enter into civil society, yet
there can be no such obligation if one must relinquish one's autonomy in
fulfilling it. Kant solves this problem by demonstrating that autonomy
and authority are not diametrically opposed; on the contrary, they are not
even distinct notions. He accomplishes this identification by means of the
concept of a right.
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C. Justice and Rights^ 2
According to Kant, the moral concept of justice is applicable under
three conditionsd3 First, it applies only to the external relations of moral
agents, in so far as these agents mutually influence each other. Second,
the concept of justice concerns the relation of one will to another. Finally,
justice is not concerned with the intended ends of moral agents, which is
the concern of the theory of virtue. Now it is not clear that these
conditions are actually distinct from one another. The difference between
the first and second conditions is more a matter of expression than
substance, for the relation of one will to another just is the external
relation between those two wills. As for the third condition, it is merely
negative and is actually a consequence of the first. Since the ends pursued
by a moral agent are internal to that agent, they are not subject to external
legislation and are not duties of justice.
Taking all three conditions together, it is clear that Kant intends the
concept of justice to cover the totality of external relationships and
interactions among moral agents. We are to imagine a system of
individual moral agents bound together in a state of dynamic community.
In such a community, there are no relations of subordination; all
^2- The German word 'Recht' can be translated into English using either 'law,' 'justice,' or
'right,' depending on the context. The difference lies in whether Kant is concerned with the
whole (as the whole corpus of law or the totality of external relationships) and the
principles that ought to govern it (in which case 'law' or 'justice' respectively would be
appropriate), or whether we are concerned with something particular (as, for example, the
specific rights of individuals). For the most, 1 chosen to follow Ladd's translation here, for
it seems to me to be quite satisfactory. For a discussion of these points, see Ladd's
"Translator's Introduction," in Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, pp. xv-xviii.
^3- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 34.
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members are coordinate with each other and co-exist in a thoroughgoing
reciprocity of mutual interaction. This system is analogous to the natural
world. In the natural world, the interaction of material entities, the
relations among which are similarly external, are determined by the
relative forces of attraction and repulsion, forces which operate according
to laws of nature. moral world, however, is not subject to the
conditions of space and time, since qua moral agents we are noumena.
The laws governing this world are not physical but juridical, and the body
of these laws is called "jurisprudence." Juridical laws prescribe how
interactions among moral agents ought to take place, not how they do
occur, and are enforced by the use of coercion. In the ideal case, juridical
laws are legislated collectively by the agents themselves.
In section C of the Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of
Tustice, Kant sets forth what he calls the "universal law of justice" as the
fundamental principle of juridical laws: "act externally in such a way that
the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone
according to a universal law."^^ Kant claims that this law is a "postulate"
of pure practical reason and is "not susceptible to further proof." Anyone
who prevents me from acting in a manner consistent with this law does
me an injustice.
While the universal law of justice requires me to restrict my own
freedom, it also permits me to restrict the freedom of others. Kant argues
that the coercion employed in restricting the activities of others is
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, p. 37.
Por an interesting discussion of this analogy, see Hans Saner, Kant's Political Thought:
Its Origins and Development, trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1973). Saner argues that this is one of three themes or forms of thought that has its origin
in Kant's pre-critical period and runs throughout his mature critical philosophy.
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 35.
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compatible with freedom and that justice or right involves the
authorization to use coercion. He bases this argument on the principle
that anything that counteracts the hindrance of an effect is consistent with
that effect and in fact serves to promote it. Any unjust action or condition
is by definition a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws.
Consequently, if a certain use of freedom is unjust, then the use of
coercion to counteract or prevent it is just, that is to say, it is consistent
with freedom according to universal laws. It follows from this last claim
and the law of contradiction that "justice [a right] is united with the
authorization to use coercion against anyone who violates justice."^^
I am authorized to use coercion against anyone who would act
unjustly towards me, just as others are authorized to use coercion against
me so as to prevent me from doing them an injustice. Thus, "strict justice
can be represented as the possibility of a general reciprocal use of coercion
that is consistent with the freedom of everyone in accordance with
universal laws."^® We find, then, freedom and coercion combined in the
same concept, that of justice or of a right: "the concept of justice <or of a
right> can be held to consist immediately of the possibility of the
conjunction of universal reciprocal coercion with the freedom of
everyone.
The notion of a right embodies this duality. A right is not only the
freedom to act in a certain way; it is also the authorization to use coercion
to prevent someone from hindering me in the performance of that action.
If I have the right to perform an action, then I am authorized to use
1^- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 36.
1®- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 36.
19- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 36.
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coercion to prevent someone from hindering me in that action. The
positive and negative conceptions of freedom are again indissolubly
united, for my freedom to do engage in a specific action always involves a
corresponding freedom from external interference with the performance
of that action. Thus, " 'right' <or 'justice'> and the 'authorization to use
coercion' mean the same thing."20
Just as law is divided into natural and positive, so rights are divided
into innate and acquired. Innate rights belong to us by virtue of our
nature as human beings, whereas acquired rights are established by actual
juridical acts. Positive law, then, serves to determine our acquired rights.
Though there are many acquired rights, there is only one innate right:
"Freedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar as
it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a
universal law, is the sole and original right that belongs to every human
being by virtue of his humanity. "2^ We are autonomous agents, and our
autonomy ought to be respected insofar as it is consistent with the
autonomy of all other moral agents. Acquired rights specify the actual
terms of that autonomy in the social world. As we shall see in the next
section, the most important acquired right is the right of property.
D. Property22
Property is the locus of our interaction with other moral agents. In
order to pursue our particular private ends, we must avail ourselves of
external objects as means to those ends. In using these objects, we come
20- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 37.
21- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 43-4.
22- For useful discussions of Kant's theory of property, see Shell, The Rights of Reason, pp.
127-52, and Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, pp. 77-96
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into conflict with others wishing to use those same objects in the pursuit
of their private ends. These conflicts must be resolved in a manner that
respects the autonomy of the different moral agents involved, and such a
resolution is possible only in civil society.
According to Kant, an object is my property if its unauthorized use
by another would constitute an injury to me: "An object is mine de jure if
I am so bound to it that anyone else who uses it without my consent
thereby injures me."23 if this object is external to me, then it is mine only
if such use would constitute an injury even if the object were not in my
possession. Now at first glance, this last claim appears to be contradictory,
for it asserts that I can possess an object even when I do not possess it. In
order to avoid this contradiction, Kant distinguishes between two types of
possession: sensible or empirical; and intelligible or rational. Sensible
possession of an object is detention, actual physical possession. Intelligible
possession, however, is possession regardless of detention; it is pure de
jure possession. Now the term 'external' has two different senses here. In
the first sense, an object is external to me, if it occupies another position in
space and time. In the second sense, an object is external to me if and only
if it is distinct from me, i.e. the object and I are different entities. When
'external' is used in the first sense, possession is sensible; when used in
the second sense, possession is intelligible.
With intelligible possession, we abstract from the conditions of
space and time. The nature of the concepts involved make this abstraction
both possible and necessary. We are concerned here with pure practical
concepts, and such concepts allow reason to transcend the limits of sense
23- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 51.
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experience and its forms, space and time, though they provide us with no
speculative knowledge thereby. Further, since we are concerned with the
interaction of moral agents, i.e. noumena, our concepts must not be
limited by the conditions of space and time. These concepts are
independent of the material provided by intuition:
The possibility of intelligible possession and hence also of
what is externally yours or mine can not be intuited, but
must be inferred from the postulate of practical reason.
There is something especially noteworthy in that here
practical reason proceeds without intuitions, not needing
even a single a priori intuition, and extends itself by simply
omitting empirical conditions, a procedure justified by the
law of freedom.24
Now Kant provides two different formulations of this postulate of
practical reason. His first is as follows: "it is possible to have any and
every external object of my will as my property. "25 Later, he changes this
formulation so that it reads: "It is a duty of justice to act toward others so
that external objects (usable objects) can also become someone's
[property]. "26 it is on the latter formulation that he bases his deduction of
the concept of intelligible possession. Since it is a duty to act according to
this principle, it must be possible to do so. It can only be possible to do so if
intelligible possession is possible. Thus, intelligible possession must be
possible.
My focus will be on the second formulation of the juridical
postulate, since it is clearer and more easily connected to his claim that we
have an obligation to enter into civil society. Though a postulate of
practical reason is not supposed to be demonstrable as such, Kant does in
24- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, p. 64.
25- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 52.
26- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, p. 60.
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fact provide a justification for this postulate in section 2 of the first chapter
on Private Law. Kant is concerned here with the question of right (quid
juris), for which he must provide a "deduction" or proof.27 His approach
here is similar to that which he employed in the Transcendental
Deduction of the categories in the First Critique .28 Where in the latter he
argued that the categories were necessary for self-consciousness and
intelligible thought, in this section he argues that property is a necessary
condition of morally acceptable action. This argument is central to Kant's
political theory, for it is on the necessity of property that Kant builds his
argument for the crucial claim that we are obligated to enter into civil
society.
Kant defines an object of the will as an external object that I have
the power to use. This power or physical capacity to make use of an object
must be distinguished from the authority to make use of it, and it is the
latter that characterizes property. An object of the will is our property
when we not only have the power to make use of it, but in addition the
right or authority to do so. Without property rights, we would not have
the right or authority to employ any external object for our own purposes,
whatever they might be, and in the absence of such authority, any
employment of an external object would be morally illegitimate. Thus, if
property were prohibited, the will would be denying itself the use of any
means for the achievement of its ends. But if one wills the end, then one
wills the necessary means to that end. Now action is always purposive or
ends-oriented. Hence, in order to act, one must be authorized to use
external objects as means to one's ends, that is to say, one must have the
See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.l20.
See Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 185.
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right to property. Of course, we have no choice but to act and in fact are
commanded to perform certain actions by the moral law. Therefore,
individuals are authorized to acquire external objects as property and in
doing so impose obligations on others to refrain from making use of those
same objects without prior consent.
Though he generally writes in terms of private property, there is
nothing in Kant’s conception of property that would limit it solely to this.
Quite the contrary, Kant recognizes the possibility of communal
property.29 Such property is characterized by a prohibition directed to all
private individuals to refrain from appropriating it for themselves alone.
As with private property, it is not held in common by nature, but requires
a juridical act or contract in order to acquire this status.
E. Civil Society
We have finally arrived at the point where we can examine Kant's
claim that we have an obligation to enter into civil society, his argument
for which is quite simple. We have a duty to act so that external objects of
the will can be someone's property. Property is possible only in civil
society. Therefore, we have a duty to enter into civil society with each
other. I have discussed the first premise in the preceding section and now
turn to the second premise.
I think there are essentially two different views in the Metaphysical
Elements of Tustice regarding the relationship between civil society and
property. In the first view, property is possible in the state of nature, but it
is merely provisional. In order to guarantee the security of our
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 58.
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provisional property, we enter into civil society. This is similar to Locke's
argument for the necessity of civil society, the difference being that Locke
holds that property in the state of nature is more than just provisional.
According to the first view, the right to property is based on the
innate common possession of the earth, and the general will
corresponding to this common possession that permits private possession.
One acquires an object as property by being the first to possess it
empirically, and this is possible in a state of nature. Since the general will
permits the acquisition of private property, "taking possession .... is an act
of private will without being an arbitrary usurpation."30 Though property
is possible in the state of nature, it is extremely insecure, as each
individual is left to fend for him- or herself in defending his or her
property. A private individual alone can not guarantee the security of his
or her own property against threats by others, so each individual must
unite his or her will with the private wills of all other persons in order to
create a public legislative authority with sufficient power to provide the
requisite guarantees. Thus, one enters into civil society, retaining in the
process everything that one possessed in the state of nature. The laws
governing property relations in civil society are exactly the same as those
laws in the state of nature. The only difference between civil society and a
state of nature in this regard is that the laws of civil society are backed by a
public lawful coercion, that is to say, "a civil constitution only provides
the juridical condition under which each person's property is secured and
guaranteed to him, but it does not actually stipulate and determine what
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Kistico, p. 57.
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that property shall be."3t For this reason, we can say that "in the state of
nature, there can be actual external property, but it is only provisional. "32
This view IS clearly the dominant one in the Metaphysical Elements
of Justice . But if this were all Kant were claiming, he would have made
precious little advance over Locke and learned nothing from Rousseau, at
best presenting a thoroughly secular version of Locke's theory of property
and its relation to civil society. Fortunately, a stronger alternative position
is imbedded in the text. The heading of section 8 in the first chapter on
Private Law states that "having external things as one's property is
possible only in a juridical condition of society, under a public-legislative
authority, that is, a civil society. "33 in the very next section, however,
Kant retreats from this position and adopts the view presented above.
This move is quite typical of Kant's procedure in his political theory; Kant
often sets forth a bold claim, only to weaken it in the very next breath.
The shift in doctrine from section 8 to section 9 substantially weakens
Kant's theory and opens it to several objections.34
First, Kant has mixed pure and empirical practical concepts in that
he has made first empirical possession into the ground of intelligible
possession. With intelligible possession, we are supposed to abstract from
the conditions of space and time, yet a temporal condition, first possession,
is supposed to be the ground of intelligible possession. Certainly, the
concept of intelligible or de jure possession must "be applied to objects of
3t- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 65.
32- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 65.
33- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 64.
34- In general, commentators on Kant's politics accept the weaker doctrine of provisional
property without criticism. Even Mary Gregor, whose approach is in many ways similar to
my own, commits this error. See Mary Gregor. The Laws of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1963), pp. 50-63.
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experience, the knowledge of which depends on temporal and spatial
conditions."35 But if first possession is to be the condition of application,
then we are entitled to an argument establishing this claim, and Kant
never provides us with one.36
Second, Kant claims that there is only one innate right, freedom. If
law specifies our rights and natural law specifies our right to property,
then it is difficult to see how Kant can square the claim that we have
property rights (of which there would seem to be many) in a state of
nature with the claim that we have only one innate right.
But there is a more fundamental problem with this view. Our right
to property is based on our innate common possession of the land and the
corresponding general will permitting private possession. We have only
one innate right, and any right to an external object is an acquired right
based on positive law. Now, the acquisition of an external object is right
only when it is in accordance with the general will. But the general will
does not exist in a state of nature, rather it is produced by the uniting of
private wills together upon entrance into civil society. In a state of nature,
we act according to our own private wills. We all have the right to follow
our own individual judgment as to what is best, as there is simply no
general, public standard to which we can appeal. Upon entrance into civil
society, however, we unite our separate private wills into a general will
capable of legislating for all. Outside of civil society, in a state of nature,
this general will does not exist. As we shall see, Kant himself recognizes
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Tusticc, p. 61.
If we accept that provisional property is possible in the state of nature, then in this
respect, Kant did not even advance as far as Locke. Locke at least provides a justification of
private appropriation prior to civil society based on the application of one's labor to
nature.
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this point. Thus, the general will permitting private property does not
exist in the state of nature, and any acquisition of property outside the
legal framework of civil society is nothing but an arbitrary usurpation. In
a state of nature, one may possess an object empirically but not de jure, for
de jure property requires the recognition of other moral agents and that
can only take place in civil society.
In section 44 of the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice. Kant argues
that if provisional property were impossible, civil society would likewise
be impossible. In doing so, Kant makes property the condition of the
possibility of civil society, when in fact the converse is the case. He writes:
If it were held that no acquisition, not even provisional
acquisition, is juridically valid before the establishment of a
civil society, then civil society itself would be impossible.
This follows from the fact that, as regards their form, the laws
concerning property in a state of nature contain the same
things that are prescribed by the laws in civil society insofar as
they are considered merely as pure concepts of reason; the
only difference is that, in the civil society, the conditions are
given under which the [right of] acquisition can be exercised
(in conformity with distributive legal justice). Accordingly, if
there were not even provisional property in a state of nature,
there would be no duties of justice with respect to them, and
consequently, there would be no command to quit the state of
nature.37
If we examine this passage carefully, we can see the confusions and the
contradictory elements involved in the doctrine of provisional property
and its relation to civil society.
Let us consider for a moment the argument that Kant puts forth
here. The conclusion Kant wishes to draw allegedly "follows from the fact
that, as regards their form, the laws concerning property in a state of
nature contain the same things that are prescribed by the laws in civil
37- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 77.
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society." Now the form of a law simply is its universality, that is, its
universality of application to moral agents as well as its universality as
being legislated by those same agents. In fact, a law is universally
applicable because it is universally legislated; it is because we have all
given the law to ourselves that we are all bound by it. Now this is just
what the idea of the social contract expresses- that our external relations
with each other ought to be governed by those laws to which we could all
as rational agents agree. The laws that govern property, then, are to be
determined in accordance with the social contract. Thus, rather than being
the necessary precondition of civil society, property presupposes the social
contract and the civil union it prescribes as an end-in-itself. As Kant
himself states in "Theory and Practice," the union of individuals in civil
society is the "primary duty in all external relationships whatsoever."
Now Kant's confusion here leads him into a contradiction. In the
penultimate sentence of this passage, Kant asserts that the conditions for
the acquisition of property are given in civil society, which is correct. But
if this is the case, then clearly there can be no property in a state of nature,
since the conditions for its acquisition are not present. The primary
condition for the acquisition of property is of course the general will.
Given the absence of the conditions required for legitimate appropriation,
provisional property can be nothing more than usurpation.
We are left, then with Kant's initial claim that property is only
possible in civil society. This is a much stronger position, and there are
sufficient materials available in the text to sustain such an interpretation
along these lines. For example, in section 8 of the first chapter on Private
Law, Kant writes:
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Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, a
unilateral Will can not serve as a coercive law for everyone,
since that would be a violation of freedom in accordance with
universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone
else- that is a collective, universal (common), and powerful
Will- is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee
required. The condition of being subject to general external
(that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil
society. Accordingly, a thing can only be externally yours or
mine only in civil society.^s
This passage is especially important for my reading of Kant and as such
bears careful examination. We see here a subtle shift in Kant's position.
In the first sentence, Kant takes the strong, and I think correct, position, by
arguing that a unilateral private will cannot legitimately claim any
external object as its property, even one in its physical possession. He then
weakens this stance by maintaining that a general will provides only the
security for property that is lacking in the state of nature. Finally, Kant
reverts to his original strong position and draws the correct conclusion
that property is only possible in civil society. Let us now examine that
inference.
When I appropriate something as my own, I impose an obligation
on others to forbear from using it without my authorization. Similarly, I
am reciprocally bound to respect the property of all others. Thus, when I
declare that some object is my property, I am in effect legislating for all
moral agents; I am binding them to an obligation through an act of my
will. But the legislation of a unilateral private will cannot produce the
universality required, for this would violate the autonomy of all other
moral agents. I can not legislate for others without making them
dependent on my will, thereby impinging on their autonomy. Only a
general, collective will can provide the necessary universality, while at the
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 65.
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same time preserving the autonomy of all moral agents involved. Now
only through the establishment of civil society can the required union of
private wills into a general will be effected. Disputes over property, then,
are resolved by appeal to the laws promulgated by this general will. In this
way, no moral agent is able to impose his or her private will on any other
moral agent. Therefore, while detention or physical possession is possible
in the state of nature, property is only possible in civil society.
Since all moral agents participate in the general will, when one
submits oneself to the general will, one is obeying only those laws that one
has legislated for oneself. These laws are universal, not only because they
apply universally, but also because they can command universal
agreement. That is, all agents, in so far as they are rational, could agree to
be bound by such laws. Further, since everyone legislates for everyone,
there is no possibility of injustice. If one individual legislates for another,
there is always the possibility that the former will do the latter an
injustice. But no individual qua perfectly rational agent can do him- or
herself an injustice. Those laws, then, that can command the unanimous
agreement of moral agents are just and specify those external duties that
we have towards other individuals, i.e. our duties of justice. Civil society,
then, guarantees the security of one's property, but also determines what
that property shall be and how it may be acquired.
F. Conclusion
In his politics, Kant is grappling with the fundamental question of
how individuals can live together in community with each other and yet
remain autonomous. The idea of the social contract provides the answer
to this question by displaying in ideal terms the conditions under which
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this is possible. But just as the categories of the understanding are
conditionally a priori, this idea is conditional in character, . The idea of
the social contract applies only under the condition that persons must
inevitably come into contact with one another, and this is a contingent
fact. Given that we find ourselves interacting with each other, the social
contract determines the conditions and laws that ought to govern this
interaction.
Though its applicability is dependent upon a contingent fact, the
validity of the idea is still independent of the empirical character of the
individuals involved, for as an idea it applies to rational agents as such.
"Even if we imagine men to be ever so good natured and righteous before
a public lawful state of society is established," we are still obligated to enter
into a civil union governed by the social contract.^9 For this reason,
interpretations of the Kantian social contract that emphasize its
instrumental character are misleading.^o It is true that at times Kant
writes as if this obligation depended on the specific nature of the human
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 76.
See Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, and Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, as
well as his Will and Political Obligation . I trust that in the last chapter I paid sufficient
attention to the problems with Williams' interpretation in this regard; however, I think
further attention to Riley's is in order here. Riley's teleological interpretation of Kant's
politics emphasizes the purely instrumental character of civil society as regards the status
of persons as ends in themselves. Civil society serves to realize legally certain moral ends
and provides a context for the flourishing of a good will on the part of individuals by
removing impediments to its development. While it is certainly true that civil society does
further the development of a good will on the part of its members, the civil union generated
by the social contract is not just a means to that end but an end in itself. Civil society is not
established simply to secure some given rights or ends, but to establish what those rights
are in the first place. As an idea, it plays a constitutive role in the determination of our
obligations towards other persons. 1 shall discuss Riley's interpretation further in the next
chapter.
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beings,4i but m doing so, Kant ignores the ideal character of the social
contract.
Kant rejects anarchy as the appropriate condition for moral agents,
for true autonomy can never be exercised in such a condition. In the state
of anarchy, which just is the state of nature, each person "will have his
own right to do what seems just and good to him, entirely independently
of the opinion of others. "‘^2 Hence each individual would be subject, at
least potentially, to the will of any other individual possessing superior
power, and thus be placed in condition of heteronomy vis a vis that
individual. True autonomy as regards external relations among moral
agents is collective in nature. Through collective self-legislation, we
determine the rights of individual moral agents within society, most
importantly their property rights. Since this activity can only be carried
out in civil society, we are obligated to enter into civil society. Outside of
civil society, there can be no juridical legislation compatible with the
autonomy of moral agents.
"Because he can quite adequately observe within himself the inclination of mankind in
general to play the master over others (that is, man's inclination not to respect the rights of
others when he feels superior to them in might or cleverness), it is unnecessary to wait for
actual hostilities. A man is authorized to use coercion against anyone who by his very
nature threatens him." Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, p. 71-2. Here Kant
depicts human beings in a fashion quite similar to that of Hobbes, with the result that the
state of nature is a state of war even when there are no actual hostilities.
'^2- Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 76.
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CHAPTER V
THE A PRIORI PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
A. Introduction
We now turn our attention to an examination of the content of
Kant s idea of a social contract. Here we seek to determine what principles
autonomous rational agents would agree to upon entering the social
contract, a task posing especially difficult problems for Kant. As we saw in
the first chapter, the notion of the social contract has historically proven to
be extremely indeterminate when it comes to providing us with
substantive political principles. The social contract is nothing but a
principle of unanimity; it requires unanimous agreement among
contracting individuals on the principles that are to guide the
organization and activities of civil society. Construed in this manner, it is
a purely formal principle of construction that is capable of receiving
whatever substantive content with which we wish to imbue it ( as
evidence of this, witness the divergent claims by Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau, all of which are allegedly justified by the social contract). As
one commentator has put it, "Barely stated, it is a mere formula which can
be filled with any content from absolutism to pure republicanism."^
Clearly, such a criticism is a damning one for social contract theory. If the
idea of the social contract is to fulfill the normative function that Kant and
other theorists attribute to it, it must specify some determinate principles
as its content, principles that can serve to guide the organization and
L G. D. H. Cole, "Introduction," J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses .
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activities of existing civil societies. Without this content, the idea of the
social contract provides no standard that can be used in the reform of our
political institutions.
Traditionally, this deficiency has been remedied by making use of
assumptions about the nature of human beings and the specification of
their reasons for entering into the contract. Both Hobbes and Locke make
assumptions about human nature (in particular, the sociability of human
beings) that enable them to flesh out their constructions of the state of
nature and specify the ends that human beings hold, the satisfactory
pursuit of which requires the establishment of civil society. As we have
seen, the differences between their appraisals of human nature account for
the differences in respective theories of the social contract.
No such resources are available to Kant, however. As a pure
concept of practical reason, the social contract is an agreement among
purely rational agents and abstracts from all empirical conditions,
including the empirical character of the agents involved in its
construction. In short, Kant appears to be faced with the hopeless task of
deriving substantive principles of politics from a purely formal constraint,
namely, unanimity of agreement among purely rational agents. Expressed
this way, Kant's project seems rather unpromising.
Now this problem is not specific to Kant's politics, but is
symptomatic of Kant's ethical theory as a whole and is rooted in his
account of the categorical imperative. The same charge of vacuity leveled
against contractarianism has a long history as a criticism of Kant's ethics,
and thus this problem is especially acute for his version of the social
contract. Kant is often charged with an excessive formalism that is
incapable of yielding any substantive moral judgments, but is in practice
140
compatible with the grossest immorality. We find one of the earliest
statements of this line of criticism in Hegel's early work Natural Law .2 in
order to set the stage for our discussion in this chapter, I will examine
Hegel s critique in some detail and, in doing so, will quote liberally from
Hegel's text.
Hegel argues that Kant's moral theory is nothing more than an
abstract formalism in which "we can recognize only the formal Ideal of the
identity of the real and the ideal. This formal ideal provides only a
negative criterion of right: "The construction of this practical philosophy
rests on the presentation of what this negative absoluteness can achieve.'"^
In the process of this construction, all content is drained from morality,
leaving us with only a barren formalism:
Kant, the man who expounded this abstraction of the concept
in its absolute purity, recognizes full well that practical reason
totally renounces the content of the law and can do nothing
beyond making the form of fitness of the will's (Willkur)
maxim into supreme law. The maxim of the arbitrary will
iWillkiir) in choosing has a content and includes a specific
action, but the pure will is free from specification. The
absolute law of practical reason is to elevate that specification
into the form of pure unity, and the expression of this
specification taken up into this form is the law. If the
specification can be taken up into the form of the pure
Concept, if it is not cancelled thereby, then it is justified and
has itself become absolute through negative absoluteness as
law and right or duty.^
In Kant's own terminology, practical reason provides only a canon of
acceptability for maxims of the will in the form of the categorical
2- G. W. F. Hegel, Natural Law, trans by T. M. Knox, (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1975).
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 71.
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 71.
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 75
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imperative, or fitness to be universal law. A canon is a purely negative
criterion, a conditio sine qua non, which can only rule out maxims as
unfit to be universal law and hence morally unacceptable. As a canon, the
role of the categorical imperative in practical reason is analogous to that
played by the law of non-contradiction in theoretical reason, and subject to
the same limitations. (We shall discuss this point further in the next
section in order to assess the validity of Hegel's criticism.)
According to Hegel, Kant correctly recognizes that theoretical reason
can provide no universal standard of truth. The truth of judgment is a
matter of its content as well as its form. In the Introduction to the
Transcendental Logic Kant adopts a traditional correspondence theory of
truth- truth is the "agreement of knowledge with its object." A universal
criterion of truth would have to be valid in all instances of knowledge,
regardless of the variation among the objects of judgment. Given the
infinite diversity of objects of knowledge, there can be no one criterion
capable of covering them all as regards their content, for "such a criterion
[being general] can not take account of the [varying] content of
knowledge." Theoretical reason, then, provides only the law of non-
contradiction as a formal criterion of truth.
Hegel continues that Kant fails to discern the similarity here
between practical reason and theoretical reason. Practical reason finds
itself in the same situation as regards duty that theoretical reason find
itself in as regards truth. In each case, it is the content that is crucial, not
the form:
In saying this, Kant is pronouncing judgment of the principle
of duty and right set up by practical reason. For practical
reason is the complete abstraction from all content of the will
(Wille); to introduce a content is to establish a heteronomy of
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choice (Willkiir). But what is precisely of interest is to know
what right and duty are. We ask for the content of the moral
law, and this content alone concerns us. But the essence of
pure will is to be abstracted from all content. Thus it is a self-
contradiction to seek in this absolute practical reason a moral
legislation which would have to have a content, since the
essence of this reason is to have none.6
Since the legislative activity of practical reason is limited solely to the
form of the moral law, it is reduced to the production of tautologies,
which "is in truth what the sublime lawgiving power of pure practical
reason's autonomy in legislating consists of."^
Now our primary interest in our moral deliberations is with the
content of the moral law and not its form. We are concerned with the
ends we ought to pursue and the specific duties these ends give rise to.
The pure form of the law, however, is incapable of specifying the content
of morality, of providing us with concrete duties. In order to do so, we
must posit some matter, such as an end or desire: "If this formalism is to
be able to promulgate a law, some matter, something specific must be
posited to constitute the content of the law. And the form given to this
specific matter is unity or universality. But any specific matter is capable
of being so posited, as is its contrary. Thus, the form of universal law is
compatible with any matter we may choose to posit:
But every specific matter is capable of being clothed with the
form of the concept and posited as quality; there is nothing
whatever which can not in this way be made into a moral
law. Every specific matter, however, is inherently particular,
not universal; the opposite specific thing stands over against
it, and it is specific only because there is this specific
opposition. Both are equally capable of being thought; which
of the two is to be taken up into the unity or to be thought.
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 76.
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 76.
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 76.
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and which is to be abstracted from, is completely open and
free. If one is fixed as absolutely subsistent, then, to be sure,
the other can not be posited. But this other can just as easily
be thought, and, since the form of thinking is the essence,
expressed as absolute moral law.9
Since every specific matter can be given the form of universal law, no
concrete duties can be specified simply by employing the formal principle
of universality; everything is permissible when all we may utilize in the
determination of our obligations is the pure form of the law.
Hegel illustrates his point by applying the categorical imperative to
a concrete situation, the acceptance of a deposit and the resulting
obligation to return that deposit when so requested. If one is entrusted
with a deposit, one is obligated to return it to its rightful owner upon his
or her request. If this were not the case, a contradiction would result in
that deposits would cease to exist. But, Hegel argues, there is no
contradiction in the non-existence of deposits. We are left, then, only with
the tautology that a deposit is a deposit.
Now since deposits are a form of property, this allows Hegel to
expand upon this point and to critique Kant's theory of property along the
same lines:
If the specification of property in general be posited, then we
can construct the tautological statement: property is property
and nothing else. And this tautological production is the
legislation of this practical reason; property, if property is,
must be property. But if we posit the opposite thing, negation
of property, then the legislation of this same practical reason
produces the tautology: non-property is non-property. If
property is not to be, then whatever claims to be property
must be cancelled. But the aim is precisely to prove that
property must be; the sole thing at issue is what lies outside
the capacity of this practical legislation of pure reason,
namely to decide which of the opposed specific things must
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 77.
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be lawful. But pure reason demands that this shall have been
done beforehand, and that one of the opposed specific things
shall be presupposed, and only then can pure reason perform
its now superfluous legislating.^
0
According to Hegel, Kant must assume the existence of property in order
to ground the question-begging inference that there is property. But none
of this establishes that there must be property, which is exactly what we
want to prove. Now we have seen that Hegel is mistaken on this critical
point, Kant does in fact demonstrate the necessity of property, though I
shall hold off on discussing Hegel's error on this matter until later.
Hegel argues that this problem is the result of Kant’s
transformation of the conditioned into the unconditioned:
When the specific concept is expressed in a sentence, the
specific thing, taken up into the form of pure unity or formal
identity, produces the tautology of the formal sentence: the
specific A is the specific A. The form, or in the sentence the
identity of subject and predicate, is something absolute, but
only negative or formal, and the specific A is unaffected; for
the form, this content is something wholly hypothetical.
However, the absoluteness, which by virtue of the sentence's
form is in the sentence, acquires a totally different meaning
in practical reason. Absoluteness is also conferred on the
content, which by its nature is something conditioned; and
this conditioned non-absolute, contrary to its own essence is
elevated into an absolute by this confusion.^
^
This confusion between the "absolute form" and the "conditioned matter"
of the maxim allows Kant to smuggle the former into the latter and turn
anything into a duty.
This same sort of criticism has been levelled at Kant from a radically
different philosophical perspective. In his Utilitarianism, Mill criticizes
those "a priori moralists," who, when they argue at all, appeal to the
Hegel, Natural Law. 78.
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 78-9.
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principle of utility or greatest happiness. According to Mill, Kant is the
foremost example of such a moralist, for his formalism allows the
adoption of any maxim, even the most immoral, on the part of rational
agents. Kant can only prevent this result by appealing covertly to the
principle of utility:
This remarkable man [Kant], whose system of thought will
long remain one of the landmarks in the history of
philosophical speculation, does in the treatise in question
[Ihe Metaphysics of Morals l. lays down a universal first
principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is
this: 'So act that the rule on which thou actest would admit
of being adopted as a law of rational beings.' But when he
begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of
morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there
would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical)
impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the
most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is
that the consequences of their universal adoption would be
such as no one would choose to incur.^2
Kant, then, is a closet utilitarian for whom such "utilitarian arguments are
indispensable." That Kant does in fact appeal to the principle of utility in
deriving our actual duties is questionable to say the least, but Mill, like
Hegel, does zero in on the most significant problem of Kant's ethics: How
are we to imbue the categorical imperative with the necessary determinate
content?
In what follows in this chapter, I shall absolve Kant from this
charge of empty formalism, without thereby turning him to a proto-
Utilitarian. Ultimately, one's acceptance of my arguments depends on the
legitimacy of Kant's moral theory, the full explication and defence of
which would alas take us well beyond the particular subject at hand.
Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 6.
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Regrettably, then, my remarks will be unavoidably sketchy at important
points.
The organization of this chapter will follow Kant's presentation of
the three formulations of the categorical imperative as a "progression"
from the "unity of form" to the "plurality of material" and finally
culminating in the synthesis of form and matter in the "totality of a
system of ends."^3 Given that the categorical imperative is the "supreme
principle of morality, it is appropriate that we employ it as the organizing
principle of our discussion, for the theory of justice is only one part of the
system of morals to which it gives rise. The a priori principles of justice,
therefore, must be derived from the categorical imperative. In the first
formulation, the categorical imperative is treated as "a form, which
consists in universality," whereas in the second, it is considered as
providing "a material, i.e. an end" in the form of rational beings. These
two formulations are synthesized to yield "a complete determination of all
maxims by the formula that all maxims which stem from autonomous
legislation ought to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with a
realm of nature."^ ^ xtijs third formulation, with its concept of a realm of
ends, is central to understanding Kant's politics and its position within his
moral theory.
There is some disagreement in the secondary literature on just how many formulations of
the categorical imperative Kant does provide. Professor Paton counts five such formulae. A
more recent commentator, Bruce Aune, asserts that there are four formulae, each with a
corresponding typic. See Bruce Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979). I have adopted Kant's own count in my exposition for
organizational reasons and not because I believe it be correct.
Kant, Foundations, pp. 54-5.
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B. The Limits of Ethical Formalism
On the surface, Hegel's and Mill's criticism of Kant's moral theory
has considerable merit and has been echoed since their time. Kant seems
to present us with the impossible task of deriving substantive moral
principles from a purely formal constraint. ^5 This task is fraught with
insurmountable difficulties, for it asks us to derive content from form.
Yet in his ethical theory, this is exactly what Kant asks us to do, for a free
will is just that which acts according to the pure form of universal law.
Let us examine then the functioning of Kant's formulation of the
categorical imperative in order to see how Kant approaches this task.
Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative reads as
follows: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law."^^ Now this formulation
provides only the negative condition of acceptability of maxims, or a
canon of practical reason, and Hegel appears to be quite correct on that
point. In section three of the Introduction to Transcendental Logic in the
First Critique, Kant distinguishes between a canon and an organon. The
canon of understanding is concerned with the mere form of judgments
and provides only the negative condition of truth. With respect to the
For a discussion of this point, see Wolff, The Autonomy of Reason . Professor Wolff
argues that in the Foundations Kant attempts to ground a theory of obligatory ends that
would provide content to the categorical imperative. Kant fails in this task for the best of
all reasons- because it can not be done. There simply are no categorical imperatives. This
does not prove that Kant’s analysis of moral imperatives is incorrect, however, for Kant
may very well be correct in his analysis and yet be mistaken as to whether we are bound by
any moral law in the first place. If Professor Wolff is correct, then rather than being a fact
of reason, the moral law is just a chimera.
Kant, Foundations, p. 39.
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understanding and theoretical reason, this role is filled by formal logic
and, in particular, the law of non-contradiction. The law of non-
contradiction is "the purely logical criterion of truth, namely, the
agreement of knowledge with the general and formal laws of the
understanding and reason, is a condition sine qua non, and is therefore
the negative condition of all truth."17 Nq consideration is given here to
the content of judgments or the objects of knowledge. With respect to
their form, all judgments must conform to this law, and a violation of this
form yields a contradiction. But mere conformity itself is not a guarantee
of the truth of judgments. We can only say that any judgment that
possesses this form is logically possible and nothing more.
In contrast to a canon, an organon is an "instrument" capable of
generating substantive judgments that "extend and enlarge our
knowledge." We succumb to the "logic of illusion" when we attempt to
treat formal logic as an organon for the production of true judgments;
"General logic, when thus treated as an organon, is called dialectic."^
^
Such a move is clearly illegitimate, "for logic teaches us nothing
whatsoever regarding the content of knowledge, but lays down only the
formal conditions of agreement with the understanding; and since these
conditions can tell us nothing at all as to the objects concerned, any
attempt to use this logic as an instrument (organon) that professes to
extend and enlarge our knowledge can end in nothing but mere talk."^9
But it is just the content of a judgment that is essential in determining its
truth and providing us with knowledge of the objects of experience. Thus
^7- Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 99.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 99.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 99.
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in abstracting from the content of judgments, logic is limited to providing
only a canon of reason.
As a canon, the categorical imperative is a test applied to given
maxims, and this is the way Kant employs it in his examples. It is not a
principle from which concrete duties can be deduced as theorems from an
axiom, but a test applied to independently formulated, given maxims to
determine whether they are capable of being practical laws.
As a canon of practical reason, the categorical imperative in its first
formulation establishes only the permissibility, the analogue of logical
possibility, of acting on a given maxim not its obligatoriness. This creates
something of a problem for Kant. At best, Kant can only establish that a
certain action is permissible, but not that it is obligatory. The categorical
imperative would seem, then, to be incapable of grounding Kant's notion
of duty or obligation. Now there is one special set of circumstances under
which we can derive an obligation from the permissibility and
impermissibility of maxims, i.e. when a canon functions as an organon.
Such a situation exists when there is a finite set of possible maxims and all
but one of them fails to meet the test of the categorical imperative. Under
such circumstances, the adoption of all but one maxim is impermissible.
Further, an agent cannot abstain from acting. Since acting follows
analytically from the concept of agency, it is necessarily the case that agents
act. Consequently, rather than being just permissible, the adoption of the
remaining maxim becomes obligatory. Thus, Kant's task is not as hopeless
as it might appear at first. This point will be important in our discussion
of Kant's fourth example as it relates to respect for rational beings as ends-
in-themselves.
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Given Kant's own reasoning, there is much to be said for Hegel’s
claim that Kant has succumbed to the "logic of illusion" with regard to
practical reason. In our moral deliberations, it is just the content of the
moral law (our specific concrete duties and the ends that we are to pursue)
that concerns us and not the form of our maxims. In order to satisfy the
demands of our ordinary moral reasoning, Kant must provide some
content to the moral law, some ends that we ought to pursue, but he has at
his disposal here only the pure form of law, its universality. In attempting
to derive substantive principles from this purely formal constraint, Kant
appears to have fallen prey to the same error he so forcefully warned us
against with regard to theoretical reason; he has treated a canon as an
organon.
But there is one crucial difference between theoretical and practical
reason that Hegel has failed to grasp. Where the understanding and
theoretical reason seek knowledge of the objects of experience, practical
reason seeks the determination of the will to action. With regard to the
former, we are concerned with thinking; whereas with regard to the latter,
we are concerned with willing. Therein lies the difference between logical
possibility and permissibility; in the former we are concerned with
judgments, while in the latter, with maxims or rules of action. Hegel,
then, is clearly incorrect when he asserts that "the form of thinking is
essence expressed as absolute moral law."^0 By formulating the core of
Kant's ethics in this way, Hegel conflates theoretical and practical reason.
Correctly stated, it is the form of willing that is the essence expressed as
absolute moral law. By focusing on thinking rather than willing, Hegel
Hegel, Natural Law, p. 79.
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misses Kant's argument for the practical necessity of property- that
property, as the means to our ends, is a necessary condition of our
purposive action. Kant is quite dear about this in the first formulation of
the categorical imperative, when he states that we are to consider whether
we can will that a maxim should be a universal law, not whether whether
we can conceive that it be so.
Mill commits the same mistake in his interpretation of Kant. It is
not only whether we can conceive of all moral agents acting according to a
certain maxim that is important, but also whether we can will that they do
so, for the former is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the latter. If
a maxim is incapable of being a universal law, then we can not
consistently will that it should be so. But Kant clearly thinks that there are
certain maxims that could conceivably be universally adopted, e.g. rational
egoism, but which we could not will to be so adopted: "although it is
possible that a universal law of nature according to that maxim could
exist, it is nevertheless impossible to will that such a principle should hold
everywhere as a law of nature.
The key transition in Kant's ethical theory is between the first and
second formulations of the categorical imperative. The first formulation
of the categorical imperative is formal in nature, whereas the second
provides the material or end of the law that we so desperately need to get
past the empty form of universality and move from permission to
obligation. Kant is caught between two poles here. On the one hand, he
claims that the law is logically prior to its object and must give rise to that
object. But on the other hand, he needs some object of the law, some end
Kant, Foundations, p. 41.
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that we ought to pursue, to provide the moral law with a determinate
content that is capable of generating concrete moral duties. In order to
provide such content, he must provide some account of objective or
obligatory ends, i.e. ends that are valid for all rational agents as such.
In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morak Kant
acknowledges the necessity of providing such an account. There he
distinguishes between subjective and objective ends. Kant recognizes that
the "objective ground" determining the will to action is always an end.
Some of these ends are those "which a rational being arbitrarily proposes
to himself as consequences of his action;" these "are material ends and are
without exception only relative, for only their relation to a particularly
constituted faculty of desire in the subject gives them their worth."22 in
contrast to these ends, there are ends that "are given by reason alone" and
"depend on motives valid for every rational being."23 Kant then
categorizes practical principles according to the type of end they involve;
"Practical principles are formal when they disregard all subjective ends;
they are material when they have subjective ends, and thus certain
incentives, as their basis. "24 Only objective ends "afford any universal
principles for all rational beings or valid and necessary principles for every
volition," for such ends themselves possess validity for rational agents as
such.25 Kant's formalism, then, contra Hegel, does not preclude a matter
or content of morality, only the specific type of content determined by the
subjective constitution of our faculty of desire.
Kant, Foundations, pp. 45-6.
23- Kant, Foundations, p. 45.
24- Kant, Foundations, p. 45.
23- Kant, Foundations, p. 46.
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In a particularly important section of the Doctrine of VirtiiP (section
III of the Introduction), Kant pursues this line of thought and elaborates
on his conception of objective ends:
An end is an object of free choice, the thought of which
determines the power of choice (Willkur) to an action by
which the object is produced. Every action, therefore, has its
end; and since no one can have an end without himself
making the object of choice into an end, it follows that the
adoption of any end of action whatsoever is an act of freedom
on the agent's part, not an operation of nature. But if this act
which determines an end is a practical principle that
prescribes the end itself (and therefore commands
unconditionally), and not the means (and so not
conditionally), it is, therefore, an imperative which connects
a concept of duty with that of an end as such.26
Kant acknowledges, then, the purposive nature of human action. In
keeping with freedom as a precondition of morality, the ends that guide
our actions must be freely adopted, though their source may lie either in
our reason or in our empirical nature. If that source is the former, those
ends are objective or valid for all rational beings; if in the latter, they are
purely subjective, for rational beings may differ with regard to the
contingent make-up up of their constitution of desire.
Given the purposive nature of human action, if there are to
obligatory actions, there must be obligatory ends ("objects man ought to
adopt as ends"):
Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative
corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there
must also be ends to which as their object, these actions are
directed. But among these ends there must also be those that
are at the same time ( that is, by their concept ) duties. For
were there no such ends, then all ends would be valid for
practical reason only as a means to other ends; and since
Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary Gregor, (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1980), p. 43.
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there can be no action without an end, a categorical
imperative would be impossible. And this would do away
with all moral philosophy.27
Since there is a categorical imperative, there must be objective ends. If
there were no objective ends, then there could be no morality. But it is a
"fact of reason" that we are morally responsible agents and are subject to
moral law.
The difficulty here lies in the derivation of these objective ends.
Kant argues in the Second Critique that the end or object of the law must
be derived from the law itself, or more specifically the mere form of
universality. Only if we are able to derive the ends of action from the
form of universality can we conclude that these are in fact objectively
valid for all rational agents. Thus, we again face the gap between form and
content and must find some way to bridge it.
C. Persons and Objective Ends
Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative reads as
follows: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or
in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only."^^ At first
glance, it appears that humanity supplies us with these objective ends, but
actually it is rather broader than that. Humans are objective ends because
they are capable of rational agency; hence, it is rational agents who are
ends in themselves. As ends-in-themselves, "such beings are not merely
subjective ends whose existence as a result of our action has a worth for
us, but are objective ends, i.e. beings whose existence in itself is an end."^^
27- Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 43.
2®- Kant, Foundations, p. 46.
29- Kant, Foundations, p. 46.
155
It is here that Kant fleshes out the formal skeleton of his ethics.
Unfortunately, due to the limitations of my presentation I can not do
justice to the complexity of the issues involved with Kant's conception of
persons as ends; I can only sketch the outlines of this part of his moral
theory and present what I take to be the basic problem with it, without
pretending to offer a solution.
Kant s claim that persons are ends in themselves surely involves
an odd usage of the term 'end.' In what sense of 'end' can humanity be
described as an end? When I say that the acquisition of wealth is one of
my ends, I have said something that is easily understood, and the
consequences of the adoption of this end for action are not difficult to
grasp. But when I state that I am my own end, none of this is readily
apparent. Similar difficulties arise when I apply this notion to other
individuals. If I state that my child is my end, it is unclear what this could
mean beyond the expression of a desire to sire a child, and for Kant it
clearly does mean more than that. When Kant states that a person is a end
in itself, he means that a person is a subject capable of forming and
pursuing purposes and not just an object. One treats someone as such an
end by respecting that ability. With regard to oneself, this involves trying
to develop and perfect one's natural capacities, one's ability to set and
pursue ends. When Kant speaks of treating other persons as ends, he is
referring to the ends of those persons. In this regard, Kant propounds two
different but related conceptions of persons as objective ends- a negative
one and a positive one. According to the negative conception of persons
as objective ends, treating another person as an end means not interfering
with the pursuit of his or her morally permissible ends. In the positive
sense, I treat another person as an end when I adopt that person's ends as
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my own and strive to further that persons efforts to achieve his or her
morally permissible ends; in short, 1 make that person’s happiness my
end.
Unfortunately, Kant provides scant argumentation in the
Foundations for the claim that one ought to treat persons as ends in
themselves. In fact, Kant begins by providing no argument at all for this
claim, starting with a supposition and then immediately afterwards quite
dogmatically asserting the truth of that supposition. Finally, when he
does get around to arguing for it, there seem to be a variety of arguments
imbedded in the text.3^
One such argument is suggested by Kant when he claims that a
rational being as such "restricts all [arbitrary] choice." Paton argues that
this restriction is implicit in the first formulation of the categorical
imperative. By stressing the formal universality of the moral law, Kant
requires that we take into consideration not just ourselves but all rational
agents. In its first formulation, the categorical imperative requires that we
consider not just what we can will for ourselves, but what we can will that
all rational agents should will. Thus, our own willing is limited by the
wills of all other rational agents. Hence, such agents "must serve in every
maxim as the condition restricting all merely relative and arbitrary
ends."32 Presumably, since such agents cannot will that they be treated
merely as means to my subjective ends, just as I myself can not, I am
forbidden from treating them in such a manner. At the least, in the
Kant, Foundations, p. 46.
3U In his seminal study of Kant's ethics, H. J. Paton finds four distinct arguments for the
second formulation of the categorical imperative. As should be clear, 1 am greatly indebted
to Paton in my own reading of Kant here.
32- Kant, Foundations, p. 55.
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pursuit of my own ends, I must leave others free to pursue theirs. When I
involve others in the pursuit of my private ends, as I inevitably do, I must
insure that I do not use them in such a way that they are not free and able
to pursue their own private ends
In a later passage, Kant provides another argument for the second
formulation in "the formula of an absolutely good will. "33 Here the
absolutely good will, as the subject of ends, serves as a limiting condition
on the pursuit of arbitrary ends. This argument is, of course, anticipated
in the very first sentence of the first section of the Grundlegung:
Nothing in the world- indeed nothing beyond the world- can possibly be
conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good
will. 34 The good will, then, is an end in itself. Since every person
possesses the potential for a good will, every person must be considered to
be an end in him- or herself. Every person as a moral agent has at least
potentially a good will, and this potential must be respected. Thus, every
person rightfully serves as a limiting condition upon our actions and
purely subjective ends.
But, Kant's argument here is circular in nature. A good will is
defined in terms of the moral law; one possesses a good will when one
does one's duty because it is one's duty (i.e. one follows the moral law
because it is the moral law). We can not without circularity, then, attempt
to provide content to the moral law by appealing to the notion of a good
will.
Kant provides another piece of argumentation in the following
passage:
33- Kant, Foundations, p. 56.
3^- Kant, Foundations, p. 9.
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Man necessarily thinks of his own existence in this way; thus
far it is a subjective principle of human actions. Also every
other rational being thinks of his existence by means of the
same rational ground which holds for myself; thus it is at the
same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme
practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the
will.35
This argument is based on the claim that one necessarily considers him- or
herself to be an end in itself. Further, the reason why one does so in his or
her own case holds for all other rational beings as well. But from this it
follows only that all rational agents must consider themselves as ends in
themselves, a conclusion that is clearly insufficient for Kant's purposes.
Kant needs to get beyond the subjective validity of this rational ground for
each agent to its objective validity for all agents and does so by means of
the requirement that all maxims be universalizable. In order to see how
Kant accomplishes this, let us first consider the nature of this rational
ground.
In the footnote to the above passage, Kant refers us rather vaguely
to the final section of the Foundations for the relevant discussion of this
rational ground. Following Paton, I take it that this reference is to the
passage entitled "Freedom Must Be Presupposed As The Property Of The
Will Of All Rational Beings. There Kant argues that, on whatever basis
we ascribe freedom to our own will, we must also attribute freedom to all
rational beings. This claim rests on the moral law itself, which is valid
"for us only as rational beings." Since the moral law as valid for all
rational beings "must be derived from the property of freedom," freedom
must be ascribed to such beings. Kant concludes this sub-section by
Kant, Foundations, p. 47.
Kant, Foundations, p. 66-67.
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maintaining that "the will of a rational being can be a will of its own only
under the idea of freedom, and therefore in a practical point of view such
must be ascribed to all rational beings. "37 Freedom, then, provides the
rational ground on which each agent considers him- or herself to be an
end in itself.
Kant elaborates and expands upon this line of thought in sections 82
to 87 of the Critique of Tudement . Patrick Riley calls attention to the
importance of these sections for an understanding of Kant's doctrine of
persons as ends in themselves in his excellent study of Kant’s political
Philosophy.38 in what may seem to be an old-fashioned appeal to
teleology, Kant argues that only in human beings as rational agents do we
find a being "who can form a concept of purposes and use his reason to
turn an aggregate of purposively structured things into a system of
purposes."39 This establishes humanity as the "ultimate purpose of
creation," "the purpose by reference to which all other natural things
constitute a system of purposes." Humans, through the use of their
reason, are able to order and systematize all natural entities into coherent,
structured whole of purposes and thereby introduce purpose into the
natural world. But this activity is "always subject to a condition: he must
have the understanding and the will to give both nature and himself
reference to a purpose independent of nature, self-sufficient, and a final
purpose. "40 We find intimated here an important distinction between
ultimate and final purposes, though one that is not clearly drawn.
Kant, Foundations, p. 67.
Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy .
Kant, Critique ofludgmcnt, p. 67.
Kant, Critique of Tudgmcnt, p. 318.
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The ultimate purpose of nature is immanent within nature and lies
in the development of a rational being who possesses an aptitude for
setting purposes for himself and using nature for their attainment, i.e.
who possesses what Kant calls "culture." It is here in this concept that we
find a rather old-fashioned teleology at work. But Kant goes on to
distinguish a final purpose from the ultimate purpose of nature. A final
purpose is defined as "a purpose that requires no other purpose as a
condition of its possibility."41 Since it depends on no other condition, a
final purpose is unconditioned. But within nature, the unconditioned is
nowhere to be found, for here we are confronted only with an unending
series of conditions. The final purpose of creation, then, must not be
sought "within nature at all;" it is transcendent. Now only rational agents
as noumena fit this description:
Now in this world of ours there is only one kind of being
with a causality that is teleological, i.e., directed to purposes,
but also so constituted that the law in terms of which these
beings must determine their purposes is presented as
unconditioned and independent of conditions in nature and
yet necessarily in itself. That being is man, but man
considered as noumenon. Man is the only natural being in
whom we can recognize, as part of his own constitution, a
supersensible ability (freedom), and even recognize the law
and the object of this causality, the object that this being can
set before itself as its highest purpose (the highest good in the
world).42
As moral beings, rational beings under moral laws, humans serve no
other purpose.
Without such beings, Kant argues, the world would lack all value.
If there were no rational beings in the world, there would exist no entity
Kant, Critique of ludgment, p. 322.
Kant, Critique of ludgment, p. 323.
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that could imbue the world with value. Thus, the existence of the world
and everything in it would be without value. Further, if there were only
instrumentally rational beings, the world would also lack value, for there
would be no final point of attachment for "the chain of mutually
subordinated purposes." Under such conditions, this chain would remain
forever incomplete. It is, then, the power of desire determined by laws of
freedom, i.e. practical principles, that gives human existence absolute
value.
Kant s point here is a simple one: each human being must consider
himself to be a subject of purposive action and not solely as its object. This
consideration rests on his freedom as a rational agent, as an agent who can
set himself ends, and is not dependent on any teleological interpretation
of humanity as the ultimate purpose of creation. The positing of an end
must be considered an act of freedom, undetermined by natural necessity,
which is purely mechanistic. This is why human freedom is teleological.
Since one must consider oneself as such a subject, one can not will that
one should be used solely as an object to be used in the attainment of
another's ends. Consequently, I can not will that the maxim 'Always treat
others solely as a means to my ends' be a universal law. Thus, in one's
relationships with others, one must respect them as subjects with their
own ends. This requires that, in the pursuit of one's own ends, one not
use others in such a manner as to prevent them from attaining their own
ends.
Now this reasoning, while I think it is correct, is insufficient for a
full understanding of what it means to be an end-in-itself. Kant argues
that our conception of others as ends must be positive as well as negative:
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but this harmony with humanity as an end-in-itself is only
negative rather than positive if everyone does not also
endeavor, so far as he can, to further the ends of others. For
the ends of any person, who is an end in himself, must as far
as possible also be my end, if that conception of an end in
itself is to have its full effect on me.^^
Thus, we are required by the positive conception of humanity as an end in
itself to adopt the ends of others as our own. But now we need some sense
of how Kant might be able to derive this stronger conception of an end in
itself from the formulation of the categorical imperative as fitness for
universal law. This is provided by Kant's reasoning in the fourth
example, in which he attacks rational egoism as a possible principle of
morality. Here Kant argues that, given the type of being we are, we can
not consistently will that all rational agents act solely out of self-interest.
There are times in which each of us may need the aid of others, even
though the provision of that aid by others would run counter to their own
self-interest. Thus, my own self-interest demands that others not always
act according to their own self-interest; hence, I can not consistently will
that the maxim of rationally self-interested action become a universal law
of action.
We can express the maxim of rational self-interest and its contrary
in the language of means and ends. So formulated, the maxim of rational
self-interest is as follows: Always treat others solely as a means to one's
own arbitrary ends. The alternative to this maxim is: Never treat others
solely as a means to one's own arbitrary ends, but treat them also as ends
in themselves, i.e. the second formulation of the categorical imperative.
Here we have a quite plausible case of a canon functioning as an organon.
Kant, Foundations, p. 49.
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We have a choice between two possible maxims 44 the adoption of one of
which is prohibited by the categorical imperative expressed as universal
law; thus we are obligated to act according to the sole remaining one. This
manner of expressing and justifying the second formulation of the
categorical imperative on the basis of the first formulation provides a basis
on which to ground the positive as well as the negative conception of
persons as ends in themselves, since it recognizes the need of all
individuals for the aid of others.
Now Kant must find some way of distinguishing those ends of
others that I ought to adopt and advance and those that I ought to oppose,
(my earlier discussion in terms of morally permissible ends skirted this
problem). Clearly the adoption of certain ends is immoral (e.g. Hitler's
adoption of the extermination of world jewry as an end was immoral
because it violated the negative conception of persons as ends as regards
the world's Jews), and hence should not be furthered by us but opposed.
Kant needs some way of discriminating, then, between those ends whose
attainment I ought to oppose and those ends of others that I ought to
adopt as my own. The appeal to persons as ends does not seem to be able
to do this without circularity. The conception of persons as ends in
themselves is supposed to provide us with the obligatory ends of our
actions, but it can only accomplish this task if we possess some prior
standard of moral permissibility for ends. If we appeal to the conception of
persons as ends as this standard, then our definition is circular. Thus, we
It may seem here that I am ignoring another possibility, the contradictory of the maxim
of rational self-interest: do not always treat others solely as means to one's own arbitrary
ends. I think, however, that this maxim fails for the same reason that the maxim of self-
interest fails. One's own self-interest demands that others never treat oneself solely as a
means to their arbitrary ends.
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seem to require some independent criterion of permissibility in order to
imbue this notion with a determinate content. But if there is such a
criterion, then the categorical imperative, at least in its second
formulation, is not the highest principle of morality as Kant claims, but a
derivative of this logically prior principle.'^^
For the most part, this issue lies outside the present range of
discussion. Since it concerns the internal adoption of ends on my part and
not the external relations among rational agents, it is a matter dealt with
in the theory of virtue and not the theory of justice. One might usefully
situate the dividing line between the two parts of the metaphysics of
morals in terms of the negative and positive conception of persons as ends
in themselves, with the theory of justice concerned with the negative
conception and the theory of virtue concerned with the positive
conception. At this point, we need merely state that those actions that
violate the negative conception of persons as ends in themselves are
prohibited. Consequently, if the adoption and pursuit of a certain end
necessarily involves the violation of that negative conception, as did
Hitler's adoption of the extermination of the world's Jews did, then we are
obligated to hinder the pursuit of that end. We need not refer to the
positive conception of persons as ends in themselves in order to make
sense of this obligation.
I wish to draw attention here to one final point on which I will
elaborate in the next section. Kant's ethics involves a conditional sort of a
priorism, which Hegel failed to appreciate. Like the categories of the First
Critique, it is dependent on our being agents of a certain sort. The
For a discussion of this point, see Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals, pp. 109-11.
165
categories do not apply to all types of understanding and intuition, but
only to beings whose experience is spatio-temporal and whose
understanding is discursive and intuitive or creative in character.
Similarly, the a priori commands of morality apply on the condition that
we are agents of a certain sort; that is, that we must employ means to
achieve our ends and that we are externally related to other rational agents
on whom we are dependent. A being such as God whose understanding is
intuitive and who is self-subsistent would not be bound by it. Now Kant
often asserts that a divine will would necessarily act according to the
commands of morality. In doing so, Kant is simply contrasting the notion
of a divine will with our own; a divine will is purely rational, whereas
our will are determinable by sensuous inclinations as well as by reason.
D. The Realm of Ends
The third formulation of the categorical imperative is intended by
Kant to be the synthesis of the previous two, with the first formulation
providing the form of the law and the second providing its matter. The
third formula is the synthesis of this form and matter. Alternatively, Kant
describes the three formulations as a "progression here like that of the
categories" unity, plurality, and totality respectively. This whole
discussion, of course, recalls the first sub-division ("Of Quantity") of the
Table of Categories. Each sub-division of that Table contains three
categories, with the third category arising "from the combination of the
second category with the first." It is easy to dismiss Kant's remarks here as
nothing more than an instance of his obsessive concern with the
architectonic of his theory, but doing so would be a mistake. First, Kant's
remarks warn us not to interpret his theory in a one-sided manner. This
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is the trap both Hegel and Mill fell into by focusing exclusively on the first
formulation to the exclusion of the later formulations and the teleological
component of Kant s moral theory. Neither seems aware of Kant's
important discussion of persons as objective ends. More recently, Patrick
Riley falls into this same error, only from the other side. Riley's
teleological interpretation of Kant's ethics and politics ignores the formal
elements of Kant's theory, most importantly, the requirement that the
object of the law be derived from the law itself.46 Second, this progression
makes it clear that the totality prescribed by Kant's theory is one of unified
plurality and not the total unity of will found in Rousseau. This allows
Kant to avoid the totalitarian implications of Rousseau's politics discussed
in the first chapter.^7
Now Kant does not provide a proper rendering of the third
formula. He simply describes it as "the supreme condition of its harmony
with universal practical reason, viz., the idea of the will of every rational
being as making universal law."48 Kant entitles this "the principle of
autonomy of the will" and later declares that it is "the supreme principle
of morality." This formula, however, seems to add nothing to the first
formulation of the categorical imperative as universal law. At best, it
merely emphasizes, what is only implicit in that formulation, that we are
To a considerable extent, Riley’s interpretation of Kant's political theory can be
accounted for by his choice of texts. Riley derives his interpretation almost exclusively
from discussions in Perpetual Peace and the Critique of Judgment, which have a
teleological orientation and view politics as instrumental to morality. He pays little and
inadequate attention to either the Metaphsical Elements of Justice or "Theory and
Practice," which are contractarian in outlook. These latter texts, especially the
Metaphysical Elements of lustice, are the heart of Kant's political theory and merit far
more attention than they receive from Riley.
For another discussion of this point, see Harry van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and
Socialism. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), pp. 33-4.
Kant, Foundations, p. 49.
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to consider the will as "not only subject to the law but subject in such a
way that it must be regarded as self-legislative and only for this reason as
being subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)."49
This is implied by the requirement that we are to ask of a maxim whether
we can "will that it should become universal law," or, alternatively, that
we could act as though the maxim of [our] action were by [our] will to
become a universal law of nature."50 Both of these formulations suggest
that the will is to be considered as "making universal law" in its willing.
In making explicit that which is only implicit in the first formula, this
principle does make an important contribution to our understanding of
Kant's moral theory.
According to Kant, the concept of autonomy of the will "leads to a
very fruitful concept, namely, that of a realm of ends," though he does not
explain this connection. It would be far more appropriate to describe this
latter concept as the synthesis of the first and second formulations of the
categorical imperative, as attested to by Kant's characterization of the three
formulae as a progression culminating in "the all-comprehensiveness or
totality of the system of ends." As I noted in my discussion of Rousseau in
the first chapter, the notion of a realm of ends is essential to
understanding Kant's vision of ideal civil society and the distinction
between the theory of right and the theory of virtue. Kant defines this
concept as follows:
By 'realm' I understand the systematic union of different
rational beings through common laws. Because laws
determine ends with regards to their universal validity, if we
abstract from the personal difference of rational beings and
Kant, Foundations, p. 49.
Kant, Foundations, p. 39.
168
thus from all content of their private ends, we can think of aWhole of all ends in systematic connection, a whole of
rational beings as ends in themselves as well as of the
particular ends which each may set for himself.51
We see m this concept, then, a synthesis of universal law with the
conception of persons as ends in themselves, both the positive and
negative conceptions. The "whole of all ends in systematic connection"
involves both the negative and positive conception of persons as ends in
themselves. The former, as represented by the expression "a whole of
rational beings as ends in themselves," is the concern of Kant's theory of
justice. The private ends "which each may set for himself," the
furtherance of which is part of the positive conception of persons as ends
in themselves, are the concern of the theory of virtue, with rational beings
as ends in themselves serving as the negative limiting condition on this
activity. In order to anticipate our discussion in the next section, one final
point needs to be made here regarding the comprehensiveness of the
realm of ends. As a totality involving all ends, the realm of ends as an
ideal encompasses all rational beings, a feature that is captured in the
expression "a whole of rational beings as ends in themselves" One
belongs to, or alternatively is a member of, the realm of ends because, as a
person, one is an end in oneself. No other qualifications are required.
Ideal civil society represents one aspect or dimension of the realm
of ends, its juridical aspect. In the realm of ends, all rational agents are
united under common laws, and it is this union that is expressed by the
social contract and just is civil society. As I pointed out in the last chapter,
these common laws are the product of a collective legislation and govern
external relations among persons. Participation in this legislative activity
Kant, Foundations, p. 51.
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is an essential element involved with membership in the realm of ends,
as it is a requirement of moral autonomy. In the absence of such
participation, one is reduced to a state of heteronomy, subject to laws that
are not of one's own making.
But Kant confuses the issue by introducing a distinction between
two different types of belonging to the realm of ends:
A rational being belongs to the realm of ends as a member
when he gives universal laws in it while also himself subject
to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when he, as
legislating, is subject to the will of no other.52
It is difficult to make out the difference here. It may be that this
distinction is another version of the distinction, found in both "Theory
and Practice" and the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, between passive
and active citizenship.53 This affinity is suggested by the second sentence,
specifically the expression "subject to the will of no other." This sentence
states that independence of another's will is a condition of belonging to
the realm of ends "as sovereign," much in the same way that it this
qualification serves as a requirement for active citizenship. However,
there are significant differences between the two as well. Here, one "gives
universal laws" as a member of the realm of ends and not just as
sovereign, whereas a passive citizen is excluded from this process. In
order to belong to the realm of ends as sovereign, one must meet some
further condition, the significance of which is not entirely clear, though
failure to meet this condition does not seem to exclude one from the
legislative process. Further, Kant's terminology also differs in these two
52- Kant, Foundations, p. 52.
53- For a fuller discussion and criticism of this distinction, I refer the reader the next section
of this chapter, section E.
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texts. Here Kant contrasts belonging to the realm of ends as a "member"
(Glied) with belonging to it as "sovereign" (Oberhaupt), whereas in the
Rechtslehre the contrast is between belonging to civil society as a "part"
(Teil) and as a member (Glied), where a passive citizen is only a part and
an active citizen is a member. For these two reasons, it would seem that
membership in the realm of ends corresponds to active citizenship in civil
society. Finally, being "subject to the will of no other" is simply a
characteristic of autonomy. Thus, if we are to take moral autonomy
seriously, every person, as an autonomous agent, must belong to the
realm of ends "as sovereign." We shall return to this point in the next
two sections as it is quite important.
Given the importance of the notion, there is one quite damning
criticism of Kant's conception of the realm of ends that requires some
comment. It has often been argued that Kant's moral theory is essentially
monological in that it requires no communication among rational agents,
each person being possessed of the same reason, which legislates the same
principles for each and all. Consequently, even in the absence of
communication among them, every rational agent will reach the exact
same conclusions regarding his or her duties. Unanimity of principles is
arrived at not by collective deliberation but by a pre-established harmony
that lies in the very nature of practical reason itself. One commentator has
compared the realm of ends to a hall full of mathematicians, each solving
the same problem independently of all the rest. The mathematicians will
all reach the same answer without ever having to consult one another.
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Under such circumstances, any communication among rational agents is
superfluous and purely accidental.54
This criticism strikes at the heart of Kant's notion of a community
of rational agents as expressed in the social contract because it obviates the
need for any collective deliberation among citizens within civil society.
While there is much to be said for this criticism, there are textual
materials on which to begin the construction of an alternative Kantian
account of reason and its relation to community.55 The relevant passages
are found scattered among Kant's shorter essays.
The second thesis in "The Idea for a Universal History from a
Cosmopolitan Point of View ' suggests a conception of reason as being
essentially social and requiring communication among rational agents.
This thesis states that "In man (as the only rational creature on earth)
those natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to be
fully developed only in the race, not in the individual."56 Kant's
reasoning for this claim is fairly straightforward:
Reason itself does not work instinctively, but requires trial,
practice, and instruction in order gradually to progress from
one level of insight to another. Therefore a single man
would have to live excessively long in order to learn to make
full use of all his natural capacities. Since Nature has set only
a short period for his life, she needs a perhaps unreckonable
series of generations, each of which passes its own
enlightenment to its successor in order finally to bring the
seeds of enlightenment to that degree of development in our
race which is completely suitable to Nature's purpose.57
Wolff, The Autonomy of Reason, p. 183.
For an examination of the public nature of reason for Kant, see the first two essays in
Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
56-
1. Kant, "The Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," in On
History, ed. by Lewis White Beck, (New York: Macmillan, 1988), p. 13.
57- Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p.l3.
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Successive generations contribute to the development of reason through
the social activities of "trial, practice, and instruction" and the
communication of the resulting enlightenment to the next generation.
Now this reasoning poses two problems for the conception of reason I am
trying to develop here. First, the fact that reason can only develop fully in
the species as a whole and not in any individual is due to the contingent
fact that our lifespans are too short to allow for the full flowering of our
rational capacities. Presumably, if persons were to live for a sufficiently
long period of time, reason could develop in the individual. Second, Kant
is concerned here only with the development of reason in history,
whereas in the realm of ends (because it is an idea) reason has already been
developed fully. It may be the case that, though communication among
persons is necessary for the development of reason, it becomes
superfluous once reason is developed. Nonetheless, Kant's emphasis on
"trial, practice, and instruction" contains the seeds of a conception of
reason in which communication plays an essential role.
My interpretation is buttressed by two other texts, "What is
Enlightenment?" and "What is Orientation in Thinking?." In the former
essay, Kant argues that the public use of reason is necessary for
enlightenment, the ability of a person to make use of his or her own
reason: "The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone
can bring about enlightenment among men."58 Only if individuals are
free to discuss and debate can persons employ their own reason, and
without such employment, one can never free oneself from one's "self-
I. Kant, "What is Enlightenment?," The Critique of Practical Reason and Other
Writings in Moral Philosophy, trans. and ed. by Lewis White Beck, (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 287; VIII, [36].
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incurred tutelage." Like any other capacity, one's reason must be exercised
if it is develop. This exercise of reason must be public if it is to be corrected
and purged of error. While Kant's conception of the public use of reason
is rather narrow, being restricted to "the use which a person makes of it as
a scholar before the reading public,"59 it contains the recognition of the
necessity of public discourse for rational agency.
Kant naakes a similar point in the short essay "What is Orientation
in Thinking?." There Kant argues that thinking itself is impossible
without the ability to communicate one's thoughts to one' fellow citizens:
Freedom to think is first opposed by civil restraint. Certainly
one may say. Freedom to speak or write can be taken from us
by a superior power, but never the freedom to think.' But
how much, and how correctly would we think if we did not
think in common as it were with others, with whom we
mutually communicate! Thus one can well ask that the
external power which wrests from man the freedom publicly
to communicate his thoughts also takes away the freedom to
think- the sole jewel that remains to us under all civil
repression and through which alone counsel against all the
evils of that state can be taken.60
Without the ability to communicate our thoughts, we lack the corrective
of criticism from others and the access to information of which we are
ignorant. Without open, public examination, thinking itself becomes
impossible.
Unfortunately, Kant did not fully elaborate on these matters in the
context of his moral theory, but we can start with his recognition of the
centrality of communication for both reason and human community. Let
us return to the analogy of practical deliberation with mathematical proof.
Kant, "What is Enlightenment," p. 288.
1. Kant, "What is Orientation in Thinking?," The Critique of Practical Reason and
Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, trans. and ed. by Lewis White Beck, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 303; Vlll, (44).
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There is one important difference between the two that is highly relevant
to our assessment of this comparison. Mathematical propositions and
their proofs can be known a priori because they are grounded on
constructions in pure intuition. But there is nothing analogous to pure
intuition in the case of practical reason; rather, the laws of freedom
prescribed by practical reason are analogous to the laws of nature, which
are determined by the rule-governed synthesis of empirical intuition.
Knowledge of these laws requires a community of scientists engaged in
theorizing and experimentation.
The notion of a realm of ends is an Idea. From the standpoint of
morality, "a possible realm of ends" is regarded "as a realm of nature," that
is, "it is a practical idea for bringing about that which is not actually real
but which can become real through our conduct, and which is in
accordance with the idea. "61 In order to be guided in our conduct by this
idea, we must apply it to existing circumstances, which can only be known
empirically through the communication of public discourse.
While Kant is often seen as an "a priori moralist," he was not so
naive as to fail to recognize the importance of empirical conditions for
morality. In the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant is quite clear about the
importance of matters of fact for his moral theory. While "the concept of
justice [recht] is a pure concept," it must also take "practice (i.e. the
application of the concept to particular cases presented in experience) into
consideration. "62 Consequently, "a metaphysical system of justice would
have to take into account the empirical diversity and manifoldness of
those cases in order to be complete in its subdivision," which is
Kant, Foundations, p. 55.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of justice, p. 3.
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impossible.63 Thus the first part of his Metaphysics of Morak is entitled
Xhe Metaphysical Elements of Tustice (Die Metaphvsiche Anfanesgriinde
der Rechtslehre) and not the Metaphysical System of Justice, "for, if we
take these cases of application into account, we can only expect to attain
only an approximation of a system, not a system itself."64 Civil society,
however, requires a system of public law that takes into account just this
empirical diversity and manifoldness," the understanding of which can
only be generated by public discourse. The legislation of specific laws
within such a system, then, must be the outcome of the collective
deliberation of the members of civil society.
There is, then, an open-endedness to Kant's ethics that derives from
his appreciation of the importance of empirical conditions. It is important
to keep this in mind when considering Kant’s politics, for he often
misapplies his own principles. Many of the problems and paradoxes in
Kant's theory, I think, stem not from those principles, but from his own
misapplication of them to the empirical world.
E. Freedom, Equality, and Independence
As pointed out in the previous section, ideal civil society is the
juridical dimension of the realm of ends; civil society concerns itself with
the status of agents as negative ends in themselves and their legislative
role in the promulgation of the common laws governing their external
relations within the realm of ends. The agents within civil society are
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc. p. 3.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, pp. 3-4. Ladd translates the German word
'Anfangsgriinde' as elements, though it can also be translated as first principles. This word
is actually a plural compound noun composed of the nouns 'Anfang' (meaning beginning) and
Grund (meaning ground). Literally, then, it means beginning grounds, which I think
captures better the incompleteness of Kant's moral theory.
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called "citizens" by Kant: "The members of such a society (societas civilis),
that is, of a state, who are united for the purpose of making laws are
citizens."65 According to Kant, "there are three juridical attributes
inseparably bound up with the nature of a citizen as such-" freedom,
equality, and independence. These three juridical attributes, then, are
essential characteristics of all members of the realm of ends. Simply put,
they are the necessary conditions for the autonomy of rational agents
within a community of rational agents.
At this point, Kant makes a profoundly important move. Rather
than attempting to derive the basic principles of politics from the
unanimous agreement of rational agents within a contractarian
construction, Kant recognizes that those principles are logically prior to
and constitutive of the construction itself. Kant expresses this by
describing freedom, equality, and independence as "attributes" of citizens
within civil society and not as principles derivable from that construction.
The a priori principles of justice govern the construction of ideal civil
society, thereby defining the nature of citizenship within it. Freedom,
equality, and independence are the three essential characteristics that
individuals within the fram.ework of contractarian deliberation must
possess if they are to be truly autonomous agents.
My interpretation of Kant on this point diverges sharply from the
Kantian constructivism espoused by John Rawls.66 Rawls interprets the
social contract as a theoretical construction from which we can derive
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 78. In this passage, Kant appears to treat
the term 'state' as interchangeable with that of 'civil society. In another passage, Kant
defines the term 'state' in a similar fashion: "A state (civitas) is a union of a multitude of
men under laws of justice." (p. 77)
John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980," The
lournal of Philosophy. September, 1980, pp. 515-72.
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substantive principles of justice. Consequently, these principles are
logically posterior to the contractarian construction. But for Kant, the
contractarian construction is not a conceptual device for the generation of
principles; rather, it is an idea and provides us with a model of civil
society to be used as a guide for the transformation of the actual world.
The a priori principles of justice, then, are not logically posterior to the
contractarian construction but logically prior to it in that they govern its
construction.
I shall now discuss each attribute in turn, for they provide us with
the fundamental a priori principles of justice. Since Kant's accounts of
these principles vary with different texts, 1 shall be concerned to reconcile
them where this is possible.
In Theory and Practice," the principle of "the freedom of every
member of society as a human being" is expressed as follows: "No-one can
compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of
others, for each may seek to be happy in whatever way he sees fit, so long
as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end
which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a
workable general law- i.e. he must accord to others the same rights as he
enjoys himself."67 Kant provides here a classic formulation of the
neutrality of the liberal state towards differing individual conceptions of
the good. Freedom, then, is just the negative status of one as an end in
oneself. One is obligated to respect the particular ends of other individuals
by not imposing one's own conception of the happiness upon them and
interfering with their actions in pursuit of their own welfare, that is, as
Kant, "Theory and Practice", p. 74.
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long as those actions are compatible with the framework of universal law.
All persons are to be allowed to pursue their own private ends so long as
they respect rights of others to the similar pursuit of their ends. Given
that we are concerned with the external relations of moral agents here,
this obligation is to be enforced by the coercive apparatus of the state.
the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice. Kant describes freedom as
"the lawful freedom to obey no law other than one to which he has given
his consent."68 vVe see a shift here from the negative conception of
persons as ends in themselves to one of self-legislation or autonomy,
which is a more comprehensive and expansive account of freedom. It is
not difficult to reconcile these two accounts, however.
In "Theory and Practice," our pursuit of our own individual
happiness occurs within the framework of universal laws. These laws of
course are just those which can command the unanimous consent of
rational agents as such, i.e. those which are the product of our collective
legislative activity. Freedom, then, has the double meaning of our
freedom to pursue our own ends and our freedom collectively to give
laws to ourselves. This is nothing but the positive conception of freedom
in both its individual and collective aspects, i.e. freedom as self-legislation.
Our self-legislation governs both our adoption of particular ends as
individuals and our collective legislation of universal laws. We are free,
then, to pursue the ends we give to ourselves qua individuals within the
framework of laws we collectively impose on ourselves as a society. Kant
combines both the individual and the collective aspects of self-legislation
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Iiistice, p. 78.
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in this a priori principle of freedom, thereby making explicit what is, at
best, only implicit in the formula of freedom in "Theory and Practice."
Let us now turn to the a priori principle of equality. Kant's
formulations of this principle also differ in "Theory and Practice" and the
Metaphysical Elements of Tustice , though they too are easily reconciled. In
Theory and Practice," the principle of equality is expressed in the
following formulation: "Each member of the commonwealth has rights
of coercion in relation to all the others, except in relation to the head of
state. 69 Later Kant characterizes this as equality before the law. All
individuals are to be subject equally to the same laws. Law, "as the
pronouncement of the general will," is universal; that is, there is to be
only one law to which all are subject. However, this does not accord with
Kants exemption of the head of state from any "rights of coercion"
possessed by the members of society, an exemption that, as we shall see,
creates considerable confusion for Kant and which is dropped in the
formulation of this principle in the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice .
Iri the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice. Kant describes "civil
equality" as the right "of having among the people no superior over him
except another person over whom he has just as much of a moral capacity
to bind juridically."70 Here equality expresses our co-equality as
legislators, as well as our equality as subjects. Each individual is equal as a
legislator in the legislation of universal laws, and this co-equality implies
our equality before the law. Under a juridical condition of society, persons
are subject to a publicly promulgated and enforced law that determines the
coercive rights that an individual possesses vis a vis all other individuals.
Kant, "Theory and Practice," pp. 74-5.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Kistice. p. 79.
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If the law differs among individuals in such a way that different
individuals are subject to different laws, then the corresponding coercive
rights towards others will also differ among individuals, i.e. different
individuals will possess different coercive rights towards others.
Consequently, individuals would not be co-equal as legislators under such
circumstances, for one individual would then possess coercive rights over
another that that individual would not possess over him. Therefore, if
individuals are subject to different laws, then they can not be co-equal as
legislators. Coercive rights can only be equal if the law binding each is the
same for all.
Now Kant distinguishes "civil" equality from economic equality,
the former being compatible with an extreme degree of economic
inequality. According to Kant, the principle of equality requires only that
one be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn
through his talent, his industry, and his good fortune."7I As regards the
class structure of a society, Kant uses the principle primarily as a means of
delegitimating the hereditary privileges of the feudal nobility of his time.
Since all laws and the distribution of positions within civil society
must be governed by the universal legislation of the general will, a
hereditary nobility is unacceptable. The general will can not allow the
existence of a class of hereditary nobles, "a class of persons who acquire
their rank before they have merited it," that is, purely by an accident of
birth.72 Such individuals have not acquired their position on their own
merits nor is there any reasonable ground to expect that they will merit
their position through their actions. A hereditary nobility owes its
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 75.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 97.
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position and privileges to the accident of their birth and not to their own
talents and efforts, and "since birth is not an act on the part of one who is
born," It can not ground "any inequality in his legal position."73 Only
differences that result from the actions of agents themselves are sufficient
to ground a legal distinction, because only such actions and their
consequences are attributable to those agents. There is simply no valid
reason to ground the existence of a hereditary nobility. Thus, "as it can be
assumed that no man would throw away his freedom, it is impossible that
the general will of the people would consent to such a groundless
prerogative, and therefore neither can the sovereign make it valid."74
Since there is no valid reason for its existence, rational agents could not
possibly will that there be a hereditary nobility.
By advocating the abolition of different legal statuses among
persons and the establishment of a single legal status for all, that of citizen,
Kant takes the first step in the emancipation of humanity . The different
estates and their separate law courts are to be dismantled and replaced by
the formal equality of citizenship and a unitary system of justice, as was
done during the French Revolution. The formal inequality of feudalism
is to be replaced by the formal equality of liberal capitalism.
But while he argues for the formal equality of all persons, Kant still
accepts the existence and persistence of material inequality. I think Kant’s
reasoning on this matter is not difficult to reconstruct. With the abolition
of the legal barriers preventing the advancement of commoners and the
feudal privileges preserving the position of the nobility, all positions
within society are opened up to all persons; no longer are the highest
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 76.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 97.
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positions within society the exclusive preserve of a few. With their efforts
no longer frustrated by feudal barriers, individuals are able "to reach any
degree of rank" that they can "earn through [their] talent, [their] industry,
and [their] good fortune." Over time, material inequality should come to
reflect those factors and not be the result of the formal inequality
institutionalized in the different legal statuses of feudalism.
In contrast to the hereditary privileges of the nobility, then, Kant
believes that the legal categories of employer/employee, landlord /tenant,
etc., open as they are to all persons in society, are founded on the
meritorious actions of individual; thus, there is a sufficient basis on which
such legal distinctions may be grounded. Kant's acceptance of inherited
wealth, however, raises serious problems here. Since a person may
dispose of his acquired property as he wishes, one is entitled to pass on
that property to one's heirs. Over time this property may accumulate in
the hands of individuals so that vast inequalities of wealth are created:
"He [a member of the commonwealth] may hand down everything else
[but the privileges attached to the rank he occupies in the commonwealth],
so long as it is material and not pertaining to his person, for it may be
acquired and disposed of as property and may over a series of generations
create considerable inequalities of wealth among the members of the
commonwealth (the employee and the employer, the landowner and the
agricultural servants, etc.)."75
But one simply cannot distinguish so sharply between one's
material property and the position one occupies in society, as Kant does
here, for one's socio-economic position depends upon one's property
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 76.
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holdings. Thus, by permitting unlimited inheritance of property, Kant is
allowing the inheritance of social position. While the accumulation of
property on the part of one person may be the result of his or her own
efforts, surely the inheritance of that property and the socio-economic
position that accompanies it is not the result of merit. In fact, Kant
recognizes this in his discussion of feudal privilege. But if one is able to
inherit and not merit one’s position as landlord or employer, this calls
into question the legitimacy of historically-given legal categories.
In short, while Kant argues that all persons ought to possess the
same legal status, he allows their class status to continue to vary widely,
for the abolition of legal barriers does not automatically produce the
crumbling of class barriers. Consequently, the legal categories, despite
their ostensibly open character, reflect and serve to perpetuate the class
composition of society, thereby undermining the formal equality of
citizens. I shall discuss this point in more detail in the last section of this
chapter.
Finally, we turn to the principle of independence. Kant's clearest
characterization of this principle is found in the Metaphysical Elements of
Justice where he asserts that the citizen possesses "the attribute of civil
independence that requires that he owes his existence and support, not to
the arbitrary will of another person in the society, but rather to his own
rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth, hence his own civil
personality may not be represented by another person in matters
involving justice and rights."76 Kant’s actual treatment of this principle
is very curious and highly problematic. If the principle of independence is
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 79.
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to have the same status as the principles of freedom and equality, then it
ought to treated expansively as imposing a requirement upon the
organization of society. Interpreted in this manner, this principle requires
that society be organized so that persons are not dependent on other
individuals for their livelihood. (I will return to this point in the next
section.) But Kant employs this principle in the opposite manner by using
it to restrict the franchise.
Kant uses this concept of independence to ground a distinction
between two types of citizens. He claims that "fitness for voting is a
prerequisite of being a citizen. "77 xhis fitness, however, depends not one
one's status as a person but on one’s independence of other individuals,
that is, on being not "just a part of the commonwealth, but also a
member. This requires that one "will of his own accord." Now a
condition of dependency threatens this ability. If someone "must depend
for his support (subsistence and protection), not on his own industry, but
on arrangements by others (with the exception of the state)," one lacks
independence and consequently "civil personality." Kant describes this
type of existence as "only in the mode of inherence." As examples of this
condition, Kant lists "the woodcutter whom I employ on my estate; the
smith in India who goes with his hammer, anvil, and bellows into houses
to work on iron, in contrast to the European carpenter or smith, who can
offer the products of his own labor for public sale; the private tutor, in
contrast to the schoolteacher; the sharecropper, in contrast to the farmer;
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p.79.
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and the like. "78 All these are "under the orders or protection of other
individuals and thus lack "civil independence."
Kant seems to be distinguishing here between the independent
producer of goods and services and the wage-laborer.79 The independent
producer possesses sufficient capital to support himself outside the employ
of others, though, of course, he is, strictly speaking, not independent of the
arrangements" of the market, whereas the wage-laborer possesses no
such endowment and consequently can live only by selling his labor to
those who can make use of it. Thus, the wage laborer is dependent upon
another person, his employer, in a way that the independent farmer,
artisan, or merchant is not. Kant's view on these matters is similar to that
of Karl Marx:
it follows precisely from the fact that labour depends on
nature , that the man who possesses no other property than
his labour power must, in all conditions of society and
culture, be the slave of other men who have made
themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour.
He can only work with their permission, and hence only live
with their permission.80
This condition renders one subject to the "orders" of another and thus
unable to "will of his own accord," thereby making one incapable of
representing oneself. Consequently, Kant argues, such individuals are
unfit to vote, though "they can still demand that they be treated in
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 79. For a useful explication and discussion of
Kant’s meaning here, see Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy .
His comparison of the private tutor and the schoolteacher is a bit problematic in this
regard, since neither presumably owns any capital but must sell their skills. The
schoolteacher, however, had an established and secure position within the community and
therefore was dependent on civil society as a whole and not on any particular individual.
On the other hand, the private tutor essentially occupied the position of a servant within
the household of his employer, on whom he was completely dependent. Kant himself
started his career as a private tutor and experienced this dependency first-hand.
Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, (New York: International Publishers,
1966), p. 3.
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accordance with the laws of natural freedom and equality," which only
entitles them to the right "to work up from this passive status to an active
status. "81
Kant’s distinction between passive and active citizens is clearly
untenable within the framework of his a priori principles, for the concept
of a passive citizen is, according to Kant's own definitions, an oxymoron.
Kant himself recognizes that the concept of a passive citizen "appears to
contradict the definition of the concept of a citizen in general," though he
provides no account that serves to clear up this apparent contradiction. In
order to display the contradictory nature of the concept of a passive citizen,
we need merely to refer to Kant's definition of citizens as "the members of
such a society (societas civilis), that is, of a state, who are united for the
purpose of making laws. "82 gy definition, one can not be citizen without
actively participating in the collective legislation of civil society. Later in
the text, when he introduces this distinction, Kant claims that "fitness for
voting is a prerequisite of being a citizen." If one is not fit to vote, as is the
case with the passive citizen, then that person has simply not met one of
the requirements for being considered a citizen. Thus, if we follow Kant’s
own definitions, the concept of a passive citizen is a contradiction in
terms.
But we need not restrict ourselves simply to definitions of terms in
order to see the incoherence of this notion, for more importantly there are
significant theoretical grounds for its rejection as well. Despite Kant's
pronouncements to the contrary, this distinction is "incompatible with the
freedom and equality that men possess as human beings." If one were not
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 80.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of justice, p. 78.
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permitted to participate in the legislative activity of civil society, one
would be subject to a "law other than one to which he has given his
consent," which is a violation of one's "lawful freedom." Further, under
such circumstances, if one were a passive citizen, one would have as a
superior a person, namely all active citizens, over whom he does not have
"just as much of a moral capacity to bind juridically as the other has to
bind him," in violation of his civil equality. Finally, Kant ignores his own
injunction that one's "civil personality may not be represented by another
person in matters involving justice and rights. "83
Finally, the category of passive citizenship is incompatible with the
concept of a realm of ends. As stated in the previous section, civil society
represents the juridical aspect of the realm of ends. All persons, or
rational beings, are ends in themselves and hence necessarily members of
the realm of ends.84 ^\n essential element of membership in the realm of
ends is the giving of universal law, i.e. participation in the collective
legislative activity that produces the common laws to which all persons
are subject. This follows simply from our autonomy as moral agents, for
exclusion from this process would relegate one to a position of
heteronomy vis a vis those common laws.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. pp. 78-9.
A brief rehearsal of terminological issues dealt with in the previous section may be
helpful here. One may belong to the realm of ends in two ways: as a member {died); or as
sovereign {Oberhaupt). Membership is the weaker sense of belonging. In both cases,
however, one is involved in the making of the common laws that govern external relations
among members of the realm of ends. With regard to civil society, however, one can be a
part (Teil) or a member {died), with passive citizens being the former and active citizens
being the latter. Here, being a part of civil society, and hence a passive citizen, is the
weaker sense of belonging to civil society. Now membership in the realm of ends involves
membership in civil society. Consequently, there is no way in which one can incorporate
the notion of a "part of civil society" into the concept of a realm of ends.
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Now one might argue that Kant has anticipated these criticisms and
circumvented them by the language he uses. For example, when he
discusses the consent that is necessary to legitimate a law, he does not
mean the actual consent of the empirical self, but rational consent, the
consent that one would give if one were a perfectly rational agent.
Further, in his discussion of equality, he uses the expression "moral
capacity" to bind others, not actual capacity. This merely refers to the right
one has to be considered in the promulgation of laws.
None of this will do, however, for Kant is not discussing here actual
civil society, but ideal civil society, which ought to guide actual civil
society. The right one has to be considered in the promulgation of laws
derives from one's ideal participation in the legislation of the public law
of civil society. At best, one can only argue that, in a society in which the
franchise is restricted by property qualifications of the type Kant presents
(or any type for that matter), those who can vote must consider what all
persons (including those without the franchise) could consent to when
promulgating laws. But this requirement stems from the nature of ideal
civil society, in which all persons participate in the collective legislation of
public law.
While his acceptance of property qualifications for the franchise is
untenable within the framework of Kant's theory considered ahistorically,
it does make more sense when placed in the appropriate historical context.
Kant is addressing a very hot political issue of his time, though one which
has cooled considerably since then. Viewed in this light, Kant appears as
moderately liberal, requiring only the ownership of enough property to
subsist on for the right to vote. Given his commitment to the gradual
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reform, it is tempting to see Kant as advocating here only the next step in
the expansion of political liberty as opposed to stating its end-point.
In both "Theory and Practice" and the Metaphysical Elements of
accepts as a given the economic situation in which some
have sufficient property to support themselves while others do not, never
questioning the conditions that give rise to it. In the former text, his
discussion explicitly abstracts from the justice of this situation and the
historical process that generated it: "As for landowners, we leave aside the
question of how anyone can have rightfully acquired more land than he
can cultivate with his own hands (for acquisition by military force is not
primary acquisition), and how it came about that numerous people who
might otherwise have acquired permanent property were thereby reduced
to serving someone else in order to live at all."85 Kant's earlier remarks
with regard to the passing on of property to one's heirs give us some idea
as to how he might at least partially answer the second question. As for
the first question, Kant does not leave this question unaddressed, but one
must ferret out his views on this subject from a variety of texts and draw
the appropriate conclusions for oneself, for Kant did not.
E. Conclusion
It would be quite easy to conclude on the basis of his remarks about
the three a priori principles that Kant is little more than an apologist for
the emerging bourgeois order of his time. By attacking the hereditary
privileges of the feudal nobility while accepting the massive inequalities
of wealth generated by emerging capitalism, Kant certainly employs those
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 78.
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principles in a manner that is quite congenial to the interests of the
emerging bourgeoisie. Further, by arguing for property qualifications for
the franchise, he places political power firmly in the hands of capital,
while relegating wage-labor to the political limbo of passive citizenship,
denied the right to press their case through the ballot box or the street and
dependent on the good will of the property-owning class. Kant's political
project, then, seems to provide a rationalization of the freeing of the
hands of the bourgeoisie vis a vis both the old feudal nobility and the
newly emerging working class.
In a classic Marxian critique of Kant's political theory, Herbert
Marcuse charges Kant with transforming "the historical facticity of
bourgeois society into an a priori ideal. "86 According to Marcuse, Kant
presents us with a society of individuals, each with a claim to the free
exercise of his will and striving naturally after the acquisition of property.
The result is a "society of universal insecurity, general disruption, and all-
round vulnerability," which can be held together only by a regime of
universal coercion that secures the lives and property of each and all.
Kant recognizes that simple possession is not property, a divorce he
represents by the distinction between empirical and intelligible possession.
Empirical possession is purely fortuitous and in and of itself based upon
the acquisition by a unilateral will; consequently it is inherently insecure.
Private possession can be legitimated only by the original communal
ownership of nature and and a general will permitting the private
appropriation of nature on this basis. Thus, Kant paradoxically bases the
acquisition of private property upon collective ownership, thereby
Herbert Marcuse, Studies in Critical Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 79-
94.
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justifying the peremptory possession of bourgeois property. But Marcuse
also acknowledges the progressive moment in Kant’s social thought:
"When Kant deals with social problems in the context of general
community, this already signifies a decisive step in the history of social
theory: it is no longer God but man who gives man freedom and
unfreedom."87 However, Marcuse goes on to argue, "not every general
community, i.e. every actually constituted society, is truly universal."88 in
bourgeois society, the interest of the "ruling strata," the bourgeoisie, is
antithetical to that of the majority of citizens.
My response to Marcuse is three-fold. First, his criticism is based on
the acceptance of the doctrine of provisional property, for it is only this
doctrine that allows for the legitimation of "property relationships as they
existed at the 'beginning' of bourgeois society" and their securing by civil
society. But as I pointed out in the last chapter, this doctrine is incoherent
within the terms of Kant’s own theory and ought to be replaced by the
stronger doctrine that Kant enunciates in the first part of the Metaphysical
Elements of Tustice . Once this is done, we can develop the full critical
potential of Kant’s theory. Second, Marcuse’s characterization of Kant’s
view of society focuses solely on the negative conception of persons as
ends in themselves, thereby ignoring the positive conception, which is an
essential component of the concept of the realm of ends. The realm of
ends, then, is not a competitive society but a cooperative one in which
individuals seek to further the ends of each other. A society in which this
is impossible and where one group’s pursuit of its interests necessarily
Marcuse, Studies in Critical Philosophy, p. 87. As we shall see later in this section, this
point is made explicitly by Kant in the Lectures on Ethics .
Marcuse, Studies in Critical Philosophy, p. 88. But then Kant never made this claim;
nor would it be consistent with his theory and the claims he does make.
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interferes with a similar pursuit on the part of others, as Marcuse claims is
true of bourgeois society, simply could not be considered even an
approximation of the realm of ends as it would conflict not only with the
positive conception of persons as objective ends but the negative
conception as well. Finally, the claim by each person to the free exercise of
his will is also a demand to participate in the legislation of common laws
governing society, a demand that has radical implications for the
organization of society.
Though such a view as Marcuse's does have merit, especially in the
light of some of Kant's own pronouncements, we adopt it at the risk of
missing Kant's insights into the nature of domination and subordination
and losing sight of a potentially powerful Kantian critique of these
relationships. In reading Kant, we must always keep in mind the
limitations of his perspective imposed upon him by his historical position
and what I have remarked upon before- his unique combination of
timidity and boldness. Kant constantly puts forth radical concepts and
pronouncements, only to withdraw from the implications of his own
doctrines in the very next breath. Thus, we may rest satisfied with the
results of Kant's apparently conservative temperament or we may pursue
the implications of his deeper insights to their ultimate conclusion. The
latter is the task I have set for myself in this work. What I want to do in
this, the final section of the chapter, is to call attention to some of Kant's
more radical insights and pronouncements in order to construct the
outlines of a Kantian critique of the political economy of capitalism.
It is true that Kant himself did not level such a critique. Given his
historical position he could not have; further, he pulled back from
drawing the conclusions that I argue are implied by his own theory.
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Nonetheless, it is not for naught that Kant has been called "the true and
real originator of German socialism. "89 i think we can discern in Kant's
moral theory the outlines of a rapprochement between liberalism and
socialism involving the construction of a vision of democratic socialism
on impeccably liberal foundations, socialism as the completion of the
liberal dream. It is entirely fitting that Kant, the great Prussian liberal,
should provide us with the basis from which to begin such a project.
The key to this project lies, as one might expect, in the notion of
autonomy. We have seen that Kant's attempt to ground a distinction
between active and passive citizenship is based on a recognition of the
dependence of wage labor on capital. Kant's understanding of this
relationship is quite similar to that of Marx. For both Kant and Marx, the
wage laborer, since he iacks sufficient capital to sustain himself, is forced to
sell his labor and thereby becomes dependent upon his employer, who
controls the material conditions of his livelihood. The employer
determines whether he works, and since he must work to live, thereby
determines whether he lives.
Though he clearly recognizes this situation, Kant draws the wrong
conclusions from this recognition. Kant argues that wage laborers ought
to be deprived of the franchise because they lack the requisite
independence for its exercise. Such a distinction certainly controverts the
notion of each individual as co-legislator. Though he falls into
inconsistency in his argument for this conclusion, Kant is at least honest
QQ
Hermann Cohen, cited in van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism, p. vii. van der
Linden's reconstruction is deeply influenced by Cohen and aims to ground socialism on
Kantian ethics. In this very interesting effort, van der Linden uses the notion of the highest
good as social duty to project a Kantian version of democratic socialism as the appropriate
goal of humanity's moral striving.
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in his attempt to tackle a problem that strikes at the heart of our
autonomy, rather than just ignoring it. However, one can easily stand
Kant's own argument on its head and point it in a rather different
direction on the basis of his insight into the domination of the wage-
laborer by capital. Kant recognizes that this relationship of domination
and subordination among persons undermines the autonomy of those
who are subordinate, thereby denying them full citizenship in civil society
and membership in the realm of ends. But he should have concluded
that, in order to bring into being the realm of ends, this form of
domination must be ended.
As has been observed by other commentators, Kant’s theory fits
quite nicely the model of an agrarian society consisting of independent
landowners and artisans, a society existing in the ideal only.90 in fact,
Kant's various discussions of property focus almost exclusively on the
ownership of land, which seems to serve as the paradigm of property.
When confronted with nascent industrial capitalism, his model begins to
lose its basic underpinning- the assumption of the economic
independence conferred by the ownership of property by all of the actors
within the society. This loss of economic independence and its
replacement by the structured dependency of the capitalist wage
relationship confronts Kant as a powerful challenge- how can persons be
citizens, that is, co-legislators, when they lack the material conditions
necessary for autonomous agency in the real social world. Kant responds
to this challenge with the distinction between passive and active
citizenship- persons without capital are still citizens but lose their right to
For example, see Victor J. Seidel, Kant, Respect and Injustice: The Limits of Liberal
Moral Theory, (London: Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1986).
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legislate. As we have seen, this solution is simply not tenable. But the
failure of Kant's proposed solution should not leave us complacent with
regard to the position of wage-laborers within the state, satisfied that they
can be secured the right to vote. Kant is far too astute an observer of
human society to have missed the mark so badly. The recognition of the
dependency of the capitalist wage relationship that motivates this effort is
still substantially correct and unaffected by the failure of his solution. It is
to Kant s credit that he at least recognizes this dependency and attempts to
make provisions for it in his theory; it is his failure that he takes the
wrong path after this recognition.
In order to see the path he could have and should have taken, let us
recapitulate the principle of independence as expressed in the
Metaphysical Elements of Justice . This principle requires that the citizen
owe "his existence and support, not to the arbitrary will of another person
in the society, but rather to his own rights and powers as a member of the
commonwealth. Now Kant treats this principle as specifying a
requirement for full citizenship in the state, but in doing so he
misconstrues the force of his whole theory. We are entitled to be citizens,
to be co-legislators, not because we are economically independent, but
because we are persons. We are moral agents who are ends in ourselves
and possess an inviolable dignity as such. In order to express our nature as
persons, we must participate in the collective decision-making of civil
society, for otherwise we are reduced to a condition of heteronomy, subject
to laws that are not of our own making.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 79.
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But full autonomy requires independence (in this case, economic
independence). As co-legislator within the realm of ends, one must be
subject to the will of no other, that is, one must belong as sovereign to the
realm of ends. Kant should have conceived of this principle as expressing
the requirement that within civil society each individual be guaranteed
the material conditions necessary for the exercise of autonomy, rather
than as stating a requirement for the vote. As pointed out in the last
section, this manner of construing the principle of principle coincides
with the use Kant makes of the other two a priori principles of justice-
freedom and equality. These principles are used in an expansive manner
to establish certain rights, whereas the principle is used in a restrictive
manner to limit them. I take this difference in usage to be further
evidence of Kant's misunderstanding of his own principle.
To a considerable extent, Kant acknowledges the point I have made
here by advocating the establishment of social welfare programs by the
state. In section C of the General Remarks, Kant argues along
contractarian lines that the state is obligated to provide the basic material
means of life for those who are unable to provide it for themselves:
The general Will of the people has united itself into a society
in order to maintain itself continually, and for this purpose it
has subjected itself to the internal authority of the state in
order to support those members of the society who are not
able to support themselves. Therefore, it follows from the
nature of the state that the government is authorized to
require the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to
those who are unable to provide the most necessary needs of
nature for themselves.92
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of fustice. p. 93.
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Since the physical existence of the individuals within civil society
depends on the act of subjecting themselves to the commonwealth for
the protection and care required in order to stay alive, they have bound
themselves to contribute to the support of their fellow citizens, and this is
the ground for the state's right to require them to do so."93 The state,
then, has the right to tax the wealthiest members of the commonwealth to
provide a minimum income for all its members. This income is to be
provided out of current tax assessments, in order to insure that "the
profession of poverty will not become a means of livelihood for the lazy."
Those who, for whatever reason, are unable to support themselves are to
be supported by a social welfare system established and administered by
the state.
One can derive this from both the principle of unanimity and the
concept of a person as an end in himself. In the first instance, given the
general insecurity of human existence, all agents could certainly agree to
the establishment of basic social welfare designed to provide a measure of
economic security. The second strategy, which is the one actually
employed by Kant, appeals to the purpose of civil society in establishing
one's negative status as an end in oneself. Since the continuation of life is
a prerequisite for membership in the realm of ends, one can not be
simultaneously treated as an end and allowed to perish. The denial of the
necessities of life is an interference with the pursuit of one's private ends
and thus a violation of one's negative status as an end in oneself. Since
life is a necessary condition of moral agency, one can not be autonomous if
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 93.
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one is not alive. Therefore all persons must be guaranteed at least the
minimal material means necessary for the sustaining of life.
At best, however, Kant's reasoning in this passage provides only a
rationale for welfare-state capitalism. At a deeper level, we may question
the inequality of resources (and the social structure producing it) that gives
rise to this situation, as Kant himself does. The injustice of economic
inequality is a recurring theme throughout the Kantian corpus. We find
an expression of this theme in his Lectures on Ethics :
We all have an equal right to the good things which nature
has provided. These good things have not, however, been
shared out by God. He has left men to do the sharing. Every
one of us, therefore, in enjoying the good things of life must
have regard to the happiness of others; they have an equal
right and ought not to be deprived of it.94
This passage reminds one of Locke's dictum that, in the private
appropriation of property, one must leave "enough and as good" for others.
Kant's point here is that the sharing out of nature is a human activity and
not divinely ordained; consequently, it ought to be governed by moral
principles.
Here, of course, one may argue that Kant has only granted that all
persons have an equal right to share in the bounty of nature and not a
right to an equal, or even equitable, share of the same. Such an
interpretation, however, would not be consistent with either Kant's moral
theory as a whole or other passages from the text. If one individual, or
group of individuals, appropriate for their own so much of nature that
others are unable to make do on what remains, then that person (or group
of persons) have violated the status of others as ends-in-themselves by
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963),
p. 192.
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depriving them of the basic material means of pursuing their own ends.
This would constitute a violation of the principle of non-interference.
Further, such an appropriation would render those without property
dependent on those with property, thereby undermining their autonomy
and respect.95 One's independence, an aspect of autonomy, is threatened
by a lack of the material means of livelihood.
In depriving others of the means of sustenance, we have done
them an injustice. Under such conditions, acts of charity are not
meritorious, for they merely restore to others what is rightfully theirs:
Respect for the rights of others is rooted in principle, and as
mankind is not rich in principles. Providence has implanted
in our bosoms the instinct of benevolence to be the source of
actions by which we restore what we have unrighteously
procured. We have thus an instinct to benevolence, but not
to righteousness. This impulse makes a man merciful and
charitable to his neighbour, so that he makes restitution for
an injustice of which he is quite unconscious; though
unconscious of it only because he does not properly examine
his position. Although we may entirely within our rights,
according to the laws of the land and the rules of our social
structure, we may nevertheless be participating in general
injustice, and in giving to an unfortunate man we do not
give him a gratuity but only help to return to him that of
which the general injustice of our system has deprived him.
For if none of us drew to himself a greater share of the
world's wealth than his neighbour, there would be no rich
and no poor. Even charity therefore is an act of duty imposed
upon us by the rights of others and the debt we owe to
them.96
"Money enables a man to bring others under his power; for reasons of self-interest they
will labor for him and do his bidding. By dependence upon others man loses his worth, and
so a man of independent means is an object of respect."(Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 177.) It is
clear in the text that the 'respect' to which Kant refers here the empirical respect we
accord to others in everyday life and not the moral concept of 'respect' in the Foundations .
But just as clearly Kant's remarks are appropos of the latter kind.
Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 194. See also p. 21 1 : "And as our social system is so arranged
that we take part in the universal and open give and take of business with peculiar profit
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In this passage, we see Kant again distinguishing between natural rights
and legal rights, with the latter being open to criticism on the basis of the
former. But Kant breaks new ground here by setting forth an explicitly
egalitarian standard to be used in judging the justice of existing social
systems. Our failure to recognize the injustice of an inequitable
distribution of wealth in those systems stems from our failure to critically
examine our social position and the societal structure in which it is
imbedded, and we should expect that Kant, the man who advocated
submitting every area of human endeavor to criticism, would not himself
fall prey to the same failure. He does not.
Now we may well grant that the Lectures on Ethics is a pre-critical
work and as such not reflective of Kant’s mature views on the subject.
But Kants admonitions regarding the injustice of gross inequalities of
wealth and their attendant consequences is also a regular feature of his
critical writings. In the Critique of Tudgment. Kant recognizes that, under
conditions of gross inequality in the distribution of wealth, persons
without wealth are reduced to mere means used by and for the benefit of
those who possess vast amounts of property. In a passage that appears to
begin as a paean to the beneficial effects of inequality and social
stratification, Kant launches into a condemnation of the
instrumentalization and exploitation of the laboring classes by those with
wealth:
It is hard to develop skill in the human species except by
means of inequality among people. The majority take care,
mechanically as it were and without particularly needing art
for this, of the necessities of life for others, who thus have the
to ourselves, ours acts of charity to others should not be regarded as acts of generosity, but as
small efforts towards restoring the balance which the general social system has disturbed."
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ease and leisure to work in science and art, the less necessary
ingredients in culture. Those others keep the majority in a
state of oppression, hard labor, and little enjoyment, eyen
though some of the culture of higher class does gradually
spread to the lower also. But on both sides trouble increases
with equal yigor as culture progresses, (the height of this
progress, when people's propensity to what is dispensable
begins to interfere with what is indispensable, is called
luxury.) For the lower class trouble results from yiolence
from without, for the higher from insatiability within. And
yet this shining misery has to do with the deyelopment of
man s natural predispositions, and nature still achieyes its
own purpose, eyen if that purpose is not ours.97
Kant ends this passage with his characteristic faith in progressiye course of
history, but it is clear that, aside from the possible historical necessity of
the situation, this condition is morally objectionable. First, those who
labor for the leisure class are turned into instruments for the cultural
adyancement of the latter and become the object of their yiolence and
oppression. This is lessened only slightly by the trickling down of culture
to those oppressed classes. Further, the resultant discord threatens the
integrity of ciyil society and can only be alleyiated by an alteration in social
structure.
That such a condition, one where the distribution of wealth reduces
some persons to a condition of dependence on others, is unjust is
explicitly stated in the Doctrine of Virtue : "The ability to practice
beneficence which depends on property, follows largely from the injustice
of a goyernment which fayors certain men and so introduces an
inequality of wealth that makes others need help. "98 in a manner
reminiscent of the Lectures, Kant concludes this section by questioning
whether an act of beneficence can, under such conditions, be considered
Kant, Critique of judgment, p. 320.
9®- Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 122.
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something meritorious" and should even be called "beneficence at all."
We have arrived, then, back at our point of departure in the Lectures .
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the division of property
and the rights attending to such ownership ought to be determined in
accordance with the principles of justice. Kant reiterates this point in
section B of the General Remarks in the Staatsrecht. Given that property
is based on the common appropriation of nature by the general will, the
actual division of property in society is subject to the a priori principles of
justice that ought to govern society. Since the right of property ("the
possibility of having something external as one's property") is "the first
acquirable right of possible possession and use, all such rights must be
derived from the sovereign as lord of the land or, better put, the supreme
proprietor." The sovereign, then, is the supreme proprietor. The
sovereign as supreme proprietor "is, however, only an Idea of the civil
union that serves the purpose of representing the necessary unification of
the private property of all the people under a general public will possessor,
so that the determination of particular owners is in accordance with the
necessary formal principle of division (division of the land) in terms of
concepts of justice, rather than by principles of aggregation (which proceed
from part to whole). "99
Kant utilizes the notion of supreme proprietorship to bear a heavy
burden by grounding a myriad of governmental activities on it. This idea
permits the sovereign "to levy land taxes, excises, and customs or
services," as well as "the right of the supreme commander to administer
the national economy, finance, and police."^ 00 More interestingly,
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 90.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Tustice. p. 91.
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though, this idea serves as the moral basis for any land reform effort that
the state may undertake. The general will, from whose appropriation of
nature the legitimacy of land-ownership is derived, is represented by the
sovereign, who as supreme proprietor represents this common
appropriation. Consequently, it is well within the rights of the sovereign
as supreme proprietor to alter existing property arrangements, as those
arrangements depend on the sovereign as representative of the general
will for their legitimacy. Those who are dispossessed have no recourse to
any higher authority:
Those who are affected by such reforms can not complain
that their property has been taken from them, inasmuch as
the only ground for their previous possession was the
opinion of the people, which, as long as remains unchanged
makes the possession necessarily valid. As soon as public
opinion changes, however- but public opinion as it is reflect
in the judgement of those who through their merits have the
best claim to lead it- then the presumptive ownership must
cease just as though it had been lost through appeal to the
state.^0^
Historically-given property arrangements, then, are subject to change in
the light of public opinion, which presumably is to be guided by the a
priori principles of justice. Such reforms are subject only to the condition
that those who are dispossessed must be compensated for their loss.
This discussion is interesting for two reasons. First, it reinforces my
contention in the last chapter that Kant ought to discard the doctrine of
provisional property, for he reiterates the logical priority of the general
will to the right of first possession. Further, the right of first possession is
not absolute but subject to change with changes in public opinion. Now
Kant's addition of the restriction commanding compensation could be
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 91.
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seen as an attempt to reconcile the acceptance of land reform with his
assertion of a right of first possession derivable from the general will. But
it is not clear that Kant's assertion of this condition is justifiable in the
light of his own remarks. If "presumptive ownership" ceases with legal
changes in property arrangements, then there is no good reason to require
compensation to any previous owners. One is entitled to compensation
for one's property, but not for something that is not one's property. When
presumptive ownership ceases, one's property rights cease to exist,
including all claims to compensation for that property. Compensation
may be justified on other grounds, then, but not on the basis of any
putative property rights of previous owners. This line of thought is
reinforced by the inclusion of the expression "just as though it had been
lost through appeal to the state." I take it that Kant is drawing an analogy
here with legal disputes between different claimants to the same object.
Such a dispute is resolved by the courts when the judge determines which
litigant has the legally-valid property claim. Consequently, since it is
determined that the object is not the property of the loser, he or she is not
necessarily entitled to any compensation by the victor.
Second, this passage augments my previous criticism of Marcuse's
critique of Kant. Though it is clear from the passage in question that Kant
is taking aim at the institutions of feudalism, the same claims are equally
valid of capitalist property relations. Kant's theory provides no defense of
the absolute and immutable property rights of the bourgeoisie. Quite the
contrary, such rights are also subject to change in accordance with the a
priori principles of justice.
It is true that Kant's conception of property arrangements and their
possible reform is circumscribed by his insistence that ownership must be
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private and not collective, that "all land belongs to the people (not
collectively, but distributively)."102 i think this claim is best interpreted as
a result of the limitations placed on Kant’s vision by his cultural and
historical perspective, rather than as an essential component of his theory.
Kant may simply not have been familiar with communal land ownership
patterns prevailing in other cultures; further, he does except nomadic
tribes from this limitation, indicating that it is not absolute and
unconditional.
More importantly, Kant writes at the beginning of the industrial
revolution and the widespread development of factory production and
consequently can not be expected to understand fully the nature of those
developments. Nonetheless, Kant does remarkably well in providing us
with the elements of a moral critique of capitalist relations of production
when supplemented by an empirical understanding of their nature. The
problem with Kant here is one of application in that we must adapt the a
priori principles of justice to the prevailing empirical conditions; we need
to keep in mind that the concept of the realm of ends must be applied to
existing social reality so as to guide its transformation. Unfortunately, my
conclusions here can only be of the most tentative sort. Based on Kant's
analysis of economic dependency, 1 think we can plausibly argue that this
transformation involves a movement towards socialism and away from
capitalist relations of production. In brief, the socialized character of mass
production requires collective ownership of the means of that production
by labor if we are to overcome dependent condition of the wage-laborer.
Such property arrangements are not only compatible with Kant's theory.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc. p.90.
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but are mandated by the principle of independence when properly
understood. This conclusion is further reinforced when we consider that
the realm of ends incorporates both the negative and the positive
conception of persons as ends in themselves. According to the latter
conception, we are obligated to actively further the ends of other persons.
Now this obligation is better fulfilled in a cooperative, socialist economy
than m a competitive, capitalist one, where are relations with others often
possess a purely instrumental character, an important case in point is the
employment (employee/employer) relationship in which this
instrumental character is suggested by its very name.
I shall conclude here by pointing to what I take to be both Kant’s
most damning criticism of capitalist relations of production and the vision
upon which any humane community must be built. Kant was perhaps
the greatest defender of the dignity of all persons and expounded this
position in some of the most moving passages in the history of
philosophy. In his discussion of the realm of ends in the Foundations, he
draws a distinction between price and dignity:
In the realm of ends everything has either a price or a dignity.
Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its
equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price,
and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.^ 03
Anything that "is related to general human inclinations and needs" have
"a market price, for example "skill and diligence in work." Persons, on the
other hand, possess an inviolable dignity due to their status as moral
agents. If the relations of production within society are to be morally
acceptable, they must respect the inviolable dignity of all persons that Kant
Kant, Foundations, p. 53.
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always insists upon. But in a situation in which an individual must sell
his labor and thereby himself, for wage-labor is nothing other than the sale
of the use of one’s body for a wage, i.e. the market price, persons lose their
dignity and become commodities to be exchanged at the going rate.
Consequently, a capitalist labor market is incompatible with one’s dignity
as a human being and with the concept of a realm of ends.
I confess that my conclusions in this chapter are of the most
tentative sort and require substantial elaboration, which would take us far
beyond the limitations of this work. Nonetheless, I think these
conclusions do point Kant’s theory in the appropriate direction.
Unfortunately, I must reserve the full development and elaboration this





We now turn to the nature of the ideal state (a republic) that Kant
envisages as the application of the three a priori principles of justice-
freedom, equality, and independence. According to Kant, the constitution
of the ideal state must be republican in form: "The only constitution
which derives from the idea of the original compact, and on which all
juridical legislation of a people must be based, is the republican."^ This
constitution is based on the a priori principles of justice and is the only
one consonant with those same principles. Under a republican
constitution, the executive authority of the government is separate from
the legislative authority. In this chapter, I will discuss the nature of the
republican constitution and Kant's arguments for it, as well as his
rejection of political democracy. Kant equates democracy with popular
sovereignty; in a democracy, legislative authority, or sovereignty, is vested
in the people as a whole.
In many ways, Kant's discussion of republicanism is the least
satisfactory component of his political theory. Kant's discussion of the
ideal state is quite confusing due to the seemingly incoherent ordering of
the text in the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice,^ his fluctuating
L Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1957), p. 11.
One recent commentator has argued quite convincingly that the section entitled
"Staatsrecht" is in complete disorder:
"
'The Right of a State' ('Staatsrecht') is a text
which almost certainly was not written as a single piece by a knowledgeable author who
was capable of coherently presenting his thoughts." Bernd Ludwig, "'The Right of a State'
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terminology, and his own annoying tendency to misuse and conflate his
own terms. Further, the explicit textual references to the nature of the
republican constitution are few, the most extensive discussion being the
"First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace." It is questionable whether,
when taken all together, Kant's remarks on the subject provide us with a
coherent doctrine, and it has been questioned whether Kant has anything
original to say on these topics.3
In order that we may approach Kant's republicanism as
methodically as possible, I shall begin by discussing in the next section the
three different authorities within the state. In Perpetual Peace. Kant
distinguishes between "the form of sovereignty" and "the form of
government
, section C will be devoted to a discussion of the former and
section D to a discussion of the latter. Kant explicitly rejects democracy as
incompatible with a republican constitution, but I will demonstrate that
this rejection is the result of Kant's ignoring of his own conceptual
framework and his conflating of the form of sovereignty with the form of
government. Finally, I will conclude by examining his contention that the
spread of republicanism is necessary for the emergence of world peace.
Here I will argue that the republican constitution must be democratic in
character if it is to sustain the claims Kant makes for it in this regard. As
in previous chapters, I will be concerned to determine where Kant held to
in Immanuel Kant's Doctrine of Right", Tournal of the History of Philosophy. July, 1990,
Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, p. 408. Professor Ludwig's proposed alternative ordering of the text is
as follows: sections 45, 48, 46, 49, 47, 51, 52, the General Remark, and section 50. This
proposed ordering does render a confusing text considerably more coherent.
For example, see W. B. Gallie, "Kant's View of Reason in Politics," Philosophy. 54, 1979,
pp. 19-33. Gallie argues that Kant's philosophy of the state is merely an "academic
exercise" that "amounts to a restatement, in dehistoricized terms and in accordance with
Kant's rationalist theory of morals, of Rousseau's central political teachings." (p. 19) I
trust that I have said enough in previous chapters in the way of criticism of the construal of
Kant as presenting a "deepened Rousseauianism."
210
the proper course and where he went astray. It is my basic contention, in
this chapter and throughout this work, that Kant's contractarian
construction, despite his own statements to the contrary, projects a vision
of radical democracy as the ideal form of civil society.
B. The Functions of the State
Kant distinguishes three authorities (or persons) within the state:
the legislative authority (in the person of the sovereign); the executive
authority (in the person of the ruler); and the judicial authority (in the
person of the judge). Kant likens these three authorities to the three
premises of a practical syllogism: "the law of the sovereign Will is like the
major premise; the command to act according to the law is like the minor
premise that is the principle of subsumption under the will; and the
adjudication (the sentence) that establishes what the actual law of the land
in the case under consideration is, is like the conclusion."^ This analogy
plays an important though obscure role in Kant's argument for
representational politics and will be discussed in greater detail in section D
of this chapter.
Kant conceives of the three authorities as being both coordinate
with one another and subordinate to each other. As coordinate, each "one
serves as a complement to the others for the completeness of the state's
constitution"; each function is equally necessary for a complete state. But
they are "subordinate to one another" in that no one authority may
"usurp the function of the others," for each authority has its own proper
sphere of activity to which it is restricted. Thus, each authority or person
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 78.
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is superior to the others in its own proper sphere. Finally, this
combination of subordination and coordination "secures" to every subject
what IS just and right."5 Let us now consider briefly each authority in
turn.
We have already discussed at considerable length the legislative
authority and will turn to it again in the concluding section of this
chapter, so I will merely recapitulate here what I have said earlier. We
have seen that "the legislative authority can be attributed only to the
united Will of the people" for "only the united and consenting Will of all-
that is, a general united Will of the people by which each decides the same
for all and all decide the same for each- can legislate."6 Kant attributes this
to the necessity to secure justice for each and all, since insofar as one is
rational one can not do oneself an injustice. As we have seen in the last
chapter, the deeper reason for this is the need to preserve the autonomy of
the individual within civil society. It is my basic contention that,
irrespective of his pronouncements to the contrary, Kant is first and
foremost a theorist of radical democracy and popular sovereignty. I only
note at this stage in my argument that Kant conceives of sovereignty as
legislative authority.
Let us now turn to the ruler, the repository of executive authority.
Essentially the ruler administers the governmental apparatus so as to
execute the laws given by the sovereign. The ruler is unable to
promulgate laws himself, rather "the commands he gives to the people,
the magistrates, and the ministers who are in charge of the administration
are not laws, but ordinances and decrees, because they involve decisions
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, p. 81
.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 78.
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about particular cases and are subject to change."7 Kant’s manner of
putting this is somewhat misleading. First, in at least one case, that of
deciding to go to war, the sovereign makes a decision in particular cases.
Second, it is at least conceivable that the law, as well as executive orders
and directives, could change with changing circumstances. Executive
commands, then, are different from laws in that, as applications of the
law, they rely on the law for their validity. Should a discrepancy arise
between a law propounded by the sovereign and a directive of the ruler,
the former would invalidate the latter. In this regard, the ruler is
subordinate to the sovereign, for he merely carries out the sovereign's will
as expressed in the law. As we shall see, many of Kant's problems in the
application of his theory arise from his tendency to conflate executive and
legislative authority.
Finally, Kant separates the judicial function from the executive and
legislative: "neither the sovereign nor the ruler can judge; they can only
appoint judges as magistrates."^ Initially, Kant vests this appointive
power in the ruler alone without any explanation as to why this should be
so. But he later weakens the ruler in this regard by granting to both the
executive and legislative branches the power to make judicial
appointments. Kant does not rest content here, however, for immediately
after this assertion he proceeds to make the case for a judiciary in which
"the people judge themselves through those of their fellow citizens whom
they have named by free elections as their representatives. "9 Each act of a
judge is "an adjudication (a sentence) [is] an individual act of public legal
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of justice, p. 82.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 82.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 82.
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justice (lustitiae distributivae) performed by an official of the state (judge
or court of justice) on a subject, that is, on someone belonging to the
people."10 The judge is to ascertain the facts in a particular case and then
render a decision regarding the application of the law, a decision that is
then enforced by the executive authority.
With Kant's account of the division of the state before us, we may
now proceed to his account of the different forms of the state. Actually
Kant’s discussion of this in Perpetual Peace is slightly different from that
Metaphysical Lements of Tustire. 1 will focus my discussion on the
account in the former, since it is more comprehensive than that in the
latter, actually containing the latter account as one of its sub-divisions.
The different forms of the state can be classified in two different
ways- according to the exercise of sovereignty within the state (the form of
sovereignty) or according to the internal structure of the state (the form of
government):
In order not to confuse the republican constitution with the
democratic (as is usually done), the following should be
noted. The forms of the state (civitas) can be divided either
according to the persons who possess the sovereign power or
according to the mode of administration exercised by the
chief, whoever he may be. The first is properly called the
form of sovereignty (forma imperii), and there are only three
possible forms of it: autocracy, in which one, aristocracy, in
which some associated together, or democracy, in which all
those who constitute society, possess sovereign power. They
may be characterized respectively, as the power of a monarch,
of the nobility, or of the people. The second division is that
by the form of government (forma regiminis) and is based on
the constitution, which is the act of the general will- through
which many persons become one nation. In this respect
government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism
is the political principle of the separation of the executive
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 83.
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power (the administration) from the iegislative; despotism ismat of the autonomous execution by the state of laws which
It has Itself decreed. Thus in a despotism the public will is
administered by the ruler as his own will.^
This classification, then, is motivated by Kant's desire to avoid what he
sees as the common confusion of a republic with a democracy, though
, as
we shall see, he succumbs to the opposite confusion of opposing a republic
to a democracy. Kant's discussion of the forms of the state in the
Metaphysical Elements of Tustice encompasses only what he calls the form
of sovereignty in this passage. ^ 2 Further, his language also differs in the
two texts in a way that sometimes generates contradictions between the
two texts. We shall first examine Kant's discussion of the forms of the
state and then proceed to his account of the forms of government; finally
we will conclude with an examination of how his conflation of this
distinction leads him to misunderstand the implications of his own
theory and mistakenly reject democratic self-rule.
C. The Forms of Sovereignty
I begin my discussion here by reiterating Kant's conception of the
nature of sovereignty. Sovereignty is legislative authority; it is the right
to promulgate the common laws binding on all members of civil society.
There are three distinct forms of sovereignty: autocracy, in which one
individual possesses legislative authority; aristocracy, in which some
associated together possess sovereign power; and democracy, in which all
persons in society hold that power together.
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 13-14.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. pp. 109-10.
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Kant’s classification of the forms of the state, considered in terms of
the exercise of sovereignty, in the Metaphysical Elements of is
similar to that m Perpetual Peace; in both texts, the three forms of the state
are autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy respectively. The difference
between the two texts lies in a distinction between autocracy and
monarchy that is propounded in the former. In the passage above, Kant
identifies monarchy and autocracy, with autocracy being "characterized ...,
as the power of a monarch." Later in his discussion of the possible
transformation of existing regimes into republics, all mention of
autocracy' drops out of the the discussion and is replaced by the term
monarchy. In the Metaphysical Elements of lustice. however, monarchy
is contrasted with autocracy, the difference lying in the extent of each's
authority. The autocrat ('or 'self-commander'") "is one who possesses all
the authority," whereas the monarch "possesses only the highest
authority. The autocrat is said to be the sovereign, while the monarch is
said to represent him. ^3 jj- jg difficult to make sense of the distinction
Kant is attempting to draw here, especially since he then proceeds to use
the two terms interchangeably. It may be that Kant is trying to capture
with this distinction the difference between the limited constitutional
monarchy of England and the royal absolutism of Louis XIV in France.
At any rate, this distinction fits in nicely with his attempt to show that a
monarchy, since it is representative of the sovereign, is closer to the
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 110.
This is a rather tricky point. Kant believed that in practice the British regime
behaved as an absolute monarchy, or what Kant calls here an autocracy. Consequently, the
difference between Great Britain and France is only nominal, but these definitions do seem
to capture that nominal distinction. For Kant's view of the British monarchy, see section 8
of Part II of The Strife of the Faculties . Immanuel Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again:
Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?," in On History, ed. Lewis White Beck, trans.
Robert E. Anchor, (New York: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 148-50.
216
republican form of government, which is essentially representational,
than is a democracy.
Of the three forms of the state, autocracy is the simplest, for there is
only one legislator and thus only one relationship in it, "that of a single
person (the king) to the people." The aristocratic form is a bit more
complex because it involves two relationships: the relation of the
aristocratic legislators to each other; and the relation of the legislative
aristocracy to the people as a whole. Finally, a democracy is the most
complex of the three forms, containing as it does three relationships-
"first, the Will of all to unite to constitute themselves a people; then, the
Will of the citizens to form a commonwealth; and finally, to place at the
head of this commonwealth a sovereign, who is none other other than
this united will itself."^ 5
In his analysis of the different relationships in a democracy, Kant
departs from the symmetry of the previous two forms of the state without
making clear why he does so. There seem to be no more relationships
involved in a democracy than in an aristocracy, though those
relationships are different ones. Whereas in an aristocracy we have
relations among aristocratic legislators and between the aristocracy and the
people as a whole, we have in a democracy relations among democratic
legislators and between the people as a whole qua sovereign and the
people as a whole qua subject. Instead of this scheme Kant substitutes a
three-step process, each seemingly with its own contract, thus adding to
even the traditional double contract theory. In the double contract theory,
there are two different contracts- a social contract by which civil society is
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Kisticc, p. 110.
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constituted and a contract of government by which one part of the state,
the ruler(s), contracts with another, the subjects. The latter contract
presupposes the former. Now the third relationship that Kant points out
is merely the contract of government. However, it is not clear which of
the first two contracts is the social contract and why there is a need for two
distinct steps in the first place, for the constitution of a people and the
formation of a commonwealth are better considered as one act.
Nonetheless, this discussion is very important, for here Kant implicitly
acknowledges that only in a democracy can the united will of the people be
considered to be sovereign. Since only if the united will of the people is
sovereign can persons within civil society be autonomous, we can
conclude that persons are only autonomous in a democracy.
Now Kant goes on to argue that "as far as the administration of
justice is concerned, the simplest form is without doubt also at the same
time the best; but as far as justice and Law are concerned, the simplest
form is the most dangerous for the people in view of the fact that it
strongly invites despotism."^ 6 Thus, "Simplification is indeed a
reasonable maxim in the machinery of uniting the people through
coercive laws, provided that all the people are passive and obey the one
person who is above them; but, under such circumstances, none of the
subjects are citizens."^ ^ Autocracy, then, would seem to violate the
freedom and independence of agents as citizens. All persons in such a
society are denied their role as co-legislators and are subject to the will of
one individual.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 110.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 110.
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There is a deep tension here that runs throughout Kant political
theory. Kant recognizes that "The supreme authority resided originally in
the people, and all the rights of individuals considered as mere subjects
(and especially as political officials) must be derived from this supreme
authority. Further, this right is inalienable, and it would seem that the
people can never relinquish it. In an allusion to Louis the XVI of France,
Kant argues that:
the right of supreme legislation in a commonwealth is not an
alienable right, but the most personal of all rights. Whoever
possesses this right can control anci direct the people through
the collective Will, but can not dispose of the collective Will
itself, for the collective Will itself is the first and original
foundation of any public contract whatsoever. A contract
that would obligate the people to give back its authority could
not be consistent with its role as legislative power, and to
hold that such a contract has any binding force is self-
contradictory by the principle: 'No man can serve two
masters. '^9
But if sovereignty is inalienable, residing originally in the people, and the
people can not give back the supreme legislative authority once they have
received it, how could they ever have given it up in the first place?
Autocracy, and aristocracy, then are incompatible with the supreme
legislative authority of the collective will of the people, for each subjects
the people to the arbitrary will of one or a few, thereby denying them their
freedom, equality, and independence as citizens. Only in a democracy can
all legislate for each and each legislate for all.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 113.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 1 14.
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D. The Forms of Government
Let us now turn to Kant's discussion of the forms of government.
Kant distinguishes two forms of government- despotic and republican.20
In a despotic government, the legislative and executive functions are
combined in one person. A republican government, on the other hand,
separates these two functions and assigns them to different persons or
branches of the government. Under such a government, all subjects are
treated as citizens, that is, in accordance with laws of their own proper
independence. "21 Here "everyone possesses himself and does not depend
on the absolute Will of another next to or over him. "22 From this last
claim, Kant concludes that "the sovereign of the people (the legislator) can
not at the same time be the ruler, for the ruler is himself subject to the law
and through it is obligated to another, the sovereign. "23
The reasoning here is straightforward. If the ruler not only executes
but also makes the law, then the ruler is superior to the law (i.e. the law is
annexed to his person). This point is made quite clearly by Hobbes in
Leviathan. The sovereign in the Hobbesian commonwealth is incapable
of violating the law for his will is the law and "having power to make and
repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that
subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of
20- This is the characterization provided in Perpetual Peace, whereas in the Metaphysical
Elements of Tustice, the distinction is between despotic and patriotic government. The
difference between the two texts on this point is purely verbal.
2L Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 82.
22- Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 82.
20- Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 82.
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new."24 Should a discrepancy arise between his actions and his law, the
sovereign need merely amend the law so as to bring it into conformity
with his actions. The Hobbesian commonwealth, then, is a perfect
despotism, where all members of civil society are subject to the arbitrary
will of a single individual. But this political arrangement reduces the
citizens of a commonwealth to a condition of heteronomy and violates
the equality of all citizens by imposing upon them a superior whom they
have no moral capacity to bind juridically." Consequently, government
must be republican and not despotic, for the republican "constitution is
the only enduring political constitution in which the law is autonomous
[selbstherrschend] and is not annexed to any particular person."25
Under a republican form of government, it is always possible that
the ruler abuse his power by failing to execute and even by violating the
laws of the commonwealth. But as regards this abuse of power, Kant
argues, the sovereign possesses only limited rights vis a vis the ruler;
"The sovereign can take his authority from the ruler, depose him, or
reform his administration, but can not punish him. "26 An act of
punishment is an exercise of executive authority; thus, in punishing the
ruler, the sovereign would be usurping the position of the executive. The
ruler is the highest executive authority of the state, that is, to the ruler
"alone belongs the supreme capacity to use coercion in accordance with
the law." To subject the ruler to coercion, of which punishment is an
instance, is to subject the supreme executive to some higher executive
authority, "which is a self-contradiction."
Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 313.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 112.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 82.
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Kant’s argument here is dearly untenable. If the ruler is deposed,
then he no longer possesses "the supreme authority to use coerdon in
accordance with the law;" rather, this authority is now vested in the new
ruler who replaces him. This new ruler is certainly empowered to employ
coercion against the old ruler for his violations of the law, as long as a
judgment to this effect is handed down by the appropriate judicial
authority.
Kant could respond to this point by appealing to the ideal character
of the republican constitution, for the idea of a republican constitution
abstracts from the conditions of space and time. The punishment of a
deposed ruler by his successor takes place within the temporal ordering of
events. Thus, by arguing along these lines for the legitimacy of the use of
coercion against the ruler, one illegitimately imports temporality into the
republican ideal.
But it is actually Kant who is responsible for the importation of
time into the republican ideal. The deposing of a ruler and the reforming
of his administration are themselves temporal acts. Thus, if it is
illegitimate for this reason to punish the ruler for his actions once he has
been deposed, it must also be illegitimate to depose him in the first place.
But the latter can not be illegitimate, for otherwise the republican
constitution would be a dead letter. It is important to remember here that
ideas must be applied to the empirical world if they are to have any
practical application for us. This requires that we apply them to the
conditions of space and time, i.e. that we construct a typic. Thus, the
importation of space and time into the discussion of the republican
constitution is perfectly legitimate if we conceive of ourselves as
constructing a typic for that idea, and that is just what we are doing here.
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We can, however, continue to press the issue by again pushing it
back one step and questioning whether the sovereign even has the right to
depose the ruler in the first place, let alone punish him. As an application
of the law to the ruler, the act of deposing a ruler is arguably an exercise of
executive authority and thus lies outside the sphere of the sovereign. But
if the sovereign were to lack this authority, then the whole republican
structure would break down. Under such conditions the law would
become an empty letter, for the ruler could break it with impunity. The
whims of the ruler would then be the real law.
In this whole discussion, Kant is torn between pedantry and
pragmatism. On the one hand, Kant argues on the basis of the definitions
of legislative and executive authority for a rigid subordination of the
legislative to the executive in the administration of the law, while on the
other hand he recognizes the need for checks and balances and
consequently flexibility in the allocation of power and authority to the
respective branches of the government. He tries to resolve this conflict by
means of the halfway house of permitting the deposition of the ruler but
not his punishment. However, this solution can satisfy neither the
demand for precision in the definitions of concepts nor the need for a
realistic assessment of the exigencies of human government. I suggest
that the choice to be made here can be determined only by appeal to the a
priori principles of justice, which govern the constitution of ideal and
civil society, and these I think decide in favor of Kant's pragmatic
impulses for the reasons already adduced.
Finally, a republican government must be representative in nature,
(in fact this is the only characterization of a republican constitution that
Kant provides in the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice) :
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Every republic is and can be nothing else than a
representative system of the people if it is to protect the rights
of its citizens in the name of the people. Under a
representative system, these rights are protected by the
citizens themselves, united and acting through their
representatives.27
Kant s argument for this claim is provided in Perpetual Peace . Let us now
consider it in some detail.
If a government is not representative, then it is, "properly speaking,
without form. "28 Kant’s reasoning here is based on the analogy of the
different authorities of the state with the formal structure of a syllogism,
with the legislative branch being the analogue of the major premise and
the executive the analogue of the minor. Apparently, if a government is
not representative, then the legislative and the executive branches are one
and the same. But it is impossible in a syllogism for the major and minor
premises to be one and the same. On the basis of his analogy of the
internal structure of the state with syllogistic form, Kant concludes that
similarly the legislative and the executive can not be so united: "The
legislator can unite in one and the same person his function as legislative
and as executor of his will just as little as the universal of the major
premise in a syllogism can also be the subsumption of the particular under
the universal in the minor."29
This argument contains two rather puzzling points. First, it is
unclear what type of impossibility Kant means when he claims that the
legislative and executive can not be united in one person. Second, the
nature of the connection between representation and form is quite murky.
- Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 113.
28- Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 14.
2^- Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 14
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With respect to the first point, Kant’s analogical inference from the
impossibility of the unification of the major and premises of a syllogism to
the impossibility of the unification of the legislative and the executive
branches of government simply will not do, for a government is not a
syllogism. Despotism is a possible form of government, and Kant himself
explicitly recognizes this with his distinction between republicanism and
despotism. As a matter of empirical fact, a government can exist and
function even though the executive and legislative are united in one
person, and it is just this form of government that Kant desires to
discredit. Thus, it is unclear what type of impossibility we are dealing with
it is not logical or real impossibility. Perhaps we are
concerned with moral impossibility, which is to say that such a form of
government is impermissible. Kant certainly believes this to be the case.
But if it is the case, then the argument from form is superfluous. Kant can
adduce compelling moral reasons for republicanism by appealing to the a
priori principles of justice, and the argument from form adds nothing to
these considerations. The most that Kant can establish with this analogy is
that a government without form is a despotism and that a despotism is a
government without form. This may be an interesting side point, but it is
nothing more.
As regards the second puzzle, Kant does not make clear in the text
why a non-representational government is necessarily without form,
even if it is clear that a government without form is a despotism. We can
only speculate as to Kant’s thinking on this matter. First we need to know
who is being represented and who is doing the representing. There are
two possibilities here: first, the sovereign represents the people; second,
the ruler represents the sovereign. In the former case, the sovereign
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represents the people in that he is authorized by them to make laws for
them. But if this is what is meant by 'representation' here, the notion of
representation provides no reason why the sovereign could not also be the
ruler. In the latter case, the ruler represents the sovereign as his agent in
the execution of his laws and the administration of the governmental
apparatus. Now this conception does provide for a separation of the
executive function from the legislative function. Further, it is quite
compatible with the first conception of representation, as the sovereign
could represent the people and the ruler the sovereign. I am inclined to
think that Kant meant his conception of representation here to encompass
both of these relationships. But a republic need involve only the second
relationship, not both of them. An arrangement in which the ruler
represents the sovereign as his agent and the sovereign is actually the
people themselves, not just their representative, is an instance of a
republican constitution, for that constitution is defined only as the
separation of the executive from the legislative.
As we have just seen, the analogy of the form of government with
the form of the syllogism serves the dual purpose of providing arguments
for both the division between the legislative and executive branches and a
representative system, but Kant confuses these issues by dragging in a
discussion of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, thereby conflating the
form of sovereignty with the form of government. Kant argues that while
monarchy and aristocracy are defective modes of administration, "it is at
least possible for them to assume a mode of government conforming to
the spirit of a representative system." But this is impossible for a
democracy, for under democratic rule "everyone wishes to be master."
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It is clear from Kanfs discussion that by the term 'master' ("Herr")
he means the ruler or chief executive. The ruler is supposed to represent
the people, and this power of representation is enhanced by a decrease in
the number of rulers: "the smaller the personnel of the government (the
smaller the number of rulers), the greater is their representation and the
more nearly the constitution approaches to the possibility of
republicanism; thus the constitution may be expected by gradual reform
finally to raise itself to republicanism." Presumably, we are to conceive of
representation in arithmetical terms. If there is more than one ruler, then
each of those rulers represents only a fraction of the people (the specific
fraction being determined by the number of rulers). A monarch would
represent all the people as their sole ruler, and therefore his power of
representation would be the greatest.
Kant then asserts that the greater the capacity for representation, the
closer a regime is to a republican form of government. As a result of this
greater capacity for representation, monarchy and aristocracy are more
capable of transforming themselves into a republican form of
government, whereas this is all but impossible for a democracy, for the
difficulty of such a transformation increases with the number of rulers. Of
the three forms, monarchy is the most suitable for transformation into a
presidency or constitutional monarchy along with the development of a
separate legislative branch.30 A president represents the people as their
agent in the execution of the law and the administration of the
governmental apparatus. As sovereign, the monarch is limited in his
- Kant's claim here runs counter to his other claim (cited earlier) that monarchy poses the
greatest threat of despotism. I take it that this latter claim is correct and that this
contradiction provides more evidence of Kant's confusion on this matter.
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ability to transform the form of sovereignty by the consent of the people.
Further, this transformation ought to take place gradually through legal
reform and not violent revolution. Though difficult, a gradual, peaceful
transition to a republican constitution is at least possible for a monarchy or
aristocracy, whereas "it is impossible for a democracy to do so except by
violent revolution."3^
Given the historical record and Kant's political stance vis a vis the
events of his day, in particular his devotion to the cause of the French
Revolution, it is difficult to take this last claim seriously, and if it were not
for Kant's reputed probity, one would be tempted to accuse him of
dissembling. Flistorically, the transformation of European monarchies
into republics (the French case) or constitutional monarchies (the English
case) was produced by revolutionary means, and Kant himself had the
recent example of France as evidence of this point. This is especially
puzzling since Kant was well known as a supporter of the revolution
there, so much so that he was considered by his fellow Prussians to be a
Jacobin.32
In his whole discussion here, Kant confuses the form of sovereignty
with the form of government. He talks of monarchies, aristocracies, and
democracies transforming themselves into republics when the appropriate
discussion would be of despotisms transforming themselves into
republics. The appropriate opposition is between despotism and
republicanism, not between republicanism and democracy. At most, Kant
is permitted to explain how those different forms of sovereignty might
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 15.
Kant's support for the French Revolution and his views on revolution in general will be
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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help or hinder the transformation of a despotic government into a
republican one. Strictly speaking, none of these forms can be transformed
into a republic, and in speaking of such a transformation, Kant is guilty of
a category mistake.
Let us consider Kant's specific argument against democratic self-
rule. Kant asserts that "democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a
despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which 'all' decide
for or even against one who does not agree; that is, 'all,' who are not quite
all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and
with freedom. 33 pj^st, a system of governance is not despotic because of
some alleged contradiction with the general will, but because it involves
the unification of the legislative and executive functions in the same
person or branch of government. Second, this same criticism could be
made of aristocracy and monarchy with even greater effect, where one or
some purport to decide for all. Finally, Kant fails to consider the
possibility of representative democracy with a constitutional separation of
powers; instead, he identifies democracy with one of its specific forms- a
direct democracy where the people function as both legislative and
executive
By opposing a republican constitution to a democratic one, Kant
mistakenly turns the concept of a democratic republic into an oxymoron.
A republican form of government is quite compatible with the various
forms of sovereignty, for a republican constitution involves by definition
only the separation of the executive from the legislative. The nature of
the form of sovereignty is an entirely separate issue, and the concept of a
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 14.
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republican constitution taken by itself does not entail any one of these
forms to the exclusion of the others. Sovereignty in a republic could
conceivably reside in one, some, or all. In a democratic republic,
sovereignty resides in the people as a whole, rather than some sub-
grouping of it. Further, as we have seen prior to this, the a priori
principles of right require that sovereignty be democratic in character.
E. Conclusion
I shall conclude this chapter by commenting briefly on Kant's
discussion of the connection between the spread of republicanism and the
establishment of world peace.
1
want to call particular attention to the
manner in which Kant's reasoning on this point presupposes that the
form of sovereignty under the ideal republican constitution be democratic
in character. A fuller discussion of Kant's views on world peace in the
context of his philosophy of history will be provided in the final chapter.
Kant explicitly makes the connection between republicanism and
peace in both "Theory and Practice" and Perpetual Peace, while it is only
suggested in the Metaphysical Elements of Tustice . His argument is the
same in each text and fairly straightforward. War brings upon a people
In his dismissal of Kant's views on home rule, Gallie fails to recognize the close
connection that Kant establishes between the internal structure of a state and its external
conduct. Gallie dismisses Kant's views on "home rule" as unoriginal and unincisive, but
lauds Kant's stance on international relations and the institutional arrangements necessary
to secure world peace, while adopting the converse postion on Hegel. This position is
highly problematic when one considers Kant's argument that the spread of republicanism is
conducive to the establishment of world peace. The sharp distinction between the internal
structure and the external conduct of the state that Gallie assumes is untenable in the light
of this discussion, which Gallie glosses over. One should also note that Kant held that the
connection between internal structure and external relations runs in the other direction as
well- the state of nature between nations threatens the freedom of the citizens within a
state for national security will always be used as trump to override that freedom, a claim
with considerable empirical support.
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monstrous calamities ("having to fight, having to pay the costs of war
from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war
leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves With a
heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be
liquidated on account of constant wars in the future"35) that any rational
agent would choose to avoid and few peoples would voluntarily endure.
Consequently, if the consent of the cannon fodder were required to engage
in war, few wars would ever be conducted. Under a despotic regime,
where the head of state is unaccountable to his subjects and does not suffer
the consequences of war, it is a relatively easy matter for the despot "to
resolve upon war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and
with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to
the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it."36 But this is not so
under a republican constitution. In contrast to a despotic regime, the
citizens of a republic must give their consent as co-legislators to every
declaration of war,37 and given the high human cost of war for the people
of a nation, such consent will always be extremely difficult to obtain.
But Kant's argument works only if the ideal republican constitution
is democratic in nature, that is to say, that it must be some form of
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 13.
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 13.
"A citizen must always be regarded as a co-legislative member of the state (that is, not
merely as a means, but at the same time as an end in itself), and as such he must give his
free consent through his representatives, not only to the waging of war in general, but also
to any particular declaration of war." (Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 118.)
This is another instance in which Kant follows his pragmatic impulses and breaks with his
rigid conceptual separation of the sovereign and ruler and grants executive authority to the
sovereign. A law governing "the waging of war in general" is an act of legislative
authority, whereas the application of that law to particular circumstances, as represented
by "any particular declaration of war" is an act of executive authority. Nonetheless, Kant
vests this latter power in the legislature as the duly-constituted representative of the
people.
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representative democracy. This is made quite explicit in "Theory and
Practice:"
Each state must be organized internally in such a way that the
head of state, for whom the war actually costs nothing (for he
wages it at the expense of others, i.e. the people), must no
longer have the deciding vote on whether war is to be
declared or not, for the people who pay for it must decide.
(This, of course, necessarily presupposes that the idea of an
original contract has already been realised.)38
Given the representative character of the republican constitution, such a
decision or consent can be given only if the representatives of the people
are chosen democratically, for otherwise the original problem remains.
Unelected representatives, if sense can even be made of this notion, are
not accountable to the citizens of a state and could easily embark upon a
war in the same manner as a despot without suffering any adverse
consequences from their decision. The accountability of representatives to
the popular will can be established only through channels of democratic
participation within the state.
Now Kant may be overstating his case somewhat. He probably
underestimates the risks and potential costs of war to a despot and
overestimates the difficulty of persuading citizens in a republic of the
necessity of war. The despot must always fear removal by his enemies
abroad if defeated and popular uprising at home, both of which will play a
role in his calculations and provide some check on any aggressive
tendencies he may have. Further, the citizens of relatively democratic
states have historically proven themselves susceptible to irrational appeals
to nationalism and manipulation on the part of elected officials.
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 91.
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Nonetheless, Kant s point is well taken. As an irrational force,
nationalism can be checked by the spread of enlightenment among the
citizens of a state. Further, the manipulation of public opinion requires
some measure of duplicity, secrecy, and autocratic behavior on the part of
government officials, all of which are anti-democratic in nature.
Consequently, increased democratization of the polity can reduce the
possibility of manipulation. There are certainly no guarantees that a
democracy will not wage an aggressive war, but given the high human
cost of war, it is reasonable to claim that such a war is much less likely if
critical decisions are made democratically under conditions of open,
informed, and spirited public debate on the issue, even more so when




THE IDEAL AND THE REAL
A. Introduction
In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between ideal civil
society as defined by the social contract and the real, existing civil societies
in which people actually live. As I have already said a great deal about this
in Chapter Two, I begin here by briefly reiterating in the most general way
the points contained therein. The social contract is an idea that guides our
actions within the actual world by providing us with a model, in the form
of ideal civil society, that ought to govern our efforts to reform existing
civil societies. Actual civil societies do not, and can not, ever measure up
to the standard set by the ideal; nonetheless, we can bring about in the
course of history an ever-closer approximation of the real to the ideal.
Thus, Kant sets us the infinite task of realizing the ideal in history.
This account immediately gives rise to two closely-related questions
regarding the relation of theory to practice. Given that existing statutes
and political arrangements fail to satisfy the standards of justice, a
reflective moral agent must find him- or herself in a quandary over
whether or not to respect them. The first question, then, is whether one
has any obligation to obey the actual laws of the state in which one lives,
and if so, what the extent of that obligation is. As an historical agent, one
is obligated to work for the transformation of existing civil society into a
closer approximation of the ideal. This task confronts one with a choice of
the means to be used in promoting political change. Thus one is led to ask
about the means one is permitted use to transform existing civil society.
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Since disobedience to existing political authorities, including the use of
violence to overthrow those authorities, has often been advocated and
employed as the means to change existing social and political structures,
these two questions are intricately interwoven with each other.
In Chapter Three, I presented Kant's deduction of the idea of the
social contract. With respect to ideal civil society as defined by the social
contract, it is clear that one has an absolute duty to obey the laws of the
state. Since one has participated as a co-legislator in the promulgation of
these laws, the failure to obey them is nothing less than a failure to obey
the dictates of one’s own practical reason. In short, such a violation would
constitute giving a universal law and then making an exception of
oneself. But Kant asserts that the same obligation holds as regards existing
political authority: "He who finds himself in possession of the supreme
commanding and legislative authority must be obeyed; and this is so
unconditional juridically that it is in itself punishable to inquire publicly
into the title of his acquisition, that is, to raise questions about his title
with a view to opposing him on the grounds of some defect in that title.
This last point would seem to threaten the public use of reason and
philosophical discourse itself.
Kant's position on this matter is subject to a serious internal
critique. In Chapter Three I discussed the tension between moral
autonomy and political authority. While in theory Kant is committed to
the proposition that political authority is legitimate only if it is compatible
with the moral autonomy of all the individuals who are subject to it, in
practice he resolve conflicts between autonomy and authority in favor of
C Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Kisticc, p. 139.
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existing political authority . Since subjection to the will of another is a
form of heteronomy, Kant's claim that we are bound to obey the
authorities that be relegates persons in undemocratic polities to a
condition of heteronomy. Further, Kant's distinction between natural and
positive law contains an implicit recognition of the possibility of immoral
laws, positive laws that contravene the prescriptions of natural law. These
two points are closely related, for natural law is simply that which is
legislated by our pure practical reason. Our question then becomes: Are
we obligated to obey and accept laws and institutions to which we could
not consent as rational agents? Kant's position on the authority of the
existing sovereign would seem to entail an affirmative answer to this
question, but if persons are to maintain their autonomy within existing
civil societies, it would appear that he must answer in the negative.
Kant is somewhat sensitive to these issues. In Relieion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone, Kant claims "And when it is said: 'We ought to
obey God rather than men,' this means only that when statutory
commands, regarding which men can be legislators and judges, come into
conflict with duties which reason prescribes unconditionally, concerning
whose observance or transgression God alone can be the judge, the former
must yield precedence to the latter. Thus Kant does recognize certain
limits on our obedience to statutory laws set by practical reason itself; the
commands of the sovereign are only binding when they do not violate the
dictates of the moral law.
Further, we find Kant endorsing the various revolutionary
time, the most famous being his enthusiastic embrace of
Kant, Religion, p. 142. See also the footnote on pg. 90 for a similar remark.
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the French Revolution. Thus, we are confronted with a theorist who
adopts the seemingly contradictory position of rejecting revolution in
principle while supporting the actual efforts of peoples attempting to free
themselves from the yoke of despotism. This certainly requires some
comment.
In this chapter, I propose to sort all of this out as methodically as
possible in order to determine whether Kant has a coherent position on
these matters. In the very next section, I will explicate Kant's conception
of resistance in order to determine what it is that he in fact opposes. Then
in section C, I will present and criticize Kant's arguments against any
putative right to resistance on the part of subjects against the existing
authorities. Section D will be devoted to a discussion of Kant's paradoxical
rejection of revolution in principle and his support for specific
revolutions; my focus there will be on Kant's endorsement of the French
Revolution. I shall argue that, as it stands, Kant's position on these
matters is incoherent. Nevertheless, by paying a little attention to Kant's
own conceptual framework, one can devise an account that reconciles
Kant's concrete political commitments with his theoretical standpoint. In
the penultimate section of this chapter, I will present just such a
reconstruction. There I deploy Kant's own categorization of the forms of
the state in order to distinguish among different political contexts and
thereby legitimate of resistance in at least one context. I will complete this
project in the conclusion, where I will discuss the issues involved with
obedience and resistance with respect to a republican government.
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B. The Nature of Resistance
Kant states that "It is the people's duty to endure even the most
intolerable abuse of supreme authority/'^ a claim unworthy of a
philosopher of Kant’s stature. Immediately after this statement, Kant
reformulates it in the following manner: "In other words, a categorical
imperative says: 'Obey the suzerain (in everything that does not conflict
with internal morality) who has authority over you!"4 Under certain
circumstances, one may disobey the commands of the sovereign, but one
is never permitted to resist him. Thus, Kant does not equate disobedience
with resistance. If we are to understand Kant's position, then, we need to
specify the criteria that must be met for a violation of the law to be
considered an act of resistance to the sovereign.
*5
- Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 86. Kant is not always clear about whether
the supreme authority whom we are not to resist is the sovereign or the ruler. He often uses
a general term 'chief of state' without indicating whether he is referring to the sovereign or
the ruler. Further, he talks of the subject resisting the ruler at some points in the text,
while in other passages it is the sovereign who is being resisted. There is of course a good
historical explanation for Kant's lack of precision on this point. Given the prevalence of
royal absolutism (or 'despotism' in Kant's terms) in Europe during his lifetime, there was no
sharp distinction between the legislative and the executive authority of the state.
Consequently, resistance was directed at both the executive and legislative in the person of
one individual. Thus it seems possible for the subject to resist the ruler by refusing to accede
to his commands and seeking to replace him or her by force. "If the organ of the sovereign,
the ruler, proceeds contrary to the laws- ... - the subject may lodge a complaint (gravamina)
about this injustice, but he may not actively resist."(Kant, Metaphysical Elements of
Tustice, p. 85. See also Kant's discussion of the limited constitution on pp. 88-9 of the same
text.) But as is clear from this passage, the ruler is nothing but the "organ" of the sovereign,
since his function is to administer the laws legislated by the sovereign. Further, as I noted
in the last chapter, the sovereign has the authority to replace the ruler and reform his
administration. Therefore, the sovereign is superior to the ruler and the highest authority
within the state, and in resisting the ruler, we are in effect resisting the sovereign whose
agent he is.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 139.
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Every violation of the law is by definition a crime, but Kant
distinguishes between two types of criminality:
Now the criminal can commit the misdeed either by
following a maxim of a presumed objective rule (supposed to
be universally valid) or as an exception to the rule (by
dispensing with it for the occasion). In the latter case, he only
strays from the law (even though intentionally); he can at the
same time detest his own transgression, and he can still want
to circumvent the law without formally renouncing his
obedience to it. In the former case, however, he repudiates
the authority of the law itself, even though he can not deny
its validity before his own reason ...^
Thus by focusing on the maxim involved in the commission of a crime,
we can distinguish between what we might call the common criminal and
the politically-motivated one.
The common criminal accepts the law as binding upon persons
within society, but he makes an exception of himself. His actions involve
no formal renunciation of obedience to the sovereign, and consequently
his actions have no political ramifications with respect to the legitimacy of
existing authority. Though widespread criminality within a society may
objectively indicate the existence of gross social injustice, subjectively the
criminal does not question the validity of the laws he violates. The
common criminal then is someone who is not engaged in resistance, for
he never challenges the authority of the sovereign to make the laws. But
the case of the politically-motivated criminal is considerably different.
The politically-motivated criminal adopts a maxim, which he mistakenly
believes to be universally valid, of opposition to the law and thereby
repudiates its authority over him. Here an individual violates the law for
he believes it to be unjust, even though it is a "practical principle of
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of histicc, pp. 87-88n.
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reason that one ought to obey the legislative authority that now exists,
regardless of its origin."6
As we have seen, Kant does permit exceptions to our obligation to
obey the dictates of the stated When the state commands us to commit
some action that violates the prescriptions of morality, we are obligated to
refuse: "The saying: ’We ought to obey God rather than men,' signifies
merely that when men command anything which in itself is evil (directly
opposed to the law of morality) we dare not, and ought not, obey them."8
The idea of a divine law superior to positive, statutory law merely
indicates that the latter does not necessarily conform to the dictates of
morality. Under such circumstances, we not only have the right to refuse
obedience, we have the obligation to do so.
It is not too difficult to construct situations from Kant's ethics that
exemplify this point. For example, if I am ordered to lie in a criminal trial
so that a guilty verdict may be obtained against a defendant, I ought to
refuse. Similarly, with respect to relations between nations, if I am
ordered to slaughter thousands of non-combatants, I ought to refuse. But I
can do no more than that. I am not authorized to employ coercion against
the existing authorities to prevent such atrocities from being committed,
though presumably I can publicize the intention to commit them, or their
actual commission after the fact.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 85. This is the meaning Kant attributes to the
expression 'All ruling power comes from God.’ The divine right of kings consists of nothing
more than an obligation on the part of their subjects to accept their authority and not an
actual commission from God. It can be similarly stated of any regime, whether or not it is
monarchical, that it rules by divine right.
For a reconstruction of Kant’s views on civil disobedience, see Roger Hancock, "Kant and
Civil Disobedience," Idealistic Studies, 5 (1975), pp. 164-76.
Kant, Religion, p. 90.
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All of this constitutes legitimate disobedience of existing political
authorities and not resistance, for the civilly disobedient person does not
question the legitimacy of existing authority, only the morality of specific
laws. He expresses this fidelity to the sovereign by accepting the
punishment meted out in accordance with those laws.9 This establishes a
space within Kant's theory for the traditional conception of civil
disobedience.
Resistance, then, involves more than just disobedience of the law;
rather it is always characterized by the employment of coercion against the
sovereign. We may define an act of resistance as an action "in which an
arbitrary association of the people coerces the government into acting a
certain way. Violent revolution clearly falls under such a definition
and is duly forbidden by Kant. In fact, when Kant discusses the nature of
coercion, it is clear that he conceives of it in terms of violence.
But it is questionable whether coercion can be defined solely in
terms of violence or, if it be so defined, whether resistance can be solely in
terms of force. There is another element involved in resistance, and that
is the repudiation of the authority of the existing sovereign. Clearly
certain forms of non-violent action can involve a rejection of the existing
authority. For example, in their successful effort to free themselves from
British rule, the people of India engaged in massive non-violent resistance
This conception of civil disobedience finds an early exponent in the person of Socrates. In
the Crito, Socrates argues for the acceptance of political authority, whereas in the
Apology he explicitly states his refusal to obey certain commands of the Athenian
authorities, namely the command to stop practicing philosophy and give up his divinely-
ordained mission as a gadfly. For a modern restatement of the classic conception of
disobedience along Kantian lines, see John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil
Disobedience," in Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice, ed. by Hugo Adam Bedau (New
York: 1969), pp. 240-55.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 88.
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against the colonial regime. This clearly involved rejection of and
resistance to the existing sovereign without the resort to violence.
This raises an interesting and important problem for Kant regarding
the classification and permissibility of massive non-compliance with
existing regimes. Kant conceives of revolution solely in terms of the
violent overthrow of existing authority, but in doing so, he tacitly excludes
the possibility of a non-violent revolutionary activity. We can not fault
Kant for the limitations of his historical perspective, and given his
conservatism on these matters, I think we can safely conclude that Kant
would have considered this to be a case of resistance against the sovereign
and hence would reject it as impermissible. Nonetheless, such activity
does not fit neatly into the conceptual framework of his political theory,
falling somewhere in between civil disobedience and violent revolution.
It resembles the former in its eschewal of violence as a means of
generating political change, whereas it resembles the latter in its
revolutionary aims. As we shall see in the final two sections of this
Chapter, by paying careful attention to the gradations of civil disobedience,
non-violent resistance, and violent revolution, we can provide an
alternative to the more unsatisfactory conclusions that Kant draws with
respect to one's relationship to existing authority.
Ultimately, Kant adopts a position of sanctioning only the gradual
evolution of political institutions. Only reform from above is legitimate;
revolution from below is forbidden: "An alteration in a (defective)
constitution of a state, which may sometimes be required, can be
undertaken only by the sovereign himself through reform, and not by the
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people through revolution."! 1 The progressive direction of history
provides some hope that with the spread of enlightenment the
appropriate reforms will gradually be carried out, and we are to be satisfied
with that hope. The subject is restricted to protesting publicly against
injustice and is prohibited from engaging in any activity that would
undermine the sovereign's authority.
Before we move on to a discussion of Kant's justification of his
position, there is one other important matter that requires comment.
Kant claims that from the proposition that one ought to obey the powers
that be, it follows that "The sovereign has many rights with respect to the
subject, but no coercive duties."! ^ But it does not follow that the
sovereign has no duties towards his subjects, only that he may not be
coerced into performing those duties he does have, i.e. that those duties
are non-coercive. These non-coercive duties are derived from the
inalienable rights of individuals, for the people "have inalienable rights
against the head of state, even if these can not be rights of coercion."!3
Persons can not be stripped of their rights by the state, even though the
state can refuse to respect them. If the state refuses to respect their rights,
individuals have no legitimate recourse beyond public protest and may
not resort to violence. The individual must assume that the sovereign
has no desire to do him any harm and that "any injustice which he
believes he has suffered can only have resulted through error, or
ignorance of certain possible consequences of the laws which the
sovereign authority has made."!"!
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc. p. 88.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 85.
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 84.
Kant, "Theory and Practice," p. 84.
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Now this is a questionabie move on Kant's part, for as I noted in the
third chapter, a right invoives by definition an authorization to use
coercion against anyone who would hinder nae in the exercise of it. Thus,
the notion of a non-coercive right is a contradiction in terms. This point
is especially important for my discussion in Section E of this chapter.
C. Kant’s Argument for Non-Resistance
Now that we possess a sufficient understanding of Kant's
conception of resistance, we can consider Kant's arguments for the claim
that we ought not resist the sovereign. I think that there is essentially one
basic argument that Kant adduces for his position. This argument is based
on the conceptual status of the social contract as an idea of reason. Kant
grafts two other arguments onto this argument- one derived from "the
transcendental principle of publicity" and the other from the status of the
head of state. Since the latter two arguments are often seen as entirely
separate arguments and represent distinct lines of thought,^^ though
derivative ones, I shall discuss each of them separately after my exposition
of Kant's central argument. However, these two arguments are at best
elaborations on Kant's central argument, since they are parasitic on it. If
Kant’s main argument does not work, then neither will these; and if
Kant's main argument does work, then he has no need of them.
Some commentators have professed to find an argument against
resistance based on the direct application of the categorical imperative to
the maxim of resistance to the sovereign, and one has gone so far as to
For example, see van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism, pp. 175-87, and Lewis
White Beck, "Kant and the Right of Revolution," The lournal of the History of Ideas 32
(1971), 411-22.
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claim that this is Kant's only argument for his position.l6 vvhile I agree
that there is fundamentally only one argument and that it in some sense
involves a violation of the categorical imperative insofar as resistance to
the sovereign is an instance of contradictory willing, I think that the
contradiction involved in resisting the sovereign can only be understood
in the context of Kant's discussion of the ideal character of the social
contract, and it is to this that we now turn.
Kant’s fundamental argument for non-resistance is based on the
conceptual status of the social contract. This argument finds its most
complete expression in the conclusion to "Supplementary Explanations"
Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, though intimations of it can be
found elsewhere, particularly in those passages where his secondary
arguments are presented. Kant begins this section with a quotation from
one of his reviewers and, on this point, one of his critics:
To our knowledge, no philosopher has admitted the most
paradoxical of all paradoxes, namely, the proposition that the
mere idea of sovereignty should necessitate me to obey as my
lord anyone who has imposed himself upon me as a lord,
without my asking who has given him the right to issue
commands to me. Is there to be no difference between saying
that one ought to recognize sovereignty and a chief of state
and that one ought to hold a priori that this or that person,
whose existence is not even given a priori, is one's lord?^7
Kant's position does indeed appear paradoxical at first glance, but it is not
without its rationale.
Kant's argument begins with the claim that we have an obligation
to enter into civil society as defined by the social contract. Should one
See for example Peter Nicholson, "Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the Sovereign,"
Ethics, 77 (1976), pp. 214-30. Professor Nicholson argues that this is the only argument that
Kant adduces for the duty never to resist the sovereign.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice. p. 139.
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refuse to enter civil society, one may be forced to do so. But the social
contract is only an idea; consequently, all existing civil societies are
inadequate when judged according to the standard set by this idea;
Every matter of fact is an object that is appearance (of sense);
on the other hand, that which can be represented only
through pure reason and which must be included among the
ideas- that is the thing in itself. No object in experience can
be given that adequately corresponds to an Idea. A perfect
juridical constitution among men would be an example of
such an idea.
Nonetheless, all states, however imperfect they may be, are instances of
this idea:
When a people are united through laws under a suzerain,
then the people are given as an object of experience
conforming to the Idea in general of the unity of the people
under a supreme powerful Will. Admittedly, this is only an
appearance; that is, a juridical constitution in the most
general sense of the term is present.^ 9
It is crucial to remember here that the social contract does not
provide an historical explanation of the actual origin of civil society. Civil
society is only possible through a sovereign who unites the people under
one will. As a matter of fact, sovereignty is established through the
seizure of public authority by force: "The unconditional submission of the
popular Will (which is in itself not united and hence is lawless) to the
sovereign Will (uniting everyone through one single law) is a deed that
can begin only with the seizure of the supreme authority and in this way
provides a foundation for a public Law in the first place. Once this
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 139.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, pp. 139-40.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 140. See also Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 36.
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seizure of authority is accomplished, a civil society is established as an
empirical instance of the idea of the social contract.
But the social contract can not contain a provision permitting
rebellion, because such a provision would render it null and void. We are
obligated to work for the perfection of existing civil society in accordance
with this idea, but no attempt should be made to realize this Idea
precipitously through revolutionary methods, that is, by the violent
overthrow of a previously existing imperfect and corrupt [government]
(for in that case there would be an intervening moment when the entire
juridical state of affairs would be annihilated).”^! Rebellion always
involves a departure from civil society and a regression back to the state of
nature from which we are obligated to depart. Thus in rebelling against
the existing sovereign, one acts contrary to one's duty to enter into civil
society. The claim that one has the right to rebel against the existing
sovereign entails the proposition that one is still in a state of nature. By
claiming the right to rebel against the sovereign, one has effectively
claimed the "right to put violence as the supreme prescriptive act of
legislation in the place of every right and Law."22 But when one enters
civil society, one relinquishes the right "to proceed in accordance with
[one's] arbitrary wili," including the right to employ violence, and submits
oneself to the public law promulgated by the sovereign. Therefore, one
must renounce the use of violence in one's efforts to change civil society,
for otherwise one would remain within the state of nature. For this
reason, any putative right to rebel is an instance of contradictory willing.
2R Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 129.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lustice, p. 140.
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involving as it were both willing the establishment of civil society and
willing the perpetuation of the state of nature.
Now as I noted at the beginning of this section Kant grafts two other
arguments onto this his central argument. The first of these secondary
arguments is found scattered throughout Kant’s political writings. In this
argument, Kant employs the technique of reductio ad absurdem. Simply
put, the assertion that the people have the right to rebel against the
supreme authority entails the contradictory proposition that the supreme
authority is not the supreme authority:
To permit any opposition to this absolute power [of the
sovereign] (an opposition that might limit that supreme
authority) would be to contradict oneself, inasmuch as in that
case the power (which may be opposed) would not be the
lawful supreme authority that determines what is or is not to
be publicly just [recht].23
If the sovereign were not permitted to render the final decision on matters
of public justice, then he would not be the supreme authority. But then
the supreme authority in the state would not be the supreme authority,
which is a contradiction. Consequently, the sovereign must have the final
decision in all matters regarding public right.
But this move only begs the question: are existing sovereigns
legitimate simply because they exist? Whether the final decision must rest
with the existing sovereign is exactly what is at stake. One can resolve this
question by arguing that the final decision must rest with the people and
not the titular head of state, who is their agent. When considered by itself,
this argument begs the question by assuming that the existing head of state
is the highest authority. His only argument is that the chief of state makes
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc. pp. 140-41. See also, pp. 85 & 86 of the same
text and "Theory and Practice," pp. 81-82.
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a people by uniting them under one will. But in order to understand this
claim, we need to refer to the idea of the social contract. We need some
independent argument here to establish this claim, and that is what Kant
provides with his central argument: "And this principle already resides a
priori in the Idea of a political constitution in general, that is, in a concept
of practical reason, a concept for which no adequately corresponding
example from experience can be found, but one which, however, no one
must contradict as a norm. "24
Lewis White Beck describes the secondary reductio argument as an
example of Kant’s "formalism in extremis," and interprets Kant as putting
forth the claim that there can never be a legal right to rebel against, for no
constitution can permit its own violent overthrow, a point that is trivially
true and has never caused revolutionaries to lose any sleep.25 But Beck
does not adequately put Kant's argument into its appropriate context, for
he fails to give sufficient consideration to its derivation from the idea of
the social contract. This argument is certainly derived from Kant's
"metaphysics of jurisprudence," but that metaphysics is in turn imbedded
in Kant's critical moral theory. It is not that Kant is arguing that we have
no moral right because we have no legal right; rather, he is arguing that
we have no legal right because we have no moral right. On this matter,
positive law mirrors natural law simply because it is an empirical instance
of the ideal.
The other secondary argument Kant adduces is found in Perpetual
Peace and appeals to "the transcendental principle of publicity" as the
standard by which to judge whether a policy is permissible or not.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 141.
Beck, "Kant and the Right of Revolution."
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According to this standard, a maxim must be capable of being publicized if
it is to be permissible. The principle is derived from the form of public
law itself; if one abstracts from the content of public law, all that is left is
the form of publicity. Thus, it is impermissible to act on a maxim that can
not be publicized without defeating its own purpose:
According to this principle, a people would ask itself before
the establishment of the civil contract whether it dare publish
the rnaxim of its intention to revolt on occasion. It is clear
that if, in the establishment of a constitution, the condition is
made that the people may in certain cases employ force
against its chief, the people would have to pretend to a
legitimate power over him, and then he would not be the
chief. Or if both are made the condition of the establishment
of the state, no state would be possible, though to establish it
was the purpose of the people. The illegitimacy of rebellion
is thus clear from the fact that its maxim, if openly
acknowledged, would make its own purpose impossible.
Therefore it would have to be kept secret.
There seem to be three distinct arguments woven together in this passage.
In the second sentence we find the argument from the status of the chief
of state that I have just examined. In the first and third sentences of the
passage, we find the argument from the social contract, which I have
argued is Kant’s fundamental argument. And finally, there is an
argument that if the maxim of resistance to the sovereign is publicized, its
purpose (the overthrow of the sovereign) will be defeated, and it is this
argument that I shall now consider.
Kant alleges that resistance to the sovereign is incompatible with
this principle of publicity, for if those who plot revolution reveal the
maxim on which they act, their purpose will be defeated. Consequently,
they require secrecy if they are to be successful. On the other hand, the
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 48.
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chief of state requires no such secrecy for his or her purposes. Since the
sovereign possesses "irresistible power" (otherwise he or she could not
protect his or her subjects), "he [or she] need not fear vitiating his own
purpose by publishing his maxims."
This line of argument is highly problematic. As a matter of fact,
revolutionaries have never been loathe to proclaim publicly their goals.
On the contrary, rather than requiring secrecy, revolutionaries need some
measure of publicity if they are to attract adherents to their cause. The
actual extent of that publicity is a matter of prudence, depending as it does
only upon the level of repression prevailing within a given society. In
principle, however, publicity is necessary for revolution. A coup d'etat
requires secrecy, but not a revolution.
Further, Kant's argument here ignores the question of the
legitimacy of authority. Kant's reasoning here is based on the
overwhelming might of the sovereign and not on considerations of his
right to that power, and it is this last point that is in question. Such an
argument would be acceptable if the might of the existing sovereign were
legitimated by right, but this requires some further argument that Kant
does not provide in this section. Rather he just assumes it here.
Consequently, taken by itself, this argument begs the question by granting
irresistible power to existing sovereigns, without having established their
right to it, and then using this power as a justification their right.
As we have seen, both of these secondary arguments taken by
themselves beg the question by assuming that the existing sovereign
legitimately possesses political authority. The legitimacy of this possession
is established by the idea of the social contract, and it is for this reason that
we must consider them to be secondary to and parasitic on that main
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argument. If that argument fails to convince, then these arguments will
also. And Kant's central argument is open to serious criticism. The
possession of authority by existing sovereigns involves a mixture of both
legitimacy and illegitimacy. It is legitimate because it is an empirical
instance of the idea of the social contract, but it is illegitimate as it fails to
conform to that idea. While the existing sovereign possesses supreme
authority within the actual state, Kant's own theory entails that ultimately
the people are sovereign and that the authority of the existing sovereign
derives from his or her status as the deputy or representative of the
people. Therefore, the people possess the right to dismiss the existing
sovereign should they choose to do so. In the context of this conceptual
framework, it is the sovereign who is the source of violence and engaged
in immoral activity when he or she resists the people's exercise of its
legitimate prerogative of dismissal.
D. The French Revolution
Despite his rejection of the right to revolution, Kant was deeply
inspired by and supportive of the French Revolution,27 and this
combination of opposition and support for revolution continues to puzzle
commentators. In this section, I shall examine the specifics of Kant's
support for the French Revolution in order to determine whether it can be
made to cohere with his general theoretical position on the
impermissibility of revolution. Consequently, I will first present Kant's
- For a biographical account of Kant's engagement with the French Revolution, see G. P.
Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920), pp.
260-82. See also, Iring Fetscher, "Kant and the French Revolution," in Kant 1724/1974:
Kant as a Political Thinker, ed. by Eduard Gerresheim, (Bonn: Inter-Nationes, 1974), pp.
25-40.
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position on the Revolution and then proceed to examine critically some of
the interpretive strategies that have been used to exonerate him from the
charge of inconsistency on this matter. In assessing the viability of these
strategies, we need to keep in mind that Kant supported not only the
French Revolution, but also the American Revolution and the Irish
resistance to English rule.
Kant expressed his views on the French Revolution in comments
strewn throughout his published writings and correspondence during the
last decade of his philosophical activity, but his most extensive treatment
of the subject is found in part two of The Conflict of the Faculties entitled
"An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly
Progressing?." Here Kant argues that the enthusiasm the Revolution
aroused among spectators is evidence of the moral improvement of
humanity:
This event consists neither in momentous deeds nor crimes
committed by men whereby what was great among men is
made small or what was small is made great, nor in ancient
splendid political structures which vanish as if by magic
while others come forth in their place as if from the depths of
the earth. No, nothing of the sort. It is simply the mode of
thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this
game of great revolutions, and manifests such a universal yet
disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against
those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could
become very disadvantageous for them if discovered. Owing
to its universality, this mode of thinking demonstrates a
character of the human race at large and all at once; owing to
its disinterestedness, a moral character of humanity, at least
in its predisposition, a character which not only permits
people to hope for progress toward the better, but is already
itself progress insofar as its capacity is sufficient for the
present.
The revolution of a gifted people which we have seen
unfolding in our day may succeed or miscarry; it may be filled
with misery and atrocities to the point that a sensible man.
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were he boldly to hope to execute it successfully the second
time, would never resolve to make the experiment at such
cost- this revolution, I say finds in the hearts of all spectators
(who are not engaged in this game themselves) a wishful
participation [eine Teilnehmung dem Wunsche nach] that
borders closely on enthusiasm, the very expression of which
is fraught with danger; this sympathy, therefore, can have no
other cause than a moral predisposition in the human race.^^
Kant refers here primarily to the German intellectuals of his day who
sympathized with efforts of the French to free themselves of the old
regime and construct for themselves a new one, though who may not
have been fully familiar with conditions in France at that time and who
chose not to go France themselves and actively participate in events
there.29 Thus, we are concerned solely with spectators whose support for
the Revolution was a matter of intellectual sympathy and well-wishing.
Since these spectators derive no personal gain from the success of the
Revolution, they are impartial, and their support can not be explained by
self-interest. In fact, their support for the Revolution puts themselves at
some risk of persecution. Thus, their enthusiastic support demonstrates
that some other cause, a moral cause, must be operative, for no other
explanation is possible. Given the existence and efficacy of this cause,
there is some support for the hypothesis that the human race is capable of
moral improvement. In fact, the widespread existence of such sympathy is
itself evidence of moral progress.
The sympathy of the spectators is aroused for the self-determination
of the French people in their effort to establish a republican constitution:
Immanuel Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is The Human Race Constantly
Progressing," trans. Robert Anchor, in On History, ed. by Lewis White Beck (New York:
Macmillan,1988), p. 144.
For a comprehensive account of the reaction in Germany to the Revolution, see Gooch,
Germany and the French Revolution .
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This moral cause inserting itself [in the course of events] is
twofold: first, that of the right, that a nation must not be
hindered in providing itself with a civil constitution, which
appears good to the people themselves; and second, that of
the end (which is, at the same time, a duty) that the same
national constitution alone be just and morally good in itself,
created in such a way as to avoid by its very nature principles
permitting offensive war. It can be not other than a
republican constitution, republican at least in essence; it thus
establishes the condition whereby war (the source of all evil
and corruption of morals) is deterred; and at least negatively
progress toward the better is assured humanity in spite of all
its infirmity, for it is at least left undisturbed in its advance.
Kant's primary concern here is the counter-revolutionary interventions of
the Revolution's external opponents, and both points he makes support
this project. In the absence of a direct threat by the revolutionary regime,
any external intervention into the affairs of revolutionary France would
violate the French people's right of national self-determination. Further,
developments in France pose no such threat to its neighbors. Since the
new revolutionary regime is republican, it is inherently non-aggressive.
There is of course a larger issue involved here. It is clear in this
passage that the sympathy of the spectators is aroused by the ends of the
Revolution and not the means, the use of revolutionary violence. The
end of the Revolution is the establishment of a republican constitution
under which persons would be treated as ends and not as means. This
point is made clear in the Critique of Judgment:
In speaking of the complete transformation of a large people
into a state, which took place recently, the word organization
was frequently and very aptly applied to the establishment of
legal authorities, etc. and even to the entire body politic. For
each member in such a whole should be not merely a means,
but also a purpose; and while each member contributes to
Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again," p. 144-5.
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making the whole possible, the idea of that whole should in
turn determine the member's position and function 31
The non-aggressive character of a republican constitution is merely one
aspect, albeit an important one, of its treatment of persons as ends Since a
republican constitution checks the proclivity to offensive war on the part
of rulers, it thereby removes one of the greatest obstacles to the treatment
of people as ends and not merely as means.
Moreover, given the enthusiasm aroused by the Revolution, it is
likely that the revolution will continue to serve as an inspiration to those
working for progress towards a more just society. As evidence of the
moral progress of humanity, Kant discerns the likelihood that the
example set by the Revolution will give rise to further attempts to
improve civil society on propitious conditions, for "is too important, too
much interwoven with the interest of humanity, and its influence too
widely propagated in all areas of the world to not be recalled on any
favorable occasion by the nations which would then be roused to a
repetition of new efforts of this kind. "32
Now all of this poses the problem of whether it is possible to
reconcile Kant's support of the Revolution and its offspring, the first
Republic, with his theoretical opposition to revolutionary activity in
general. A variety of approaches to this problem are possible and I shall
now consider the most promising among them.
At first glance, it would appear that Kant denied that a revolution
even took place in France, or, if it did in fact occur, that it was the King
Kant, Critique of ludgmcnt, p. 254. There is some disagreement in this passage as to
whether Kant is referring here to the United States or France. Pluhar asserts that it is the
former, while most other commentators take it to be the latter. Without taking a stand on
this issue, I need merely point out that even if Kant himself did not intend to refer to France
here, it is certainly an apt expression of his views on the newly-born Republic in France.
Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again," p. 147.
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himself who was the real revolutionary. Kant argues that when Louis the
XVI convoked the Estates General, he handed over sovereignty to it, with
the consequence that all acts of the Estates General and its successors were
the actions of the legitimate sovereign;
Thus, a great error in judgment was made by one of the
powerful sovereigns of our time when he attempted to
extricate himself from the embarrassment caused by large
state debts by leaving it to the people to take over this burden
and to distribute it as they saw fit. The natural result was that
he handed over to the people legislative authority, not only
over taxation, but also over the government, that is,
authority to restrain the government from making new debts
through the extravagance of war. As a consequence, the
sovereignty of the monarch disappeared completely (it was
not just suspended) and passed over to the people, to whose
legislative Will the property of every subject now became
subject.33
Since the sovereign is not permitted to alter the form of sovereignty, the
initial error or misdeed was committed by the King when he called the
Estates General into session and thus transferred his sovereignty to them.
Once this was done, however, the Estates-General as the new sovereign
were free to alter the government as they saw fit and took a course of
action in accordance with the a priori principles of justice.
All of this has the flavor of an ad hoc maneuver to defend the First
Republic against charges of illegitimacy as the product of an unjust
usurpation of power, and it is a highly dubious historical account of the
actual development of the Revolution at that. This depiction of the
revolutionary struggle conveniently ignores the force that was in fact
brought to bear on the French monarchy, forcing it to capitulating to
popular demands. As an avid observer of events in France, Kant cannot
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 113-14.
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have been entirely ignorant of these developments. Further, this story
cannot account for Kant's well-known support for the American
Revolution and the Irish resistance to English rule. Consequently, it is of
very limited value in helping us understand how Kant was able to
reconcile his concrete political stances with his theoretical commitments,
and we need to look elsewhere to find some more general explanation.
This leads us to a second possible explanation of Kant’s views.
According to this interpretation, Kant believed that the revolution was
wrong, but that once it successfully established itself, all persons were
obligated to give it their support: "Moreover if a revolution has succeeded
and a new constitution has been established, the illegitimacy of its
beginning and of its success can not free the subjects from being bound to
accept the new order of things as good citizens, and they can not refuse to
honor and obey the suzerain [Obrigkeit] who now possesses the
authority. "34 in this passage, Kant presents himself not only as an
opponent of revolution but also as an opponent of counter-revolution,
which he certainly was. But this line of thought, which Kant no doubt
held, reduces him to cheerleading after the fact. Kant would deny to a
revolution in its early stages the very leadership of the enlightened sectors
of the population that is absolutely essential to its success.
Kant's stance here is complicated by his acceptance of the dethroned
monarch's right to pursue his restoration to power:
The dethroned monarch (who survives such a revolution)
can not be held accountable for, much less punished for, his
past administration, provided that he has retired to the
private life of a citizen of the state and prefers peace and quiet
for himself and the state to the foolhardy act of running away
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 89.
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in order as a pretender, to attempt the adventure of
recovering his kingdom, whether it be through a secretly
instigated counterrevolution or through the help of outside
powers. If, however, he prefers the latter course of action, his
right to do so remains unchallengeable, because the
insurrection that deprived him of his possession was
unjust.35
If the struggle of the dethroned monarch for restoration to his throne is
legitimate because of the wrong done him by his removal from power,
then it would seem to follow that those who support the monarch's cause
are not doing anything wrong either. Kant asserts that this is not so with
respect to the subjects of the new regime, but he does not explain why.
Nor is his answer much better as regards other states.
Kant continues this passage as follows; "But whether other powers
have the right to join in an alliance in favor of this dethroned monarch
merely so that this crime of his people shall not go unpunished and so
remain a scandal to all other states and whether they are justified and
called upon to use their authority and power to restore the old
constitution in every state where a new constitution has been set up as the
result of a revolution-- these are questions that come under the Law of
Nations."36 Kant answers these questions with a resounding 'No';
counter-revolutions supported by neighboring states are wrong. In the
appendix to the Metaphysical Elements of lustice where he discusses the
Law of Nations, Kant asserts that punitive wars are impermissible.
Further, external support for counter-revolutionary forces violates
Preliminary Article #5 of Perpetual Peace, which states that interference by
one nation in the internal affairs of another is forbidden. Kant argues that
the relation of one state to another state is purely external; unless a state is
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 89.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of lusticc, p. 89.
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threatened by invasion by another, it has no stake in the outcome of any
internal power struggle in that state. All of this fits in well with Kant’s
opposition to the invasion of France by surrounding powers in support of
the monarchy, including his own Prussia. Apparently, the dethroned
monarch is to be granted only the right to struggle alone against the new
regime, for he can rightfully enlist neither the aid of his compatriots nor
of any other nation.
But this position is weakened considerably by three considerations.
First, according to the aforementioned Fifth Article, one state can
intervene in the affairs of another if that second state falls into two parts,
as is usually the case in revolutionary situations where a state becomes
split between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces. Thus,
during any revolutionary process, there is an interval in which external
intervention is permitted. Second, one can challenge the assumption on
which Kant’s argument is based-- that the relations among states are
purely external. A revolution in one state might inspire the subjects in a
neighboring state to rise up, a possibility that Kant himself acknowledges
when he lauds the Revolution as an example for future generations.
Thus it is not quite accurate to say that relations between states are wholly
external, involving the use of force by one against another. Kant’s own
advice to the European monarchies of his time was clear- Reform thyself-
- but his theory can be used to justify the alternative of intervention.
Finally, revolutionary regimes have historically been possessed of an
evangelical fervor that leads them to engage in aggressive wars to spread
the gospel. Thus, when faced with a revolutionary regime, a preemptive
strike on the part of neighboring states may be justifiable on such grounds.
Although our historical experience on these matters begins with the
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French Revolution so that the European powers of that time could not
have made this argument, this is certainly a reasonable point with regard
to the contemporary world, lying well within the framework of Kant's
theory.
Finally, this position relies on an oversimplified conception of the
actual course of historical revolutions; consequently, it places persons
living in the midst of revolutionary upheavals in an impossible position.
Revolutions regularly involve some transitional period characterized by
dual sovereignty- a condition in which two opposing powers claim and to
some degree exercise sovereignty over the population or a segment of it.
There is typically a period of time during which the new revolutionary
regime is in the process of formation and has not fully displaced the old
regime, which still possesses some authority. Thus, a person living in
such a situation would seem to owe allegiance to two different sovereigns:
the old regime in the process of collapse and the new revolutionary
regime in the process of formation.
Kant's prescription of obedience to existing authority provides us
no guidance as to which opposing side is entitled to one's support under
these circumstances: the old regime on account of the injustice of the
revolution or the new regime on account of its progressive nature.
During this transitional period, society reverts back to the state of nature.
Hence, one might argue that the decision to support one side over another
ought to be based on an assessment of which side is more likely to restore
the order of civil society. But this will not do, for the ability of one side to
restore order is not independent of the the choices of the people within
society, but rather rests upon those decisions. Thus, we seem to be reduced
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to making an arbitrary choice without moral guidance, a situation that
could not satisfy Kant's predilection for rigor.
The most popular interpretive strategy adopted by those seeking to
reconcile Kant’s rejection of revolution with his support of the French
Revolution emphasizes the difference in perspective involved with the
two cases. In her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Hannah Arendt
argues that the difference in evaluations here reflects the difference
between willing and judging, between the actor and the spectator.37 From
the standpoint of the actor who wills a course of action, revolutionary
activity is always wrong and thus prohibited. But from the standpoint of
the spectator who observes the course of events without any involvement
in them and passes judgment upon it, a specific revolution may meet with
approval. The spectator's judgment is teleological and historical, not
deontological. On such grounds, Kant supported the French Revolution
because he deemed it to be historically progressive, representing as it did a
movement towards a republican political constitution in which persons
are treated as ends and not solely as means. The means used may have
been wrong, but the end at which they aimed was laudatory. It was this
end that inspired the sympathy of all disinterested observers.
Now it is an easy matter to assert that differences in evaluation
derive from differences in perspective, but this does not mean that those
different perspectives can be reconciled within the same theoretical
framework. It is not clear that this approach resolves the paradox of
Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, (Chicago: 1982). Riley and
Nicholson also adopt this general line in their respective explanations of Kant's support
for the French Revolution. See also Sidney Axinn, "Kant, Authority, and the French
Revolution," The lournal of the History of Ideas 32 (1971),
pp. 423-32.
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allowing spectators to support what the actors involved are forbidden to
do. Lewis White Beck argues that Kant's position involves a conflict
between the teleological imperative of seeking to reform existing societies
and the formalism of obeying the powers that be, a conflict between
imperfect and perfect obligations that Kant decides in favor of the latter.38
Beck argues that Kant lacks the conceptual resources to resolve the conflict
between his ethics and his philosophy of history involved here. As an
historical agent committed to the progressive transformation of the state, I
seem to be forbidden from taking what is under some circumstances the
only efficacious course of action; judgment can not translated into practice.
Kant certainly believes that there is an alternative to revolution
from below— gradual reform from above. But this judgment rests on what
are certainly very shaky historical grounds. While it is plausible to
suppose that a republican regime with a democratic form of sovereignty
may be capable of peacefully reforming itself, the farther we move away
from democracy the less plausible the option of gradual reform becomes.
There is little evidence that a despotic regime can be reformed without
violence either from within or without, or at least the threat of it. With
regard to the French Revolution, Kant himself advised the monarchies of
Europe that they learn the appropriate lesson and begin the process of
reform lest they meet the same fate. Kant's formalism, then, seems to
deny moral agents living under a despotic regime the only leverage that
could reasonably be expected to produce reform. Internally, Kant's own
philosophy of history makes antagonism and conflict the engine of
historical progress, thus making revolution a necessary element in the
See Beck, "Kant and the Right of Revolution."
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process of history. For Kant, "reformative revolutions" are the vehicles of
progressive historical change.
In the final analysis, I think Kant's position here is, as it stands,
simply untenable, and some commentators have suggested that we must
choose between his formalism and teleology on this matter.39 guj- j think
we need not go so far. With a little attention to Kant's own conceptual
distinctions, we can construct an alternative position that is compatible
with his theory and would have met his practical political needs.
E. Despotism and Civil Society
In his discussion of Kant's views on revolution, Harry van der
Linden argues that a state apparatus can be so oppressive as to be said to be
in a state of nature vis a vis its subjects; under such circumstances,
rebellion may reasonably be considered an effort to establish civil society,
rather than overthrow one. Beck adopts a similar stance when he asserts
that no rule can be given to cover cases of legitimate rebellion. This view
reduces the decision to rebel against the existing sovereign to an arbitrary
choice based on one's personal judgment, with a consequent lack of rigor.
But it is this arbitrariness of decision and action that one abandons when
one enters civil society.
In this section, I propose to sketch a conceptual scheme employing
Kant's own categories that will allow us to establish the legitimacy of
revolution under despotic regimes and provide the framework for a
discussion in my conclusion to this section of extralegal political action
under republican regimes. This is not a position that Kant himself
For example Beck, "Kant and the Right of Revolution," and van dor Linden, Kantian
Ethics and Socialism.
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adopted, but it is one that he could have adopted with consistency, and I
think should have for it has the merit of bringing his theory into line with
his personal commitment to the revolutions of his time.
In the previous chapter, we discussed Kant’s classification of the
form of the state according to the form of its government. There are only
two forms of government- despotism and republicanism. On the basis of
the a prion principles of justice, Kant argues that a republican constitution
is the ideal form of government. This argument suggests a possible
strategy for the establishing the legitimacy of revolution under certain
conditions.
The despotic form of government violates the a priori principles of
justice because, by unifying the sovereign and the ruler in one person, it
raises the ruler above the law, rather than subjecting him to it.
Consequently, a civil society under a despotic constitution is not subject to
the rule of law but to the arbitrary will of a single individual. But as Locke
points out in his critique of the Hobbesian commonwealth, despotism is
not a form of civil society, because the despot remains in a state of nature
with respect to his subjects. In fact, the situation is exacerbated by the
despot's possession of the coercive power of the state in addition to any
lack of restraint.
Kant himself tacitly recognizes this point. Kant’s argument against
resistance to existing sovereigns is based on the claim that existing regimes
are all empirical instances of the idea of a juridical condition or civil
society as defined by the social contract. But as I noted in the last chapter,
Kant also holds that "the only constitution which derives from the idea of
the original compact, and on which all juridical legislation must be based.
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IS the republican."40 a despotism, then, is not actually an instance of the
idea of a juridical condition as defined by the social contract, and therefore
the reasoning behind Kant's injunction requiring obedience to existing
sovereigns does not hold in such cases.
Rather than construing rebellion against despotism as an
abandonment of a pre-existing civil society for the state of nature, Kant
should have conceived of it as an effort to establish civil society in the first
place. Every person has an obligation to enter into civil society with those
with whom he can come into contact and may be coerced into doing so.
Given that in a despotic regime the despot can not be said to be in civil
society with his fellow persons, he has an obligation to leave the state of
nature and may be coerced into doing so. A rebellion that aims at the
establishment of a republican constitution is nothing more than a
legitimate effort on the part of the despot's subjects to force the despot to
leave the prevailing state of nature and enter into civil society with them.
Nicholson argues that the claim that one can force the sovereign
into acting justly violates the Categorical Imperative. By resisting the
sovereign, the subject treats the sovereign as a means and not as an end
for the sovereign "cannot share the end of being forced to act justly."41
But this construal clearly involves a conflation of means (the use of force)
and ends (justice). Further, if it were impermissible to coerce a person into
acting justly, then civil society itself would be impossible, for that is exactly
what it involves, the use of coercion to secure the conditions of public
justice. By definition, a duty of justice is a duty that one can be forced to
perform. The primary duty of justice is the obligation to enter into civil
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 11.
Nicholson, "Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the Sovereign," p. 222.
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society with one's fellows, a duty that applies as much to the despot as to
any other person.
F. Conclusion
The approach I have just outlined has obvious limitations in that it
serves to legitimate only those revolutions that are directed against
despotic regimes. While this is precisely the situation that Kant and his
contemporaries faced and that continues to plague many peoples today,
the attention of those of us in the West today has shifted from a focus on
despotism to a concern with the citizen’s relation to the laws of modern
republican and liberal democratic regimes. Consequently, I will complete
the project I began in the last section by discussing the nature and extent of
permissible disobedience to such regimes.
Certainly, formally republican regimes are capable of a degree of
corruption and brutality rivaling that of any despotic regime. Further, a
republican constitution is not necessarily democratic, for it is compatible
with all the different forms of sovereignty. Finally, even a republican
regime with de jure democratic sovereignty can be a de facto oligarchy or,
more accurately, plutocracy, which is the problem with modern bourgeois
democracies. According to Kant, it would be wrong under such
circumstances to resort to violence in order to redress the wrongs
committed by the state and reform its operations. This may not satisfy
many an observer, and it certainly does not satisfy this one.
The problem we face here is the necessity of maintaining both
political authority and moral autonomy in the context of an imperfect
civil society. This raises serious conceptual problems within Kant's
theory; nonetheless I think we have already provided the materials for a
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satisfactory resolution of these problems. We need a categorial scheme
that captures the different mixes of legitimacy and illegitimacy in existing
civil societies in such a way that one's decision to disobey the law and the
manner in which that disobedience manifests itself can be guided by well-
grounded principles, rather than being reduced to a matter of arbitrary
judgment As I pointed out in the second section of this Chapter, careful
attention to the differences among civil disobedience, non-violent
resistance, and revolution may enable us to resolve some of the issues
involved here. In short, I will argue that non-violent resistance is
justified with regard to formally oligarchic and monarchic republican
regimes, whereas civil disobedience is legitimate with respect to formally
democratic republics that are plutocratic in operation.
Non-violent resistance combines the rejection of established
authority with the principled repudiation of violent methods of opposing
that authority, which places it somewhere between civil disobedience and
rebellion. This suggests the possibility of rejecting the authority of the
existing sovereign without abandoning civil society and returning to a
state of nature. One's refusal to recognize existing positive law as binding
in any manner constitutes the rejection of the authority of the existing
sovereign, but this is combined with a renunciation of the use of violence,
thus preserving the monopoly on the use of coercion enjoyed by the state.
The state of nature is characterized by the lack of such a monopoly; instead
every person possesses the right to use coercion. The non-violent resister,
however, repudiates that right, while still not accepting the authority of
the state.
We can apply this conception of non-violent resistance to a
republican regimes with a non-democratic form of sovereignty. Given
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that the sovereignty exercised by such a regime is undemocratic, the
regime has no authority to bind its subjects to the performance of the iaw,
and the subjects of such a regime are justified in repudiating it. But in
order not to return to the state of nature, those subjects must at the same
time repudiate the use of violence.
We have already discussed civil disobedience to some extent in the
second section of this chapter. There I put forth a fairly traditional
conception of civil disobedience as combining the acceptance of the
authority of the law and the principled violation of it. The civilly-
disobedient person seeks to express her fidelity or allegiance to the
prevailing system of law in general, even while she rejects the legitimacy
of a particular law or action of the government. This tightrope act is
accomplished by publicly violating a particular law as a protest against
some injustice and then accepting one's punishment as determined by
that law. The unjust character of a specific law or action of the
government justifies the violation of the law, while one’s acceptance of
the legitimacy of the existing authority requires that one accept one's
punishment for that violation. This conception does find some textual
basis in the Kantian corpus and is not inimical to even his exacting
demand for obedience.
Now such political action is quite congenial to the practice of
politics under liberal democratic regimes. Since sovereignty under such
regimes is at least formally democratic, the laws promulgated therein are
binding upon the subjects of the regime. But since such regimes are
imperfect instances of the ideal, the actual laws may be unjust, and
consequently one has no duty to obey them. This tension is resolved by
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the acceptance of authority combined with the rejection of law as
expressed in acts of civil disobedience.
Now I must confess that I am not fully satisfied with even this
rather extensive revision of Kant's position and would like to be able to
argue on Kantian grounds that violent revolution is permissible against
any corrupt and brutal regime, regardless of its form of government or
sovereignty. I think my revision of Kant, based as it is on formal
categories, simply underestimates the ability of a regime, even a formally
democratic one, to institutionalize systematic brutality against those living
under its rule. Unfortunately, this also seems to me to be the best we can
do and still remain within Kant's theoretical framework.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND HISTORY
A. Introduction
In the last Chapter, I examined Kant's views on the limits that
ought to be placed on our efforts to transform flawed civil societies into a
closer approximation of the ideal. This leads one quite naturally to
wonder whether history is friendly to such activity. Is the course of
history such that all our best efforts to improve society will come to
naught or does it favor us in this regard? If the former is the case, then
Kant presents us with an impossible task; but if it be the latter, then we
may take heart in spite of all our setbacks and failures. In this, the final
chapter of my dissertation, I will wrap up my reconstruction by briefly
situating the social contract within Kant's conception of history.
For Kant, the ultimate end of politics and history is the abolition of
war and the establishment of an enduring peace among rational agents.
This is achieved by replacing the arbitrary violence of the state of nature
with a juridical condition in which disputes are settled by appeal to public
law, i.e. by the establishment of civil society as defined by the social
contract. Up to this point, I have considered primarily the relations
among persons within a civil society and its internal structure, with only a
few references to relations among states. In doing so, I have abstracted
from the relations among different states, thereby unduly limiting the
scope of the social contract, which encompasses all rational agents. Even
with the establishment of particular civil societies over the face of the
globe and their continuing internal improvement, the goal of peace will
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remain forever elusive unless different states remove themselves from
the state of nature, just as their individual citizens have already done by
their establishment. The establishment of peace among states is essential
to the establishment of justice for all rational agents. Thus, in the next
section, I will examine Kant’s proposal for the establishment of a
federation of states that would be dedicated to the maintenance of peace
among its members and relate this to his conception of the social contract.
Unless it is possible for us to approximate the ideal, the ideal is an
empty figment of the imagination, for it can not be practical. But given
Kant's thoroughgoing determinism in the realm of appearances,
including history, the process of approximation must not only be possible
but causally necessary. Thus, Kant’s conception of the telos or direction of
history provides the capstone to his political theory. By reconciling the
transcendent character of the idea with the immanent stream of historical
development, Kant’s philosophy of history provides us with the hope that
our actions will be efficacious in contributing to the slow and gradual
evolution towards peaceful coexistence within ideal civil society. In the
third section, I will discuss the process that Kant believes will culminate in
the realization of this political condition.
Finally, I will conclude with some observations as to the status of
these speculations within Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant's use of
teleology here is essentially practical and not theoretical in that it does not
provide us with any knowledge of the future course of human affairs. We
are justified in thinking in this way solely on practical grounds derived
from the needs of our practical reason.
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B. Peace and the Federation of States
The establishment of some form of international political
organization that can eliminate the state of nature is a fundamental
problem of politics, without the solution of which no internally just civil
society can be established and maintained. A stable and just civil order
and its members will always be susceptible to the injustice of violence
committed against it by other states with whom it has no law-governed
relations. Further, the pressure of defense from external threats, real and
imagined, and the excuses thereby provided will always serve to
undermine the exercise and protection of the rights of individual citizens.
Consequently, "the problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution is
dependent upon the problem of a lawful external relation among states
and can not be solved without the solution of the latter problem."^
As I noted in the third chapter, it is a duty of justice for all rational
agents to enter into a juridical condition with all others with whom they
may come into contact; that is, they must establish a civil society. Under
such a condition, the rights of individuals (most importantly, the right of
property), are established and secured, and all interpersonal disputes are
adjudicated on the basis of a public law that can command the universal
assent of rational agents. Arbitrary violence is replaced by law and the
condition of constant war by the condition of peace. As long as
individuals live under separate states whose relations are not governed by
law, however, it can not be said that the duty to enter into civil society has
U Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 18.
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been fully discharged, for no one will be in a full-fledged juridical
condition with all other rational agents. In particular, one will not occupy
that position vis a vis members of civil societies other than one's own.
Now it is not quite accurate to say that the citizens of different states
are wholly in a state of nature vis a vis each other. Individuals generally
encounter each other in the midst of some civil society or other, and their
interactions are subject to the public law of that particular state.^ But
insofar as their respective home states are in a state of nature vis a vis each
other, neither can they be truly said to be in a juridical condition with one
another. Further, the public law governing interpersonal relations will be
neither universally-legislated nor universally-binding, a marked
deviation from the idea of the social contract as including all rational
agents who may come into contact with each other.
In the absence of a some supra-state political organization, states
remain in a state of nature with each other. Even though hostilities may
not have broken out, this condition is in effect one of constant war with
individual states having the right to act in any manner they deem fit,
unencumbered by any enforceable legal obligations towards other states
and their citizens. Just as individuals are obligated to leave the anarchic
condition of the state of nature, so must states do likewise; otherwise
disputes can only be settled by violence and not through adjudication in
accordance with public law as commanded by the principles of right. The
social contract must be completed by the political integration of individual
states.
There are of course some cases in which interactions among persons do not take place in
the context of any civil society and its laws, on the high seas for instance.
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Kant states the whole of his reasoning on this matter quite
succinctly in Section 54 of the Metaphysical Elements of Justice :
(1) With regard to their external relationship to one
another, states are naturally in a non-juridical condition (like
lawless savages).
(2) This condition is a state of war (the right of the
stronger), even though there may not be an actual war or
continuous fighting (hostility). Nevertheless (inasmuch as
neither side wants to have it better), it is still a condition that
is in the highest degree unjust, and it is a condition that states
are obligated to abandon.
(3) A league of nations in accordance with the Idea of
an original social contract is necessary, not, indeed, in order
to to meddle in one another's internal dissensions, but in
order to afford protection against external aggression.
(4) But this alliance must not involve a sovereign
authority (as in a civil constitution), but only a confederation.
Such an alliance can be renounced at any time and therefore
must be renewed from time to time. This is a right that
follows as a corollary in subsidium from another right, which
is original, namely, the right to protect oneself against the
danger of becoming involved in a actual war among the
adherents of the confederation.
3
I quote this passage at length because it is Kant's clearest and most concise
statement on this matter and worthy of some detailed consideration. In
my discussion of Kant's position, I will follow the outline presented in
this passage.
I have already discussed somewhat points one and two of Section
54. Since states are not subject to a public law enforced by some recognized
authority, they occupy a state of nature. The state of nature is a state of war
even if there are no hostilities for there always exists the threat of them;
consequently, states "may be judged to injure another merely by their
coexistence in the state of nature (i.e. while independent of external
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 116.
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laws)."4 But just as individuals ought to exit the state of nature and
relinquish their "lawless freedom" for the "rational freedom" of the
juridical condition, so individual states are obligated to do likewise: "Each
of them may and should for the sake of its own security demand that the
others enter with it into a constitution similar to the civil constitution, for
under such a constitution each can be secure in his right."5
This civil constitution, however, differs markedly from that which
governs the internal affairs of a particular civil society. One might expect
Kant to espouse some conception of world republicanism, but instead he
opts for a loosely-connected league of states dedicated solely to the
preservation of peace among its members and their protection from
external threats. This league would have no legislative authority over its
members and would be forbidden to interfere in their internal affairs.
Membership in the league would be purely voluntary, with each state
retaining the right to quit the league "at any time." As we shall see, this
proposal is far from satisfactory.
Kant's basic claim that states must leave the state of nature and
enter into a condition governed by "a constitution similar to the civic
constitution" in accord with "the Idea of the original social contract"
suggests a far higher degree of political integration than that provided for
by his conception of a league of states. The idea of the social contract
governs relations between persons and not states, and it is only by treating
each state as a "moral" person analogous to a real person that Kant is able
to extend this notion to an agreement among states. But it is far from clear
that this analogy is appropriate. If we take the idea of the social contract
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 16.
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 16.
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seriously, then we must conclude from the universality of its application
that all persons ought to enter into civil society with each other,
unmediated and undivided by particular states. In his Fifth Thesis on
history, Kant himself recognizes this point: "The greatest problem for the
human race, to the solution of which Nature drives man, is the
achievement of a universal civil society which administers law among
men."6 Now the analogy of states with persons may be useful in thinking
about the structure of this projected "universal civil society," but Kant
uses this analogy to produce only a pale reflection of the civil constitution
established by the idea of the social contract, one hardly deserving of the
name.
Kant's proposed league is devoid of any real political authority, for
it lacks the power to promulgate and enforce public laws on its members,
such as is established by a civil constitution. The absence of legislative
authority has far-reaching consequences for the viability of Kant's project.
Kant argues that each member of the league will be protected against
external aggression by the combined force of the league as a whole rather
than being dependent solely on its own resources: "In a league of nations,
even the smallest state could expect security and justice, not from its own
power and by its own decrees, but only from this great league of nations
(Foedus Amphictyonum) from a united power acting according to
Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 16. My emphasis on the theoretical necessity of
a univeral civil society for Kant is further bolstered by his claim that the whole world can
be conceived of as an original community of land: "any piece of land that is possessed by an
inhabitant of the earth and on which he lives is only a part of a determinate whole, and as
such, everyone can be conceived as originally having a right to it."(Kant, Metaphysical
Elements of lustice. p. 125) Since property is only possible in civil society, then all
inhabitants ought to enter into a universal civil society with each other. Until that time,
all claims to property represent nothing more than arbitrary usurpations on the part of
individuals and their respective states.
277
decisions reached under the laws of their united will."7 But where is this
"united power acting according to the decisions reached under their
united will" to be found in the league of states? The answer is nowhere.
Under the social contract, the united will simply is the legislative
authority binding civil society together, but this same authority is lacking
in Kant's proposed league of states.
This absence of real unity is further underscored by the right of exit
that each state retains upon entering into the league. By granting to each
state the right to exit the league whenever it so chooses, a right not
similarly granted to individual persons under the terms of the social
contract, Kant essentially preserves the state of nature among states. As
long as states are permitted to enter and exit the league as they please, each
individual state will remain the arbiter of its own fate and will retain the
right to act in any manner it sees fit, being checked only by the forces
arrayed against it. Consequently, the member-states of the league will not
have forsworn the use of violence, as is required of persons upon entrance
into the social contract. Moreover, this provision seriously weakens the
ability of the league to perform its assigned task. No state can seriously
expect the united power of the whole to protect it when each state is able to
exempt itself from such service as it sees fit. Ultimately, the only bond
available to this league is the narrow calculations of self-interest by each
member-state. While self-interest may, as Kant argues, drive each state
into establishing the league, it can hardly serve as the glue that holds it
together over the long haul.
Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 19.
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In sum, Kants leaguG of statGS lacks GVGry distinguishing
characteristic of a civil constitution. It seems a bit far-fetched, then, to
describe this arrangement as similar to that established by a civil
constitution. Rather than a social contract among states, we have little
more than an alliance that is always at risk of being scattered to the four
winds.
In a curious passage in section 61 of the Metaphysical Elements of
Justice, Kant himself acknowledges the validity of this point. Kant begins
by pointing to a concrete historical approximation of what he calls a
"permanent congress of states" (i.e., his proposed league of states) and then
noting its failure.^ This paragraph is then followed by another in which
he reiterates the limitations of this "congress" and implicitly commits
himself to the moral necessity of a closer union of states, citing the United
States as a example of this sort of union:
A congress in the sense intended here is merely a free and
arbitrary combination of various states that can be dissolved
at any time. As such, it should not be confused with a union
(such as that of the American states) that is founded on a
political constitution and which therefore can not be
dissolved. Only through the latter kind of union can the Idea
of the kind of public Law of nations that should be
established become a reality, so that nations will settle their
differences in a civilized way by juridical process, rather than
in the barbaric way (of savages), namely, through war.9
The fulfillment of the social contract, then, in Kant’s own mind, requires
more than just the establishment of a league of states; it requires their real
union.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of liisticc, p. 124. Kant refers to the assembly of states-
general at the Hague in the first half of the eighteenth century.
Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Tustice, p. 124-5.
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In fairness, Kant does have his reasons for settling for the
unsatisfactory arrangement of his proposed league of states. First, he
argues that it is unrealistic to expect that the sovereigns of individual
states will give up their authority and transfer it to some higher political
entity:
For states in their relation to each other, there can not be any
reasonable way out of the lawless condition which entails
only war except that they, like individual men, should give
up their savage (lawless) freedom, adjust themselves to the
constraints of public law, and thus establish a continuously
growing state consisting of various nations (civitas gentium),
which will ultimately include all the nations of the world.
But under the idea of the law of nations they do not wish
this, and reject in practice what is correct in theory. If all is
not to be lost, there can be, then, in place of the positive idea
of a world republic, only the negative surrogate of an alliance
which averts war, endures, spreads, and holds back the
stream of those hostile passions which fear the law, though
such an alliance is in constant peril of their breaking loose
again. ^0
This argument, however, explicitly accepts the subordination of
considerations of justice to empirical judgments of what is realistic in the
near future ("nations reject in practice what is correct in theory"). In
putting forth this argument, Kant succumbs to the very same weakness
that he so often warns us against-- subordinating the ideal to the real,
theory to practice— leaving us with only a "surrogate" arrangement so that
something can be salvaged.
But we are concerned here with the ideal, the integrity of which
ought to preserved and not diluted by the considerations he adduces. Nor
is it clear that he need do so. Rather than just accepting the intransigence
of existing states by conceding that the league of states is the end-point of
Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. 19-20.
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our action, Kant could have argued that this is nothing more than a
necessary stepping-stone to the final goal of a world republic, a position
that would better accord with the idea of a social contract and his own
evolutionary view of history. Kant makes a similar point in his own
discussion of despotism, maintaining that despotism, though contrary to
the principles of justice, has served historically to accustom persons to the
authority of law.^^ Similarly, Kant could have argued that the league of
states, while inadequate in itself, serves the historical purpose of
accustoming states to higher level of political integration and the rule of
international law, thus paving the way for the establishment of universal
civil society. The establishment of the league of states would then be a
necessary step in the construction of more-encompassing political and
legal institutions in the form of a world republic. This position would
accord well with his conception of an idea as model for slow, gradual
approximation in history while maintaining the purity of the ideal.
Kant’s second argument is a more serious one and does not suffer
from any inconsistency with the rest of his theory. Kant argues that,
because of the vast extent of the territory it would cover, a world republic
would eventually degenerate into a world tyranny subversive of the
principles of right and from there slide into anarchy: "Although this
condition is itself a state of war (unless a federative union prevents an
outbreak of hostilities), this is rationally preferable to the amalgamation of
states under one superior power, as this would end in one universal
monarch, and laws always lose in vigor what government gains in extent;
hence a soulless despotism falls into anarchy after stifling the seeds of the
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 38.
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good."^2 Technological advances in communication and travel have
probably reduced the force of this argument somewhat, but Kant does
displays a sensitivity in this argument to the serious problem of
centralization and decentralization inherent in any democratic polity.
Following Rousseau, Kant recognizes that the more remote the
government is from the individual citizen, the less responsive and
accountable and the more burdensome it is to him or her.^3 The
amalgamation of smaller political units into larger ones increases the
remoteness between government and individual citizen, with the extreme
limit being reached at the level of the world as a whole.
In response to these concerns, Kant reaches for the correct solution of this
problem- some type of federation or confederation of states- but fails
sufficiently to bind together the political units of the world system.
C. The Mechanism of History
Kant is not satisfied simply to advance a scheme for the
establishment of a lasting peace among states. After setting forth his
proposal, he proceeds to argue that his proposed arrangement will
inevitably be realized in the course of history. This latter claim is implied
by the combination of his acceptance of the proposition that ought implies
can along with his commitment to determinism at the phenomenal level.
In order for the idea of the social contract to be practical, Kant must
show that civil society can be gradually transformed into a closer and
closer approximation of the ideal defined by the contract. Since one is not
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 31. See also Metaphysical Elements of justice,
p. 124.
For Rousseau's views on this matter, see The Social Contract (Book II, Chapter 9), pp.
90-93.
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obligated to do that which one cannot do, one would not be obligated to
promote the end of perpetual peace if one's actions could not possibly
contribute to its realization. Thus Kant must demonstrate that it is
possible to establish an enduring peace in accord with the social contract,
or at least its approximation.^^ g^t given his thoroughgoing
determinism, the entire course of history is determined in accordance
with universal laws of nature, and consequently any thing or event that is
contrary to the operation of those laws is impossible, not logically
impossible but causally impossible. Thus, in order to prove that perpetual
peace can be achieved, Kant must demonstrate that the process of history
will inevitably lead to a closer and closer approximation of the ideal. In
order to show how this is to come about, the historical process must be
described purely in terms of natural necessity.
For Kant, then, "the guarantee of perpetual peace is nothing less
than that great artist, nature (natura daedala rerum). Nature provides
the mainspring of cultural and political development in the form of
humanity's unsociable sociability— "their propensity to enter into society,
bound together with a mutual opposition that threatens to break up the
society."^^ ygis characteristic draws persons into society with each other,
but it also makes that society tumultuous. Human social interactions are
This raises a rather tricky point in my interpretation of Kant. Kant clearly believes
that his proposal for a league of states that would establish and guarantee a permanent
peace is realizable. On the other hand, an ideal is never fully realizable in history, but
only an ever-closer approximation to it. These two points are not contradictory because
Kant, as I have already demonstrated, did not really believe that his proposal for a league
of states was the ideal arrangement; rather it was the only feasible one. Thus, we can
either talk about the realization of Kant's proposal for perpetual peace or the gradual
approximation of ideal civil society in history. In either case, my point still holds- Kant
needs to show that the course of history inevitably leads to whichever of these two goals
we specify. I have tried to frame my discussion so that it finesses this point.
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 24.
1^- Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 15.
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analogous to the interaction of physical matter in that both are governed
by opposing forces of attraction and repulsion. Human beings are drawn
into society by an inclination to associate with others, because in society
he feels himself to be more than man, i.e. as more than the developed
form of his natural capacities."^ ^ But countering this natural inclination
of attraction is a force of repulsion in the form of each persons' desire "to
have everything to according to his own wish." Expecting opposition on
all sides, individuals are forced to overcome their natural slothfulness and
develop their talents to the fullest.
Without the regulation of human affairs, human society is
impossible, for the unsociable nature of persons will always place the
existence of society at risk. The constant quarrelling among different
persons, each seeking to have his or her own way, produces a continual
disorder that threatens to tear apart the fabric of social life. Consequently,
individuals are eventually forced to submit themselves to public law
backed up by irresistible force in order to overcome their perpetual discord
and maintain the continued existence of society. This is reinforced by
external pressure from other peoples, which makes civil society necessary
for mutual self-defense against external aggressors.
Similar forces are at work with respect to different states. Every
state exists in a state of nature with every other state. By its very existence,
each state constitutes a threat to its neighbors, which must constantly
prepare to defend themselves against that threat. Eventually, open
warfare amongst neighboring states breaks out. The continual devastation
of recurring wars and the bankruptcy generated by constant preparation for
Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 15.
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war will eventually lead states to the conclusion that they must leave the
state of nature prevailing in the international arena and construct political
institutions that will rectify that situation. Thus, states will slowly be lead
to enter into a federation of states from pure self-interest and not from
considerations of right.
The establishment and spread of republicanism serves to strengthen
and greatly advance this process, for, as 1 noted in Chapter Five, republican
regimes are inherently inclined against war. No state "can neglect its
internal cultural development without losing power and influence
among the others," a loss that in the prevailing state of nature among
states could threaten its very survival. Thus, rulers are forced to reform
the governments of their respective states not from good intentions but
from basic necessity. These reforms inevitably lead to the organization of
existing civil societies in accordance with the principles of right, thus
greatly increasing the freedom of individuals with beneficial effects for the
entire society. Kant adopts the position of Adam Smith here: the private
pursuit of self-interest is coordinated by the invisible hand of the market
to produce the greater good of the whole. Any interference with personal
freedom would have the direst consequences for the strength of the state,
for "when the citizen is hindered in seeking his own welfare in his own
way, so long as it is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of
the entire enterprise is sapped, and therewith the powers of the whole are
diminished. "^8 Since the republican constitution is the only one that
accords with the principles of justice, existing states will also undertake to
Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 22.
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reform themselves by adopting such constitutions, and republicanism will
slowly spread across the face of the Earth.
This, in brief, is the process that Kant expects to lead to world peace,
and at no point in his depiction of it does he allow moral motives to enter
into his scheme. Since pure practical reason belongs only to noumenal
agents, Kant can not allow himself the liberty of attributing such motives
to phenomenal historical agents. Only natural causes, i.e. sensuous
motives, are acceptable in the characterization of this historical process.
With the development of weapons of mass destruction, the
problem of establishing peace has acquired increased urgency in our time.
While we may not be as sanguine today as Kant was about the pacific
effects of unrestrained capitalist commerce, there is fortunately some
evidence that Kant's predictions and hopes are not wholly unfounded.
The latter half of the twentieth century has seen increased political and
economic integration, most notably, in the establishment of international
political and legal institutions. However weak and open to manipulation
these institutions may be at the present time, they do hold out the prospect
of and provide the basis for stronger institutions in the future that could
check the proclivity to war and aggrandizement.
D. Conclusion
As I noted in the second chapter, Kant's division of being into
phenomena (the realm of nature) and noumena (the realm of freedom)
allows him to resolve the conflict between freedom and determinism, as
expressed in the third antinomy. As noumenal agents, we are free and
subject to the dictates of pure practical reason, even though when
considered as phenomena our actions are causally determined in strict
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accordance with universal laws of natural necessity. We may be held
responsible for our actions because as noumena we construct phenomenal
nature through the activity of synthesis. Essentially, Kant’s philosophy of
history is the application of the resolution of that antinomy to history and
society. He reveals something of this in the opening lines of his Idea for a
Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View :
Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point
of view, concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its
appearances, which are human actions, like every other
natural event are determined by universal laws. However
obscure their causes, history, which is concerned with
narrating these appearances, permits us to hope that if we
attend to the play of freedom of the will in the large, we may
be able to discern a regular movement in it, and that what
seems complex and chaotic in the single individual may be
seen from the standpoint of the human race as a whole to be
a steady progressive though slow evolution of its original
endowment.
This application is effected through the use of teleology as the
supersensible substrate of the sensible world, with the telos of history
uniting the freedom of agents with the mechanism of nature:
Hence an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the
concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept
of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition from the
sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the
theoretical use of reason) is possible, just as if they were two
different worlds, the first of which can not have any
influence on the second; and yet the second is to have an
influence on the first, i.e., the concept of freedom is to
actualize in the world of sense the purpose enjoined by its
laws. Hence it must be possible to think of nature as being
such that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize with at
least the possibility of the purposes that we are to achieve in
nature in according to laws of freedom. So there must after
all be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies nature
Kant, "Idea for a Universal History,” p. 11.
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and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains
practically, even though the concept this basis does not reach
cognition of it either theoretically or practically and hence
does not have a domain of its own, though it does make
possible the transition from one way of thinking in terms of
principles of nature to our way of thinking in terms of
principles of freedom.20
The transition from freedom to nature is provided by the concept of telos
or purpose of history. Through this concept, we are provided with no
theoretical knowledge; rather, it serves as the basis for a practical faith in
the prospects for the success of our historical endeavors, a faith that is
necessary for action.
Reason possesses no compelling theoretical interest in formulating
any conjectures about the direction of history; rather this interest is
derived from the needs of practical reason alone. We possess no
theoretical insight into the direction of history, for "we do not infer or
observe this providence in the cunning contrivances of nature." Such
insight would require an understanding of the supersensible that is
beyond our reach; instead, we must supply the design from our own
minds, in accordance with the ends specified by practical reason, and
"conceive of its possibility by analogy to actions of human art." Thus,
while the telos of history "is transcendent from a theoretical point of view;
from a practical standpoint, with respect, for example, to the ideal of
perpetual peace, the concept is dogmatic and its reality is well established,
and thus the mechanism of nature may be employed to that end."^^ Our
thinking about the teleology of history, then, is regulated by our need to
assume the possibility of the ideas and ends specified by practical reason.
20- Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 14-15.
2h Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. 25-26.
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